Air Crash Thread: Boeing MAX and Other Problems

So, what does this actually mean? Boeing knew all along that its new 737 MAX had a defective sensor even way before the Lion Air crash had happened last November 2018?

https://www.npr.org/2019/05/06/7205...ensor-problem-before-plane-crash-in-indonesia

It seems that they were aware that the Disagree sensor (or warning) was optional when they claim they'd intended it to be an automatic inclusion with all MAX orders. I guess time will tell the truth of this - did Boeing really intend that or are they blaming this "third party fault" and thereby reducing their own exposure to the liability?

I'm not sure they're saying that the physical sensor itself was faulty - and if they did think it was I doubt they would try to cover that up if a third party would be responsible for funding replacements.

The obvious question now is this: if Boeing were aware that a system they'd intended to be included in all MAX aircraft was in fact optional, how did it get to that point and were their next steps conducted with adequate urgency?
 
The CEO of Boeing is facing calls to step down. He is accused of fostering a corporate culture which places shareholder profit above engineering excellence.
05042019_Muilenburg_212850-780x534.jpg

Boeing chairman and CEO Dennis Muilenburg is shown at a 2018 meeting with President Donald Trump. Muilenburg was appointed Boeing CEO in 2015. (Carolyn Kaster / AP)

By
Paul Roberts
Seattle Times business reporter
The question seemed to catch Dennis Muilenburg off guard.

At the press conference that followed Boeing’s annual shareholders’ meeting April 29, the company’s CEO was asked if he had considered resigning over the 737 MAX crisis.

Muilenburg paused for a long moment before declaring that his “clear intent is to continue to lead on the front of safety and quality and integrity.”

“It was a yes or no question,” says Scott Hamilton, a Seattle-area aerospace analyst, who watched the press conference remotely. Muilenburg’s tepid response seemed “incredibly telling. Something else seems to be going on in the background.”

That’s probably an understatement.

Muilenburg is unquestionably a man on the spot. Just months ago Aviation Week named him Person of the Year, styling him “The Transformer” for his impact on Boeing and the industry.

Today, Muilenburg’s company is reeling not only from two fatal crashes of its most important aircraft, but also from suspicions that safety may have suffered in the push to get the MAX to market.

“These are economic decisions made at the top of the company,” said Jim Hall, a former chair of the National Transportation Safety Board, referring to Boeing’s focus on cost and schedule considerations in the process of certifying airplane safety.


Even blunter was consumer-safety advocate Ralph Nader, whose great niece perished in the second MAX 737 crash. “You and your team should forfeit your compensation and should resign forthwith,” Nader wrote in an April 25 letter.

In Muilenburg’s defense, the 737 MAX program was launched in 2011, four years before he became CEO.

But Muilenburg oversaw the aircraft’s final development and was in charge during the company’s widely criticized handling of the crashes.

More fundamentally, under Muilenburg, Boeing has intensified efforts to boost “shareholder value” by turning out more more airplanes even as it has wrung more costs from its supply chain and its workforce.

Those efforts have paid off — Boeing’s share price has more than tripled under Muilenburg. But some critics wonder whether the drive to please Wall Street has not only strained Boeing’s production systems, but also fundamentally altered its culture, resulting in what veteran aerospace analyst Richard Aboulafia has characterized as a “deprioritization and perhaps under-resourcing of engineering.”

Whether such a culture shift contributed to the MAX crisis may be a question for the various crash investigations now underway. But it raises a serious dilemma for Muilenburg and his overseers on the company’s board.


“If the decision was made to cut a corner by someone on the manufacturing side, then [Muilenburg] has to hold that person accountable in order to exert some leadership,” says Lawrence Parnell, an expert in strategic public relations at George Washington University who has closely followed the MAX crisis.

But if the MAX problem turns out to be more deeply rooted in Boeing’s culture, Parnell says, Muilenburg may find himself in a bind. “It’s very difficult for somebody who is a product of the culture, and now is charge of the culture, to change that culture,” Parnell says. “And unless he or she is very decisive, you end up in the same place.”

Talk to us
We continue to seek information on the design, training and certification of the Boeing 737 MAX. If you have insights, please get in touch with aerospace reporter Dominic Gates at 206-464-2963 or dgates@seattletimes.com. To communicate on a confidential and encrypted channel, follow the options available at https://st.news/newstips.
Muilenburg’s appointment to CEO in 2015 was itself something of a culture correction.

Where predecessor Jim McNerney was a company outsider — a finance and management expert brought in from General Electric and 3M — Muilenburg was the quintessential Boeing man: an aerospace engineer who had been with the company since a 1985 college internship.

Certainly, Muilenburg brought a different style. Where McNerney was notoriously tough on workers (he forced Boeing’s machinists to give up their pensions in return for keeping 777X production in Everett), Muilenburg pushed for a much friendlier deal with the company’s engineers soon after becoming CEO.

Yet the fact is that Muilenburg was McNerney’s handpicked successor — and overall, he hasn’t strayed from Boeing’s longstanding main objectives.


https://www.seattletimes.com/busine...ngs-ceo-faces-questions-about-his-own-future/
 
It seems that they were aware that the Disagree sensor (or warning) was optional when they claim they'd intended it to be an automatic inclusion with all MAX orders. I guess time will tell the truth of this - did Boeing really intend that or are they blaming this "third party fault" and thereby reducing their own exposure to the liability?

I'm not sure they're saying that the physical sensor itself was faulty - and if they did think it was I doubt they would try to cover that up if a third party would be responsible for funding replacements.

The obvious question now is this: if Boeing were aware that a system they'd intended to be included in all MAX aircraft was in fact optional, how did it get to that point and were their next steps conducted with adequate urgency?
So what will Boeing do now? Lol.
 

So what will Boeing do now? Lol.

They wait. They can't do anything until at least one of the crash reports is formally released. Firing people too soon for perceived mis-management (or worse) could be seen as a tacit admission of guilt. It might also turn out to be the wrong thing to do without knowing exactly what happened on those planes.

I agree that it seems very likely that some senior figures at Boeing should (and probably will) cease to be employed by the company in one way or another, but this probably isn't the right moment for that to happen.
 
They wait. They can't do anything until at least one of the crash reports is formally released. Firing people too soon for perceived mis-management (or worse) could be seen as a tacit admission of guilt. It might also turn out to be the wrong thing to do without knowing exactly what happened on those planes.

I agree that it seems very likely that some senior figures at Boeing should (and probably will) cease to be employed by the company in one way or another, but this probably isn't the right moment for that to happen.
I don't want to compare but I'm glad that Airbus does not have any kind of similar issues in their aircrafts.
 
I don't want to compare but I'm glad that Airbus does not have any kind of similar issues in their aircrafts.

Well, they can. Airbus gave their systems executive powers many years ago. Several Airbuses have had problems (some terminally) due to problems across Normal Law and Alternate Law. Sometimes that was down to the sensors, sometimes down to the systems, and sometimes down to a lack of recognition of events by crews.
 
Well, they can. Airbus gave their systems executive powers many years ago. Several Airbuses have had problems (some terminally) due to problems across Normal Law and Alternate Law. Sometimes that was down to the sensors, sometimes down to the systems, and sometimes down to a lack of recognition of events by crews.
But that was a long time ago and they seem to have fixed that. I'm referring to about the current situation here.
 
But that was a long time ago and they seem to have fixed that. I'm referring to about the current situation here.

It's not a comparison I'd like to be sure of as problems often aren't known about until they cause an accident. I wouldn't dare say "Airbus does not have any kind of similar issues". In fact, we don't know exactly what the issues were in these two crashes outside a common uncommanded pitch down. They seem driven by sensor failures, and that's a possibility common to almost all aircraft.
 
It's not a comparison I'd like to be sure of as problems often aren't known about until they cause an accident. I wouldn't dare say "Airbus does not have any kind of similar issues". In fact, we don't know exactly what the issues were in these two crashes outside a common uncommanded pitch down. They seem driven by sensor failures, and that's a possibility common to almost all aircraft.
Well, honestly, I didn't just say that out of nowhere. I just believe that if Airbus also currently have some common issues with their aircrafts that could lead to potential disasters, then there would already be news for that which would be immediately spread worldwide but so far, they're doing alright. We can never say though if or when something unfortunate happens for them, especially as it can be all of a sudden.
 
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This story has been one long uncommanded pitch down for Boeing the entire time. I'm starting to wonder when we'll finally reach the bottom.
 
Based on my understanding of what occurs, it's not surprising to me that a simulator can't simulate aerodynamic control surface loading.
Maybe the system was specifically designed to only replicate erroneous inputs made on the aircraft and not the malfunctioning of its part along with the dangerous effects once it occurs.
 
From today's edition of the The Seattle Times:

Kirkland consultant questioned for six hours in criminal probe of Boeing 737 MAX crashes
May 20, 2019 at 4:03 pm Updated May 20, 2019 at 5:00 pm




By
Steve Miletich
Seattle Times staff reporter


While Boeing’s push to lift the grounding of the 737 MAX is making headlines, federal prosecutors have been quietly gathering information to determine if criminal conduct contributed to two deadly crashes of the troubled jetliner.


The prosecutors have been tight-lipped about the investigation, which only came to light when they began issuing subpoenas. They have refused to even acknowledge the existence of the investigation, largely because of strict rules that prohibit them from discussing secret grand-jury proceedings.

But a window into their work emerged from a recent meeting in Washington, D.C., between prosecutors and a Kirkland-based consultant who has raised questions about Boeing’s development of the plane.

While the consultant, Peter Lemme, was originally subpoenaed to appear before the grand jury, he instead underwent six hours of close questioning by two prosecutors in the U.S. Justice Department’s Fraud Section, at least one federal agent and several other people.

“They’re thorough,” said Lemme, a former Boeing flight-controls engineer who is now an avionics and satellite-communications consultant.

The Department of Transportation’s Inspector General and the FBI are participating in the probe, according to informed sources who have spoken on condition of anonymity because of the confidential nature of the inquiry.

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Lemme agreed to describe the general parameters of his discussion, but said he’d abide by the prosecutors’ request not to divulge specific questions that they said might taint or influence the testimony of other witnesses.

Although Lemme has no direct personal knowledge of the airplane’s development or certification, he performed a detailed analysis of the first crash, in which a Lion Air 737 MAX 8 plunged into the Java Sea shortly after takeoff from Jakarta on Oct. 29, killing 189 people.

He was extensively cited as an expert in The Seattle Times in a March 17 story about the crashes, and in multiple other press accounts.

Lemme received a grand-jury subpoena on April 1, weeks after the second crash of a 737 MAX, this time an Ethiopian Airlines plane on March 10 near Addis Ababa. That crash, which killed 157 people, led to the international grounding of the MAX fleet and Boeing’s ongoing efforts to gain approval of its fix to a new flight-control system on the plane.

The subpoena directed Lemme to surrender emails and other records, which he provided.

He agreed to meet on May 10 with the investigative team, a member of which, he said, arrived with a notebook with Lemme’s name on it and 22 tabs with excerpts of material he had provided.

“I would say they did their homework,” Lemme said.

During the meeting, he said, he highlighted his perceptions of “shortcomings” in the development of the MAX based on available information about its production.

Most of the questions came from Cory Jacobs, a Justice Department attorney, Lemme said. Lemme’s grand-jury subpoena listed Jacobs and a second Justice Department attorney, Carol Sipperly, as contacts.

While the attorneys listened intently to particular answers, they were “not assuming, or gunning for someone,” Lemme recalled.

Most of the questions focused on Boeing and the company’s processes rather than the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) certification of the plane, he said.

There were questions about the March 17 Seattle Times story, written by Dominic Gates, that drew widespread attention. The story detailed how FAA managers pushed its engineers to delegate more of the certification process to Boeing itself, and detailed flaws in an original safety analysis that Boeing delivered to the FAA.

It isn’t known if others have met with prosecutors or appeared before the grand jury, which seems to be meeting on certain Fridays in Washington, D.C. No charges have been brought.


Boeing has refused to acknowledge it is under criminal investigation, saying only in a recent securities filing that it is “fully cooperating with all ongoing governmental and regulatory investigations and inquiries relating to the accidents and the 737 MAX program.”

The company did announce on May 1 the appointment of a newly created czarto oversee all legal matters arising from the crashes.

J. Michael Luttig, a former federal appeals court judge who has served as Boeing’s general counsel since 2006, was named counselor and senior adviser to Boeing Chairman and CEO Dennis Muilenburg and the company’s board of directors.
 
"The story detailed how FAA managers pushed its engineers to delegate more of the certification process to Boeing itself" - that's interesting, my presumption (and that of the august press) was that Boeing had pushed to take more control themselves. If it's shown that the FAA was actively pushing certification onto Boeing than the complexion of the matter changes somewhat.

If the FAA are shown to be civilly or criminally liable who makes the payout - the US taxpayer?
 
Payout to whom? The government isn't going to fine itself. Crash victims? Probably it would be just criminal charges.

Insurance companies will be making big payouts and, presumably, seeking to recoup costs from any organisation that can be found responsible.

Looks like I may have been right about a bird strike to the AoA sensor.

Indeed. I'm not sure that exonerates Boeing (or the FAA), the sensor was working or it wasn't. It wasn't - and that's what allowed the MCAS spiral to begin. A faulty (or totally smashed) AoA sensor shouldn't bring a plane down, especially if it's a state-of-the-art modern plane.

Birds, mostly. :dunce:

You tree'd me with that, see my answer above. Birds broke a sensor. There's no suggestion they caused enough damage to the engines to bring the plane down.
 
I don't find it likely that the FAA is going to be compensating insurance companies for this.

Yup, looking into it further the FAA has been protected by the SC in a case where a design failure (a certified fire-containing rubbish bin which failed to contain a fire), I still think that if the FAA are found to be at fault in the certification process we might see an effort to reclaim damages down a new legal avenue - insurances payouts will surely approach half a billion dollars.
 
I'm starting to feel like Boeing is going to need (and, in the event, definitely would receive) a bailout in the coming months....
 
As far as orders go they still have plenty on the books for other types, and it depends on what you call a "bailout". Boeing have received significant Federal grants for years in one form or another.

Things like this start to cascade. People are hesitant to fly on 737 max, airlines ask for compensation, Boeing's share value starts to decline as their losses mount, people lose faith in the company and sell off the stock, Boeing's accounts start to look really dry and R&D takes a hit, then more problems happen...etc. I'm not saying it will happen, I'm just saying it's plausible.
 
As far as orders go they still have plenty on the books for other types, and it depends on what you call a "bailout". Boeing have received significant Federal grants for years in one form or another.

Not only that, they have received massive tax advantages and other perquisites form Washington State and King County. Probably also from Chicago, North Carolina, etc. Boeing is a giant money-making machine. The stock has quadrupled from it historical levels.

Things like this start to cascade. People are hesitant to fly on 737 max, airlines ask for compensation, Boeing's share value starts to decline as their losses mount, people lose faith in the company and sell off the stock, Boeing's accounts start to look really dry and R&D takes a hit, then more problems happen...etc. I'm not saying it will happen, I'm just saying it's plausible.

I'm sure they are running scared, and they should be. Sadly, only a few heads will roll, a few bold new policies rolled out, and soon they will be back to their corrupted ways. We cannot turn back the hands of time.
 
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