Abortion

  • Thread starter Danoff
  • 2,611 comments
  • 138,101 views
Instead of creating a new thread, thought I'd put this here since the discussion revolves around foetal rights:

Mother Accuses Doctors of Forcing a C-Section and Files Suit

NYTimes
After two cesarean sections, Rinat Dray wanted to give birth naturally.

But when she arrived at Staten Island University Hospital in labor, the doctor immediately began pressuring her, she said, to have a C-section.

The doctor told her the baby would be in peril and her uterus would rupture if she did not; he told her that she would be committing the equivalent of child abuse and that her baby would be taken away from her, she said in an interview this week.

After several hours of trying to deliver vaginally and arguing with the doctors, Mrs. Dray was wheeled to an operating room, where her baby was delivered surgically.

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/17/n...-forcing-a-c-section-and-files-suit.html?_r=1
 
After several hours of trying for a vaginal delivery then medicine's responsibility to the unborn person's wellbeing outweighs the mother's birth preference... that's practically established, I believe.

I don't see that this has anything to do with foetal rights though, surely noone's arguing that right for a person who happens to still be umbilical?
 
After several hours of trying for a vaginal delivery then medicine's responsibility to the unborn person's wellbeing outweighs the mother's birth preference... that's practically established, I believe.

Why?

(also several hours is not much)
 

Why what? Why does an umbilical person's wellbeing outweigh an thinking adult's choice?

I know I'll never move you from your ultra-Libertarian view, but here's my own opinion. As societies we should raise healthy, confident well-educated children. That means that as a society we take collective responsibility for welfare and define those responsiblities in law. We provide free health, free education, and we accept that sometimes society as a whole is empowered to override the wishes of a parent as an individual (in carefully judged and balanced consideration).

We see America today with the worst-educated middle class children in the modern world (normally a good benchmark for a system overall), we see policing combined with politicking and business wealth, we see big businesses refusing to pay tax leaving their employees to receive welfare aid from the country, we see a country that refuses to provide broad healthcare to its citizens because of an apparent fear from taxpayers that someone else might get more than them out of the system. Historically the US has eschewed the modernised views of many other societies and in my view we see her in poor shape because of it.

(also several hours is not much)

Depends on the birth, and how many are several. In this case the qualified MDs took a judgement on how the number of hours affected the young person's survival chances.
 
We see America today with the worst-educated middle class children in the modern world (normally a good benchmark for a system overall), we see policing combined with politicking and business wealth, we see big businesses refusing to pay tax leaving their employees to receive welfare aid from the country, we see a country that refuses to provide broad healthcare to its citizens because of an apparent fear from taxpayers that someone else might get more than them out of the system. Historically the US has eschewed the modernised views of many other societies and in my view we see her in poor shape because of it.

Would love to see sources on most of these claims. And policing and politics and business wealth all work together in the UK as well, based on everything I've seen.

But mostly curious about your education claims.
 
Big up to the doctors.

They were going to be boned either way. Either they did nothing and risked the baby dying => lawsuit, or they just eat the inevitable lawsuit and make sure that both patients walked out of the hospital alive.

Patients alive + lawsuit > patients dead + lawsuit.

I hope they get a slap on the wrist. But even if they get the book thrown at them, I think you'd have to take some satisfaction as a doctor that no matter how ungrateful your patient, you may have saved their child's life.
 
US in 'denial' over poor maths standards

There's a thread in this forum from a user who's battling apparent police corruption in their area, and do I need to cite that some police officers are elected?

Starbucks have employees who claim welfare and while Starbucks dodge the bulk of their US tax responsibilities; well documented in the US and world press. EDIT: Not a unique problem, I accept, although it seems exacerbated in US Big Business

The decline in US education standards is worrying, they still turn out some of the top science brains but the gulf between what you get if you pay and what you get if you don't seems to be expanding quite quickly.
 
Last edited:
(also several hours is not much)

Maybe add "relatively" to that.

Looks like the Antelope Twins might be back locking horns.

Danoff, it's quite easy to imagine a situation where a woman could be a single mother of say three kids already, and die while exercising her right to vaginal disaster. Are those kids then left to die, or to burden others? Just trying to work out some of the permutations to your utopia.
 
I fully agree with this woman's choice and lawsuit. The fact that the doctor began pushing for a C-section immediately is scary. His reasonings were based on outdated science. It is called vaginal birth after caesarean, or VBAC. It is more likely to be fine than a problem. I know multiple women who had VBACs after two or more cesareans. This doctor will absolutely lose this case if he cannot present another medical reason than is stated in this article.

Furthermore, this woman should report this doctor for violating the AAPS Patients' Bill of Rights. He will face some tough questions at his next license renewal if she does. Complaints are kept on file with the licensure board and all are looked into.

Here is the AAPS Patients' Bill of Rights, for those who don't know them (relevant part bolded).


All patients should be guaranteed the following freedoms:

  • To seek consultation with the physician(s) of their choice;
  • To contract with their physician(s) on mutually agreeable terms;
  • To be treated confidentially, with access to their records limited to those involved in their care or designated by the patient;
  • To use their own resources to purchase the care of their choice;
  • To refuse medical treatment even if it is recommended by their physician(s);
  • To be informed about their medical condition, the risks and benefits of treatment and appropriate alternatives;
  • To refuse third-party interference in their medical care, and to be confident that their actions in seeking or declining medical care will not result in third-party-imposed penalties for patients or physicians;
  • To receive full disclosure of their insurance plan in plain language, including:
  1. CONTRACTS: A copy of the contract between the physician and health care plan, and between the patient or employer and the plan;
  2. INCENTIVES: Whether participating physicians are offered financial incentives to reduce treatment or ration care;
  3. COST: The full cost of the plan, including copayments, coinsurance, and deductibles;
  4. COVERAGE: Benefits covered and excluded, including availability and location of 24-hour emergency care;
  5. QUALIFICATIONS: A roster and qualifications of participating physicians;
  6. APPROVAL PROCEDURES: Authorization procedures for services, whether doctors need approval of a committee or any other individual, and who decides what is medically necessary;
  7. REFERRALS: Procedures for consulting a specialist, and who must authorize the referral;
  8. APPEALS: Grievance procedures for claim or treatment denials;
  9. GAG RULE: Whether physicians are subject to a gag rule, preventing criticism of the plan.
As for "several hours," I am very interested in knowing the number of hours. My wife was in labor for 36 hours and had a vaginal birth. We wanted a 100% natural birth, and had a birth plan on file with the hospital. Anyone who violated that birth plan without our permission would have been reprimanded. A cesarean was never mentioned, even after my wife's and my daughter's blood pressures and pulses became very weak for a period of about 5 minutes.


As someone who has likely spent far more time in a hospital than everyone in this thread combined (hell, I have eight days under my belt this year already, with another planned visit in June), the Patient's Bill of Rights is extremely important. I will not use a doctor who won't tell me he agrees to them. I have straight up looked at a doctor after a recommendation and said no, I seek second and third opinions, often in other states, and I have even pulled my daughter off one medicine and taken her to a second doctor to get another opinion. She was put on a new medicine that did work and didn't make her feel worse.
 
The fact that the doctor began pushing for a C-section immediately is scary.

Yup, I hadn't noted that point immediately. It's worth noting though that the parent's wishes were observed and a normal delivery was attempted.

I think that saving the life of the patient was absolutely paramount, after several hours of the umbilical parent attempting elective vaginal delivery the medical team decided it was no longer safe for the patient or parent to continue with that attempt.

It is my belief that any parent who makes a decision having been advised that it may kill their child should be overruled by the state. And @Danoff, I know you hate that idea but it's what I believe. We see plenty of times that we can't trust parents to look after their children all the time. We see lots of cases where "oh, something should have been done!" but never was. Baby P.

There was an interesting precedent to this case in '93 (maybe this is the one you're thinking of @Foolkiller?) where a woman clearly was led into a c-section long before any birth problems were apparent. In fact, I believe there was no attempt at vaginal delivery. She won a huge amount of money, US$1.5m. Worth a pop, right?

Here's an article that complete disagrees with me that I found very interesting; Grauniad. Still didn't agree though.
 
Yup, I hadn't noted that point immediately. It's worth noting though that the parent's wishes were observed and a normal delivery was attempted.

I think that saving the life of the patient was absolutely paramount, after several hours of the umbilical parent attempting elective vaginal delivery the medical team decided it was no longer safe for the patient or parent to continue with that attempt.
If he did not explain it in a way to justify his actions to the patient's satisfaction her lawsuit is fully justified, if only to force him to explain it to a court's satisfaction. To date, all we have is his outdated "VBACs are dangerous" excuse. If his opinion is based on outdated information then he needs a licensure review. Doctors are required to take continuing education units (CEUs) to keep their licensure renewed. If he is making judgments based on decades old thinking that has since become untrue, then he has either ignored or faked his CEU lessons, violated his oath as a doctor, and violated the patients' Bill of rights.

The woman's case may be strengthened by the one part of the ACA that I agree with: The patient has the right to demand copies of their records and notes from the most recent procedure immediately. If she did this she can see the diagnosis he gave for violating her wishes, and he must defend that.

In short: His first reaction was outdated and incorrect according to modern science. My trust in him was lost at that point. If this were us, I would have demanded a different doctor the moment he immediately pushed us to make a decision based on incorrect information and/or lies.


Edit: Autocorrect made me hit the swear filter.
 
Last edited:
Why what? Why does an umbilical person's wellbeing outweigh an thinking adult's choice?

I wouldn't have used that wording, but yes.

As societies we should raise healthy, confident well-educated children. That means that as a society we take collective responsibility for welfare and define those responsiblities in law.

There is no "society", only lots of individuals.

We provide free health, free education, and we accept that sometimes society as a whole is empowered to override the wishes of a parent as an individual (in carefully judged and balanced consideration).

You're talking about overriding the wishes of a parent in favor of a child. I'm talking about not overriding the wishes of a human being in favor of a biological entity that has no rights.

We see America today with the worst-educated middle class children in the modern world (normally a good benchmark for a system overall), we see policing combined with politicking and business wealth, we see big businesses refusing to pay tax leaving their employees to receive welfare aid from the country, we see a country that refuses to provide broad healthcare to its citizens because of an apparent fear from taxpayers that someone else might get more than them out of the system. Historically the US has eschewed the modernised views of many other societies and in my view we see her in poor shape because of it.

A) You just headed off to left field for no apparent reason
B) If you're not satisfied with the current system, why are you advocating for it?


Depends on the birth, and how many are several. In this case the qualified MDs took a judgement on how the number of hours affected the young person's survival chances.

I'm assuming several is less than 4. I usually use "several" to mean 3, sometimes, if I'm being sloppy, I'll mean 2. Never 1, and never 4. None of those numbers constitute a long time to be in labor (even if you add "several" hours to it).

Danoff, it's quite easy to imagine a situation where a woman could be a single mother of say three kids already, and die while exercising her right to vaginal disaster. Are those kids then left to die, or to burden others? Just trying to work out some of the permutations to your utopia.

Let's be clear about the scenario here:

- Single mother has 3 kids and gets knocked up with a 4th and decides to have it
- Doctors recommend surgery, she refuses
- Her choice leaves her dead
- 3 kids have no guardian, and no nearest relative
- No one wants to adopt them
- No one wants to foster them

Your question is presumably, what do we do with those kids and isn't that worth violating the mother's rights.

Part 1, what do we do with them. This scenario is one that has to be considered regardless of whether we violate the mother's rights and force her to have surgery that she doesn't want in order to potentially save her life (we wouldn't know for sure that she'd die without the surgery, and wouldn't know for sure that she'd live with it). The reason this scenario has to be considered is that she could just as easily die in a car accident or slipping in the shower and leave the kids orphans.

So what do we do with them? There needs to be a children's shelter, ideally run by private charity. The US is amazing when it comes to private charitable donations. Can you imagine a shelter having trouble collecting funds for kids if there were no alternative? I can't. I started to type up a response that goes further and assumes that no one will take them in and no one will donate to create a shelter for them, but I deleted it because I don't like discussing hypothetical worlds that look nothing like ours where we presume human behavior that doesn't exist.

Edit:

Ok I'll throw you a bone. I would be ok with requiring sufficient life insurance for the parent to cover the kid (healthcare, education, etc.) until their 18th birthday.

Part 2, isn't it worth violating the mother's rights so that we don't have to rely on charity. No, that would make us immoral people who, in turn, have lost our own rights.
 
Let's be clear about the scenario here:

- Single mother has 3 kids and gets knocked up with a 4th and decides to have it
- Doctors recommend surgery, she refuses
- Her choice leaves her dead
- 3 kids have no guardian, and no nearest relative
- No one wants to adopt them
- No one wants to foster them

Your question is presumably, what do we do with those kids and isn't that worth violating the mother's rights.

Part 1, what do we do with them. This scenario is one that has to be considered regardless of whether we violate the mother's rights and force her to have surgery that she doesn't want in order to potentially save her life (we wouldn't know for sure that she'd die without the surgery, and wouldn't know for sure that she'd live with it). The reason this scenario has to be considered is that she could just as easily die in a car accident or slipping in the shower and leave the kids orphans.

So what do we do with them? There needs to be a children's shelter, ideally run by private charity. The US is amazing when it comes to private charitable donations. Can you imagine a shelter having trouble collecting funds for kids if there were no alternative? I can't. I started to type up a response that goes further and assumes that no one will take them in and no one will donate to create a shelter for them, but I deleted it because I don't like discussing hypothetical worlds that look nothing like ours where we presume human behavior that doesn't exist.

Edit:

Ok I'll throw you a bone. I would be ok with requiring sufficient life insurance for the parent to cover the kid (healthcare, education, etc.) until their 18th birthday.

Part 2, isn't it worth violating the mother's rights so that we don't have to rely on charity. No, that would make us immoral people who, in turn, have lost our own rights.

So basically yes, it's a choice between those kids being left abandoned, or burdening others.

I just wrote a long response that I then deleted. What I might need to know first is: do you believe that suicide should be legal? And, are there exceptions?
 
A pregnant single woman (Roe) brought a class action challenging the constitutionality of the Texas criminal abortion laws, which proscribe procuring or attempting an abortion except on medical advice for the purpose of saving the mother's life. A licensed physician (Hallford), who had two state abortion prosecutions pending against him, was permitted to intervene. A childless married couple (the Does), the wife not being pregnant, separately attacked the laws, basing alleged injury on the future possibilities of contraceptive failure, pregnancy, unpreparedness for parenthood, and impairment of the wife's health. A three-judge District Court, which consolidated the actions, held that Roe and Hallford, and members of their classes, had standing to sue and presented justiciable controversies. Ruling that declaratory, though not injunctive, relief was warranted, the court declared the abortion statutes void as vague and overbroadly infringing those plaintiffs' Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court ruled the Does' complaint not justiciable. Appellants directly appealed to this Court on the injunctive rulings, and appellee cross-appealed from the District Court's grant of declaratory relief to Roe and Hallford. Held:




  • 1. While 28 U.S.C. 1253 authorizes no direct appeal to this Court from the grant or denial of declaratory relief alone, review is not foreclosed when the case is properly before the Court on appeal from specific denial of injunctive relief and the arguments as to both injunctive and declaratory relief are necessarily identical. P. 123.


  • 2. Roe has standing to sue; the Does and Hallford do not. Pp. 123-129.


  • (a) Contrary to appellee's contention, the natural termination of Roe's pregnancy did not moot her suit. Litigation involving pregnancy, which is "capable of repetition, yet evading review," is an exception to the usual federal rule that an actual controversy 401 U.S. 66 . Pp. 125-127.


  • (c) The Does' complaint, based as it is on contingencies, any one or more of which may not occur, is too speculative to present an actual case or controversy. Pp. 127-129.


  • 3. State criminal abortion laws, like those involved here, that except from criminality only a life-saving procedure on the mother's behalf without regard to the stage of her pregnancy and other interests involved violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which protects against state action the right to privacy, including a woman's qualified right to terminate her pregnancy. Though the State cannot override that right, it has legitimate interests in protecting both the pregnant woman's health and the potentiality of human life, each of which interests grows and reaches a "compelling" point at various stages of the woman's approach to term. Pp. 147-164.


  • (a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician. Pp. 163, 164.


  • (b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first trimester, the State, in promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health. Pp. 163, 164.


  • (c) For the stage subsequent to viability the State, in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life, may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother. Pp. 163-164; 164-165.


  • 4. The State may define the term "physician" to mean only a physician currently licensed by the State, and may proscribe any abortion by a person who is not a physician as so defined. P. 165.


  • 5. It is unnecessary to decide the injunctive relief issue since the Texas authorities will doubtless fully recognize the Court's ruling * Footnote * ] Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Gary K. Nelson, Attorney General of Arizona, Robert K. Killian, Attorney General of Connecticut, Ed W. Hancock, Attorney General of Kentucky, Clarence A. H. Meyer, Attorney General of Nebraska, and Vernon B. Romney, Attorney General of Utah; by Joseph P. Witherspoon, Jr., for the Association of Texas Diocesan Attorneys; by Charles E. Rice for Americans United for Life; by Eugene J. McMahon for Women for the Unborn et al.; by Carol Ryan for the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists et al.; by Dennis J. Horan, Jerome A. Frazel, Jr., Thomas M. Crisham, and Dolores V. Horan for Certain Physicians, Professors and Fellows of the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology; by Harriet F. Pilpel, Nancy F. Wechsler, and Frederic S. Nathan for Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc., et al.; by Alan F. Charles for the National Legal Program on Health Problems of the Poor et al.; by Marttie L. Thompson for State Communities Aid Assn.; by 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905):



    • "[The Constitution] is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar or novel and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United States."

    I
    The Texas statutes that concern us here are Arts. 1191-1194 and 1196 of the State's Penal Code. 1 These make it a crime to "procure an abortion," as therein 2 3 4 a single woman who was residing in Dallas County, Texas, instituted this federal action in March 1970 against the District Attorney of the county. She sought a declaratory judgment that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were unconstitutional on their face, and an injunction restraining the defendant from enforcing the statutes.

    Roe alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant; that she wished to terminate her pregnancy by an abortion "performed by a competent, licensed physician, under safe, clinical conditions"; that she was unable to get a "legal" abortion in Texas because her life did not appear to be threatened by the continuation of her pregnancy; and that she could not afford to travel to another jurisdiction in order to secure a legal abortion under safe conditions. She claimed that the Texas statutes were unconstitutionally vague and that they abridged her right of personal privacy, protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. By an amendment to her complaint Roe purported to sue "on behalf of herself and all other women" similarly situated.

    James Hubert Hallford, a licensed physician, sought and was granted leave to intervene in Roe's action. In his complaint he alleged that he had been arrested previously for violations of the Texas abortion statutes and 5 a married couple, filed a companion complaint to that of Roe. They also named the District Attorney as defendant, claimed like constitutional deprivations, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The Does alleged that they were a childless couple; that Mrs. Doe was suffering from a "neural-chemical" disorder; that her physician had "advised her to avoid pregnancy until such time as her condition has materially improved" (although a pregnancy at the present time would not present "a serious risk" to her life); that, pursuant to medical advice, she had discontinued use of birth control pills; and that if she should become pregnant, she would want to terminate the pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent, licensed physician under safe, clinical conditions. By an amendment to their complaint, the Does purported to sue "on behalf of themselves and all couples similarly situated."

    The two actions were consolidated and heard together by a duly convened three-judge district court. The suits thus presented the situations of the pregnant single woman, the childless couple, with the wife not pregnant, 402 U.S. 941 (1971).398 U.S. 427 (1970), and Gunn v. University Committee, 399 U.S. 383 (1970), are to the effect that 1253 does not authorize an appeal to this Court from the grant or denial of declaratory relief alone. We conclude, nevertheless, that those decisions do not foreclose our review of both the injunctive and the declaratory aspects of a case of this kind when it is properly here, as this one is, on appeal under 1253 from specific denial of injunctive relief, and the arguments as to both aspects are necessarily identical. See Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320 (1970); Florida Lime Growers v. Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73, 80 -81 (1960). It would be destructive of time and energy for all concerned were we to rule otherwise. Cf. Doe v. Bolton, post, p. 179.



    IV
    We are next confronted with issues of justiciability, standing, and abstention. Have Roe and the Does established that "personal stake in the outcome of the controversy," Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204(1962), that insures that "the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution," Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968), and Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 (1972)? And what effect did the pendency of criminal abortion charges against Dr. Hallford in state court have upon the propriety of the federal court's granting relief to him as a plaintiff-intervenor? 239 U.S. 33 (1915). Indeed, we do not read the appellee's brief as really asserting anything to the contrary. The "logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated," Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S., at 102 , and the necessary degree of contentiousness, Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969), are both present.

    The appellee notes, however, that the record does not disclose that Roe was pregnant at the time of the District Court hearing on May 22, 1970, 6 or on the following June 17 when the court's opinion and judgment were filed. And he suggests that Roe's case must now be moot because she and all other members of her class are no longer subject to any 1970 pregnancy. 340 U.S. 36 (1950); Golden v. Zwickler, supra; SEC v. Medical Committee for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403 (1972).

    But when, as here, pregnancy is a significant fact in the litigation, the normal 266-day human gestation period is so short that the pregnancy will come to term before the usual appellate process is complete. If that termination makes a case moot, pregnancy litigation seldom will survive much beyond the trial stage, and appellate review will be effectively denied. Our law should not be that rigid. Pregnancy often comes more than once to the same woman, and in the general population, if man is to survive, it will always be with us. Pregnancy provides a classic justification for a conclusion of nonmootness. It truly could be "capable of repetition, yet evading review." Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911). See Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816 (1969); Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 178-179 (1968); United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 -633 (1953).

    We, therefore, agree with the District Court that Jane Roe had standing to undertake this litigation, that she presented a justiciable controversy, and that the termination of her 1970 pregnancy has not rendered her case moot.

    B. Dr. Hallford. The doctor's position is different. He entered Roe's litigation as a plaintiff-intervenor, alleging in his complaint that he:



    • "n the past has been arrested for violating the Texas Abortion Laws and at the present time stands charged by indictment with violating said laws in the Criminal District Court of Dallas County, Texas to-wit: (1) The State of Texas vs. 401 U.S. 66 (1971), compels the conclusion that the District Court erred when it granted declaratory relief to Dr. Hallford instead of refraining from so doing. The court, of course, was correct in refusing to grant injunctive relief to the doctor. The reasons supportive of that action, however, are those expressed in Samuels v. Mackell, supra, and in Younger v. 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77(1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); and Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971). See also Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965). We note, in passing, that Younger and its companion cases were decided after the three-judge District Court decision in this case.

      Dr. Hallford's complaint in intervention, therefore, is to be dismissed. 7 He is remitted to his defenses in the state criminal proceedings against him. We reverse the judgment of the District Court insofar as it granted Dr. Hallford relief and failed to dismiss his complaint in intervention.

      C. The Does. In view of our ruling as to Roe's standing in her case, the issue of the Does' standing in their case has little significance. The claims they assert are essentially the same as those of Roe, and they attack the same statutes. Nevertheless, we briefly note the Does' posture.

      Their pleadings present them as a childless married couple, the woman not being pregnant, who have no desire to have children at this time because of their having received medical advice that Mrs. Doe should avoid pregnancy, and for "other highly personal reasons." But they "fear . . . they may face the prospect of becoming 401 U.S., at 41 -42; Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S., at 109 -110; Abele v. Markle, 452 F.2d, at 1124-1125; Crossen v. Breckenridge, 446 F.2d, at 839. The Does' claim falls far short of those resolved otherwise in the cases that the Does urge upon us, namely, Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971); Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); 393 U.S. 97 (1968). See also Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).

      The Does therefore are not appropriate plaintiffs in this litigation. Their complaint was properly dismissed by the District Court, and we affirm that dismissal.



      V
      The principal thrust of appellant's attack on the Texas statutes is that they improperly invade a right, said to be possessed by the pregnant woman, to choose to terminate her pregnancy. Appellant would discover this right in the concept of personal "liberty" embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause; or in personal, marital, familial, and sexual privacy said to be protected by the Bill of Rights or its penumbras, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); id., at 460 (WHITE, J., concurring in result); or among those rights reserved to the people by the Ninth Amendment, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S., at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Before addressing this claim, we feel it desirable briefly to survey, in several aspects, the history of abortion, for such insight as that history may afford us, and then to examine the state purposes and interests behind the criminal abortion laws.



      VI
      It perhaps is not generally appreciated that the restrictive criminal abortion laws in effect in a majority of States today are of relatively recent vintage. Those laws, generally proscribing abortion or its attempt at any time during pregnancy except when necessary to preserve the pregnant woman's life, are not of ancient or even of common-law origin. Instead, they derive from statutory changes effected, for the most part, in the latter half of the 19th century. 8 We are also told, however, that abortion was practiced in Greek times as well as in the Roman Era, 9 and that "it was resorted to without scruple." 10 The Ephesian, Soranos, often described as the greatest of the ancient gynecologists, appears to have been generally opposed to Rome's prevailing free-abortion practices. He found it necessary to think first of the life of the mother, and he resorted to abortion when, upon this standard, he felt the procedure advisable. 11 Greek and Roman law afforded little protection to the unborn. If abortion was prosecuted in some places, it seems to have been based on a concept of a violation of the father's right to his offspring. Ancient religion did not bar abortion. 12

      2. The Hippocratic Oath. What then of the famous Oath that has stood so long as the ethical guide of the medical profession and that bears the name of the great Greek (460(?)-377(?) B. C.), who has been described 13 The Oath varies somewhat according to the particular translation, but in any translation the content is clear: "I will give no deadly medicine to anyone if asked, nor suggest any such counsel; and in like manner I will not give to a woman a pessary to produce abortion," 14 or "I will neither give a deadly drug to anybody if asked for it, nor will I make a suggestion to this effect. Similarly, I will not give to a woman an abortive remedy." 15

      Although the Oath is not mentioned in any of the principal briefs in this case or in Doe v. Bolton, post, p. 179, it represents the apex of the development of strict ethical concepts in medicine, and its influence endures to this day. Why did not the authority of Hippocrates dissuade abortion practice in his time and that of Rome? The late Dr. Edelstein provides us with a theory: 16 The Oath was not uncontested even in Hippocrates' day; only the Pythagorean school of philosophers frowned upon the related act of suicide. Most Greek thinkers, on the other hand, commended abortion, at least prior to viability. See Plato, Republic, V, 461; Aristotle, Politics, VII, 1335b 25. For the Pythagoreans, however, it was a matter of dogma. For them the embryo was animate from the moment of conception, and abortion meant destruction of a living being. The abortion clause of the Oath, therefore, "echoes Pythagorean doctrines," 17

      Dr. Edelstein then concludes that the Oath originated in a group representing only a small segment of Greek opinion and that it certainly was not accepted by all ancient physicians. He points out that medical writings down to Galen (A. D. 130-200) "give evidence of the violation of almost every one of its injunctions." 18 But with the end of antiquity a decided change took place. Resistance against suicide and against abortion became common. The Oath came to be popular. The emerging teachings of Christianity were in agreement with the Pythagorean ethic. The Oath "became the nucleus of all medical ethics" and "was applauded as the embodiment of truth." Thus, suggests Dr. Edelstein, it is "a Pythagorean manifesto and not the expression of an absolute standard of medical conduct." 19

      This, it seems to us, is a satisfactory and acceptable explanation of the Hippocratic Oath's apparent rigidity. It enables us to understand, in historical context, a long-accepted and revered statement of medical ethics.

      3. The common law. It is undisputed that at common law, abortion performed before "quickening" - the first recognizable movement of the fetus in utero, appearing usually from the 16th to the 18th week of pregnancy 20 - was not an indictable offense. 21 The absence 22 This was "mediate animation." Although 23 But the later and predominant view, following the great common-law scholars, has been that it was, at most, a lesser offense. In a frequently cited 24 Blackstone followed, saying that while abortion after quickening had once been considered manslaughter (though not murder), "modern law" took a less severe view. 25 A recent review of the common-law precedents argues, however, that those precedents contradict Coke and that even post-quickening abortion was never established as a common-law crime. 26 This is of some importance because while most American courts ruled, in holding or dictum, that abortion of an unquickened fetus was not criminal under their received common law, 27 others followed Coke in stating that abortion 28 That their reliance on Coke on this aspect of the law was uncritical and, apparently in all the reported cases, dictum (due probably to the paucity of common-law prosecutions for post-quickening abortion), makes it now appear doubtful that abortion was ever firmly established as a common-law crime even with respect to the destruction of a quick fetus.

      4. The English statutory law. England's first criminal abortion statute, Lord Ellenborough's Act, 43 Geo. 3, c. 58, came in 1803. It made abortion of a quick fetus, 1, a capital crime, but in 2 it provided lesser penalties for the felony of abortion before quickening, and thus preserved the "quickening" distinction. This contrast was continued in the general revision of 1828, 9 Geo. 4, c. 31, 13. It disappeared, however, together with the death penalty, in 1837, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict., c. 85. 6, and did not reappear in the Offenses Against the Person Act of 1861, 24 & 25 Vict., c. 100, 59, that formed the core of English anti-abortion law until the liberalizing reforms of 1967. In 1929, the Infant Life (Preservation) Act, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 34, came into being. Its emphasis was upon the destruction of "the life of a child capable of being born alive." It made a willful act performed with the necessary intent a felony. It contained a proviso that one was not to be 29 The death penalty was not imposed. Abortion before quickening was made a crime in that State only in 1860. 30In 1828, New York enacted legislation 31 that, in two respects, was to serve as a model for early anti-abortion statutes. First, while barring destruction of an unquickened fetus as well as a quick fetus, it made the former only a misdemeanor, but the latter second-degree manslaughter. Second, it incorporated a concept of therapeutic abortion by providing that an abortion was excused if it "shall have been necessary to preserve the life of such mother, or shall have been advised by two physicians to be necessary for such purpose." By 1840, when Texas had received the common law, 32 only eight American States 33 It was not until after the War Between the States that legislation began generally to replace the common law. Most of these initial statutes dealt severely with abortion after quickening but were lenient with it before quickening. Most punished attempts equally with completed abortions. While many statutes included the exception for an abortion thought by one or more physicians to be necessary to save the mother's life, that provision soon disappeared and the typical law required that the procedure actually be necessary for that purpose.

      Gradually, in the middle and late 19th century the quickening distinction disappeared from the statutory law of most States and the degree of the offense and the penalties were increased. By the end of the 1950's, a large majority of the jurisdictions banned abortion, however and whenever performed, unless done to save or preserve the life of the mother. 34 The exceptions, Alabama and the District of Columbia, permitted abortion to preserve the mother's health. 35 Three States permitted abortions that were not "unlawfully" performed or that were not "without lawful justification," leaving interpretation of those standards to the courts. 36 In 37 set forth as Appendix B to the opinion in Doe v. Bolton, post, p. 205.

      It is thus apparent that at common law, at the time of the adoption of our Constitution, and throughout the major portion of the 19th century, abortion was viewed with less disfavor than under most American statutes currently in effect. Phrasing it another way, a woman enjoyed a substantially broader right to terminate a pregnancy than she does in most States today. At least with respect to the early stage of pregnancy, and very possibly without such a limitation, the opportunity 38 Proceedings39

      7. The position of the American Public Health Association. In October 1970, the Executive Board of the APHA adopted Standards for Abortion Services. These were five in number:




      • "a. Rapid and simple abortion referral must be readily available through state and local public 40 The 41



        VII
        Three reasons have been advanced to explain historically the enactment of criminal abortion laws in the 19th century and to justify their continued existence. 42 The appellants and amici contend, moreover, that this is not a proper state purpose at all and suggest that, if it were, the Texas statutes are overbroad in protecting it since the law fails to distinguish between married and unwed mothers.

        A second reason is concerned with abortion as a medical procedure. When most criminal abortion laws were first enacted, the procedure was a hazardous one for the woman. 43 This was particularly true prior to the 44Consequently, any interest of the State in protecting the woman from an inherently hazardous procedure, except when it would be equally dangerous for her to forgo it, has largely disappeared. Of course, important state interests in the areas of health and medical standards do remain. 45 The State's interest and general obligation to protect life then extends, it is argued, to prenatal life. Only when the life of the pregnant mother herself is at stake, balanced against the life she carries within her, should the interest of the embryo or fetus not prevail. Logically, of course, a legitimate state interest in this area need not stand or fall on acceptance of the belief that life begins at conception or at some other point prior to live birth. In assessing the State's interest, recognition may be given to the less rigid claim that as long as at least potential life is involved, the State may assert interests beyond the protection of the pregnant woman alone. 46 Pointing to the absence of legislative history to support the contention, they claim that most state laws were designed solely to protect the woman. Because medical advances have lessened this concern, at least with respect to abortion in early pregnancy, they argue that with respect to such abortions the laws can no longer be justified by any state interest. There is some scholarly support for this view of original purpose. 47 The few state courts called upon to interpret their laws in the late 19th and early 20th centuries did focus on the State's interest in protecting the woman's health rather than in preserving the embryo and fetus.48 Proponents of this view point out that in many States, including Texas, 49 by statute or judicial interpretation, the pregnant woman herself could not be prosecuted for self-abortion or for cooperating in an abortion performed upon her by another. 50 They claim that adoption of the "quickening" distinction through received common 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891), the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution. In varying contexts, the Court or individual Justices have, indeed, found at least the roots of that right in the First Amendment, Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8 -9 (1968), Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967), Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S., at 484 -485; in the Ninth Amendment, id., at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring); or in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). These decisions make it clear that only personal rights that can be deemed "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), are included in this guarantee of personal privacy. They also make it clear that the right has some extension to activities relating to marriage, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 -542 (1942); contraception, Eisenstadt v. Baird,405 U.S., at 453 -454; id., at 460, 463-465 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); and child rearing and education, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925), Meyer v. Nebraska, supra.

        This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by denying this choice altogether is apparent. Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved. All these are factors the woman and her responsible physician necessarily will consider in consultation.

        On the basis of elements such as these, appellant and some amici argue that the woman's right is absolute and that she is entitled to terminate her pregnancy at whatever time, in whatever way, and for whatever reason she alone chooses. With this we do not agree. Appellant's arguments that Texas either has no valid interest at all in regulating the abortion decision, or no interest strong enough to support any limitation upon the woman's sole determination, are unpersuasive. The 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (vaccination); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200(1927) (sterilization).

        We, therefore, conclude that the right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in regulation.

        We note that those federal and state courts that have recently considered abortion law challenges have reached the same conclusion. A majority, in addition to the District Court in the present case, have held state laws unconstitutional, at least in part, because of vagueness or because of overbreadth and abridgment of rights. Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800 (Conn. 1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-56; Abele v. Markle, 351 F. Supp. 224 (Conn. 1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-730; Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048 (ND Ga. 1970), appeal decided today, post, p. 179; Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385 (ND Ill. 1971), appeal docketed, No. 70-105; Poe v. Menghini, 339 F. Supp. 986 (Kan. 1972); YWCA v. Kugler, 342 F. Supp. 1048 (NJ 1972); Babbitz v. McCann, 400 U.S. 1 (1970); People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970); State v. Barquet, 262 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1972).

        Others have sustained state statutes. Crossen v. Attorney General, 344 F. Supp. 587 (ED Ky. 1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-256; Rosen v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 318 F. Supp. 1217 (ED La. 1970), appeal docketed, No. 70-42; Corkey v. Edwards, 322 F. Supp. 1248 (WDNC 1971), appeal docketed, No. 71-92; Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741 (ND Ohio 1970); Doe v. Rampton (Utah 1971), appeal docketed, No. 71-5666; Cheaney v. State, ___ Ind. ___, 285 N. E. 2d 265 (1972); Spears v. State, 257 So.2d 876 (Miss. 1972); State v. Munson, 86 S. D. 663, 201 N. W. 2d 123 (1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-631.

        Although the results are divided, most of these courts have agreed that the right of privacy, however based, is broad enough to cover the abortion decision; that the right, nonetheless, is not absolute and is subject to some limitations; and that at some point the state interests as to protection of health, medical standards, and prenatal life, become dominant. We agree with this approach.

        Where certain "fundamental rights" are involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a "compelling state interest," Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969), Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963), and that legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S., at 485 ; Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508 (1964); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307 -308 (1940); see 405 U.S., at 460 , 463-464 (WHITE, J., concurring in result).

        In the recent abortion cases, cited above, courts have recognized these principles. Those striking down state laws have generally scrutinized the State's interests in protecting health and potential life, and have concluded that neither interest justified broad limitations on the reasons for which a physician and his pregnant patient might decide that she should have an abortion in the early stages of pregnancy. Courts sustaining state laws have held that the State's determinations to protect health or prenatal life are dominant and constitutionally justifiable.



        IX
        The District Court held that the appellee failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that the Texas statute's infringement upon Roe's rights was necessary to support a compelling state interest, and that, although the appellee presented "several compelling justifications for state presence in the area of abortions," the statutes outstripped these justifications and swept "far beyond any areas of compelling state interest." 314 F. Supp., at 1222-1223. Appellant and appellee both contest that holding. Appellant, as has been indicated, claims an absolute right that bars any state imposition of criminal penalties in the area. Appellee argues that the State's determination to recognize and protect prenatal life from and after conception constitutes a compelling state interest. As noted above, we do not agree fully with either formulation.

        A. The appellee and certain amici argue that the fetus is a "person" within the language and meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. In support of this, they outline at length and in detail the well-known facts of fetal development. If this suggestion of personhood is established, the appellant's case, of course, collapses, 51 On the other hand, the appellee conceded on reargument 52 that no case could be cited that holds that a fetus is a person within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.

        The Constitution does not define "person" in so many words. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment contains three references to "person." The first, in defining "citizens," speaks of "persons born or naturalized in the United States." The word also appears both in the Due Process Clause and in the Equal Protection Clause. "Person" is used in other places in the Constitution: in the listing of qualifications for Representatives and Senators, Art. I, 2, cl. 2, and 3, cl. 3; in the Apportionment Clause, Art. I, 2, cl. 3;53 in the Migration and Importation provision, Art. I, 9, cl. 1; in the Emolument Clause, Art. I, 9, cl. 8; in the Electors provisions, Art. II, 1, cl. 2, and the superseded cl. 3; in the provision outlining qualifications for the office of President, Art. II, 1, cl. 5; in the Extradition provisions, Art. IV, 2, cl. 2, and the superseded Fugitive Slave Clause 3; and in the Fifth, Twelfth, and Twenty-second Amendments, as well as in 2 and 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. But in nearly all these instances, the use of the word is such that it has application only postnatally. None indicates, with any assurance, that it has any possible pre-natal application. 54 55 This is in accord with the results reached in those few cases where the issue has been squarely presented. McGarvey v. Magee-Womens Hospital, 340 F. Supp. 751 (WD Pa. 1972); Byrn v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp., 31 N. Y. 2d 194, 286 N. E. 2d 887 (1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-434; Abele v. Markle, 351 F. Supp. 224 (Conn. 1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-730. Cf. Cheaney v. State, ___ Ind., at ___, 285 N. E. 2d, at 270; Montana v. Rogers, 278 F.2d 68, 72 (CA7 1960), aff'd sub nom. Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308 (1961); Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 470 P.2d 617 (1970); State v. Dickinson, 28402 U.S. 62 (1971), inferentially is to the same effect, for we there would not have indulged in statutory interpretation favorable to abortion in specified circumstances if the necessary consequence was the termination of life entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection.

        This conclusion, however, does not of itself fully answer the contentions raised by Texas, and we pass on to other considerations.

        B. The pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her privacy. She carries an embryo and, later, a fetus, if one accepts the medical definitions of the developing young in the human uterus. See Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary 478-479, 547 (24th ed. 1965). The situation therefore is inherently different from marital intimacy, or bedroom possession of obscene material, or marriage, or procreation, or education, with which Eisenstadt and Griswold, Stanley, Loving, Skinner, and Pierce and Meyer were respectively concerned. As we have intimated above, it is reasonable and appropriate for a State to decide that at some point in time another interest, that of health of the mother or that of potential human life, becomes significantly involved. The woman's privacy is no longer sole and any right of privacy she possesses must be measured accordingly.

        Texas urges that, apart from the Fourteenth Amendment, life begins at conception and is present throughout pregnancy, and that, therefore, the State has a compelling interest in protecting that life from and after conception. We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of man's knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer. 56 It appears to be the predominant, though not the unanimous, attitude of the Jewish faith. 57 It may be taken to represent also the position of a large segment of the Protestant community, insofar as that can be ascertained; organized groups that have taken a formal position on the abortion issue have generally regarded abortion as a matter for the conscience of the individual and her family. 58 As we have noted, the common law found greater significance in quickening. Physicians and their scientific colleagues have regarded that event with less interest and have tended to focus either upon conception, upon live birth, or upon the interim point at which the fetus becomes "viable," that is, potentially able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid. 59 Viability is usually placed at about seven months (28 weeks) but may occur earlier, even at 24 weeks. 60 The Aristotelian theory of "mediate animation," that held sway throughout the Middle Ages and the Renaissance in Europe, continued to be official Roman Catholic dogma until the 19th century, despite opposition to this "ensoulment" theory from those in the Church who would recognize the existence of life from 61 The latter is now, of course, the official belief of the Catholic Church. As one brief amicus discloses, this is a view strongly held by many non-Catholics as well, and by many physicians. Substantial problems for precise definition of this view are posed, however, by new embryological data that purport to indicate that conception is a "process" over time, rather than an event, and by new medical techniques such as menstrual extraction, the "morning-after" pill, implantation of embryos, artificial insemination, and even artificial wombs. 62

        In areas other than criminal abortion, the law has been reluctant to endorse any theory that life, as we recognize it, begins before live birth or to accord legal rights to the unborn except in narrowly defined situations and except when the rights are contingent upon live birth. For example, the traditional rule of tort law denied recovery for prenatal injuries even though the child was born alive. 63 That rule has been changed in almost every jurisdiction. In most States, recovery is said to be permitted only if the fetus was viable, or at least quick, when the injuries were sustained, though few 64 In a recent development, generally opposed by the commentators, some States permit the parents of a stillborn child to maintain an action for wrongful death because of prenatal injuries. 65 Such an action, however, would appear to be one to vindicate the parents' interest and is thus consistent with the view that the fetus, at most, represents only the potentiality of life. Similarly, unborn children have been recognized as acquiring rights or interests by way of inheritance or other devolution of property, and have been represented by guardians ad litem. 66 Perfection of the interests involved, again, has generally been contingent upon live birth. In short, the unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense.



        X
        In view of all this, we do not agree that, by adopting one theory of life, Texas may override the rights of the pregnant woman that are at stake. We repeat, however, that the State does have an important and legitimate interest in preserving and protecting the health of the pregnant woman, whether she be a resident of the State or a nonresident who seeks medical consultation and treatment there, and that it has still another important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life. These interests are separate and distinct. Each grows in substantiality as the woman approaches 402 U.S., at 67 -72.



        XI
        To summarize and to repeat:

        1. A state criminal abortion statute of the current Texas type, that excepts from criminality only a life-saving procedure on behalf of the mother, without regard to pregnancy stage and without recognition of the other interests involved, is violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

        (a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician.

        (b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first trimester, the State, in promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health.

        (c) For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life 67

        This holding, we feel, is consistent with the relative weights of the respective interests involved, with the lessons and examples of medical and legal history, with the lenity of the common law, and with the demands of the profound problems of the present day. The decision leaves the State free to place increasing restrictions on abortion as the period of pregnancy lengthens, so long as those restrictions are tailored to the recognized state interests. The decision vindicates the right of the physician to administer medical treatment according to his professional judgment up to the points where important389 U.S. 241, 252 -255 (1967); Dombrowski v. Pfister,380 U.S. 479 (1965). We are not dealing with a statute that, on its face, appears to abridge free expression, an area of particular concern under Dombrowski and refined in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S., at 50 .

        We find it unnecessary to decide whether the District Court erred in withholding injunctive relief, for we assume the Texas prosecutorial authorities will give full credence to this decision that the present criminal abortion statutes of that State are unconstitutional.

        The judgment of the District Court as to intervenor Hallford is reversed, and Dr. Hallford's complaint in intervention is dismissed. In all other respects, the judgment Footnote 1 ] "Article 1191. Abortion


        • "If any person shall designedly administer to a pregnant woman or knowingly procure to be administered with her consent any drug or medicine, or shall use towards her any violence or means whatever externally or internally applied, and thereby procure an abortion, he shall be confined in the penitentiary not less than two nor more than five years; if it be done without her consent, the punishment shall be doubled. By `abortion' is meant that the life of the fetus or embryo shall be destroyed in the woman's womb or that a premature birth thereof be caused.


        • "Art. 1192. Furnishing the means


        • "Whoever furnishes the means for procuring an abortion knowing the purpose intended is guilty as an accomplice.


        • "Art. 1193. Attempt at abortion


        Has anyone read this ?

 
Of course suicide should be legal. The notion that you must live despite not wanting to is actually quite appalling.

Ok, so a doctor also has no right to stop the same mother killing herself deliberately, and the whole thing is still under-written by charity. An unknown (or at least non-secure) quantity.

What a cruel world you propose for the most giving in our society. Not only dealing with fall-outs that were inevitable, but also the ones that were avoidable.

Also, what is want? A person may want to eat a whole cake, and want to lose weight. Sometimes there's a want in the moment and a greater want. And sometimes people need objective input to sort that out. But why would it matter when we have charities to cover their arse right?
 
Has anyone read this ?

zohxd5.jpg
 
@ledhed14, it would be easier for everyone if instead of asking if we've read it to point it the pieces which support your 'particular' argument. Personally I have trouble discerning your arguments, maybe I simply need extra help? :)
 
Ok, so a doctor also has no right to stop the same mother killing herself deliberately, and the whole thing is still under-written by charity. An unknown (or at least non-secure) quantity.

Yup.

What a cruel world you propose for the most giving in our society. Not only dealing with fall-outs that were inevitable, but also the ones that were avoidable.

Yours looks cruel to me, mine looks compassionate. You're the one suggesting that a mother who wants to die should be forced to live.

Also, what is want? A person may want to eat a whole cake, and want to lose weight. Sometimes there's a want in the moment and a greater want. And sometimes people need objective input to sort that out. But why would it matter when we have charities to cover their arse right?

I don't know what you're trying to say.
 
Yours looks cruel to me, mine looks compassionate. You're the one suggesting that a mother who wants to die should be forced to live..

I disagree. When a mother is responsible for her birth, she earns the right to be responsible for her death.
 
I agree with Danoff on this. It's all got to do with the right to your own body. That said, there's things around suicide, like the most common thing depression for example, that is complicated.

The want to die in the case of a severe depression is a product of mental illness. If you would let everyone decide, then there would be a lot of people dead. People that could be cured and have their minds change. And I'm sure there's a lot of people that have gotten well from depression that are thankfull they didn't kill themselves.


This is all off-topic though.
 
This is all off-topic though.

Possibly, but maybe less than you realised.

@Danoff I have no problem with someone choosing to suicide. Hell, I've been in a situation where I could have stopped a suicide but thought that they had every right to. My inaction was also helped by the fact that I objectively believed that they had little to live for. Physical health was not a factor.

What I do have a problem with is the notion that people can do whatever they want and if it doesn't go the way that they'd hoped they can declare some kind of morbid bankruptcy, and opt out, believing that there's always some schmuck that'll take the hit for them failing their responsibilities.
 
Last edited:
What I do have a problem with is the notion that people can do whatever they want and if it doesn't go the way that they'd hoped they can declare some kind of morbid bankruptcy, and opt out, believing that there's always some schmuck that'll take the hit for them failing their responsibilities.

Damn, that's harsh. Thing is... the more I think about it the more I struggle to disagree.
 
What I do have a problem with is the notion that people can do whatever they want and if it doesn't go the way that they'd hoped they can declare some kind of morbid bankruptcy, and opt out, believing that there's always some schmuck that'll take the hit for them failing their responsibilities.

Suicide can certainly result in an immoral act. Lemme provide you with an example.

You hire someone to build a back porch for you. You pay them $5000 in cash. They go off and use it to buy cocaine, get high for a weekend, then decide to commit suicide without building your porch (yes I know there are far worse examples I could give, but this one does the job). That person stole from you, and now they're dead. If they shot their entire estate up their nose, there is no way for you to be compensated postmortem. That constitutes theft, their suicide results in a violation of your rights which is, and should be, illegal.

But let's keep it straight here, it's the theft that's immoral and illegal, not the suicide. Just like if someone commits suicide and leaves their child unfed, that constitutes child abuse - also a violation of rights and justly illegal. It is not the suicide that is immoral, but the abuse.

Edit:

The parallel I'd draw is that driving a car can result in immoral act. If you drive a car over a pedestrian, for example, you may be committing murder (if you did it intentionally). But it's the act of killing that's immoral, not the act of driving.
 
Last edited:
Semantics of course, but I try to avoid using "commit suicide", as it's a hangover from when suicide was not merely illegal, but a criminal act.

Drawing a cartoon that uses speech bubbles, it's wise to write the speech content first, then work out how best to frame it. Otherwise it's very easy to stuff it up. It seems that your way does it the other way around, in that the framework is rigidly in place, then the content is mangled and contorted to fit within those lines. It's an almost pharisaical way of remaining true to the ethos in name, but not in nature.

To me, it's not about theft or suicide, but choice. "I'm choosing to act in a way that will ensure that you do not get what you paid for".
 
Back