Air Crash Thread: Boeing MAX and Other Problems

Let's move this on... I saw the hearing (edits, anyway), which bit did you find the most interesting?
I found the fact that both the FAA and Boeing were committed to change and the fact the senators asked really good questions in for most part bipartisan way restoring my faith as highly interesting .Would be nice to see more oversight hearings go that way.

I was suprised i admit that mitch mcconnells wife was asked some tough questions and seemed engaged in finding solutions .


I also found NTSB person to have been willing to answer what i thought with candor excellent also.

Im a big areospace fan , apollo 13 is one my favorite movies , and i want Boeing or any other plane manufacture to have zero death records or atleast very little as possible.

If you watched what struck you as interesting of informative ?

I wanted to also add that the plane in my avatar is run by a Canadian company as a joint venture with American forestry service and i believe US army or airforce ,cant remember which off top my head but is a great source of pride for many Canadians

,they are called Coulson airtankers and i do believe the US sold them 6 737s .not sure which 737s but they are working mostly in california ,australia and indonesia.
 
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In all I think it showed that the FAA and Boeing won't get an easy ride. The NTSB seemed the only ones willing to stick their necks out on questions.

I wanted to also add that the plane in my avatar is run by a Canadian company as a joint venture with American forestry service and i believe US army or airforce ,cant remember which off top my head but is a great source of pride for many Canadians

,they are called Coulson airtankers and i do believe the US sold them 6 737s .not sure which 737s but they are working mostly in california ,australia and indonesia.

737-300s, according to this. Interesting solution!
 
Why on earth would I do that? The only thing I'm thinking about during such a situation is solving the problem at hand with the knowledge and tools available.

Because that'd be part of the knowledge and tools.

Boeing are ready to begin issuing their software update for MAX aircraft. MCAS warnings will be standard. It's not clear if three AoA vanes will be used for "two out of three" fault detection, I guess we'll find out more.

This is concerning. They haven't even completed the investigation of Ethiopian Air (to the best of my knowledge). I haven't even heard it reported that it has been identified as a linked event. I mean, I get that everyone assumes it will be, and that the evidence so far has pointed us in that direction, but to date I've not seen findings that say it's the same phenomenon. I've heard nothing about black box recordings of the pilot on EA, I've heard nothing about what procedures they tried or didn't try during that flight. Perhaps I'm just not well connected enough to the news (I'm not the most connected person here), but this seems extremely premature, and it seems premature precisely because of how much money Boeing and all of the airlines they service are losing during the grounding. So if you're looking for a money grab at the expense of safety, this kinda looks like that to me.

I was not excited to tie the EA crash to the Lion Air crash early on until we had some evidence. We got a little bit, and that was enough for some people to call for grounding. Fine. But until we get some more, I have no idea how they can know how to fix the issue.

Also I don't care who or what makes Boeing look bad, don't conflate me wanting logical and intelligent conversation and fact gathering with me wanting to protect Boeing. I have no stake in Boeing and in fact as said previously when someone jumped to this conclusion due to lack of a tangible argument,

I know this will seem unbelievable to some but I'm right there with you. This is going to seem self-serving, but I'm going to say it anyway:

I don't want to die in a plane. I know that comes as a shocker, but it's the truth. I think about aircraft safety a lot, and I have two degrees in Aerospace Engineering. I studied all of the ways that they come apart, and how the control surfaces work and fail. I don't work in this industry, I opted for the "space" part of Aerospace, but I studied it enough to know a little bit about the industry and about safety concerns. Maybe not as much as some in this thread.

Back to my thesis, I don't want to die in a plane. I trust my life when I board one to, ostensibly the pilot, who has the same interest I do. If the plane is crap, and the airline is crap, the pilot should refuse to take off. The buck stops with that person, and at the end of it that's where my chips have to be placed. But beyond the pilot, I expect the airline to care a great deal about safety. They're responsible for maintenance and configuration of the aircraft, for vetting pilots, and for staffing all of it appropriately. Ethiopian and Lion are the brands that are first and foremost involved when one of their planes goes down - so they have a strong interest in not flying aircraft that are not airworthy. I get that they'll pivot to blaming someone else (Boeing in this case) when a plane goes down, but prior to the crash I rely on their sense of self-preservation to keep their airplanes in the sky. After the crash, I want to see them pay in terms of PR, because that maintains every other airline's sense of self-preservation.

Beyond the pilot, and beyond the airline, I expect the manufacturer to not want their planes to go down out of a similar sense of self-preservation as the airline. But I do not trust big companies. I've seen too much first hand how big companies screw things up (even without intending to). People like to pretend that big companies are big nasty greedy evil people who act as one concerted force for darkness. It's not that at all. Big companies are full of individual self-interested people. Many of whom are myopically focused on impressing their boss or making their quarterly numbers or just making sure that if something goes wrong someone else gets the blame. Almost all of them take some degree of pride in their work, but that manifests itself in different ways. Some of them want to see a good product, but some of them take pride in shaving time and money off of the product and raising profits - not for themselves, but for the company. They view it more holistically as helping keep the lights on. The larger the company, the more difficult it is to run, and I'm not sure I've seen a very large company run very well. So I expect Boeing to keep their planes in the air, and I also expect to see some dumb-something-ery out of them.

Beyond Boeing, there is the FAA. But the FAA is the one I trust the least. The FAA has no self-preservation interest. None of the employees there are going to get fired for a crash, certainly not for a crash happening outside of the country. But even within, a crash is bound to happen. The FAA employees no doubt have a sense of self-worth and accomplishment, and that is all we have to rely on to have them push for safety. Government agencies are run typically "by the book" with very little leeway for creativity or innovation. So often there is a checklist, that has served them well in the past, and the checklist is adhered to. And if the checklist is adhered to, the job is done. This I do not trust.

This is the network that I have to give me confidence to step on a plane. In order of criticality and trust, it is 1) pilot and staff, 2) airline, 3) manufacturer, 4) government. I practically expect nothing out of number 4. So you tell me they abdicated responsibility and I say "of course, what more would you expect" and move on without raising an eyebrow. I also expect some moronic behavior out of the manufacturer - mostly because I don't believe that large companies can really and truly be competent. Still, criminal behavior or cover-ups will happen from time to time and that's totally unacceptable. Also unacceptable is repeated incompetence (as Boeing is currently demonstrating with their rush-to-fix). I do not tolerate moronic behavior from airlines, though it's bound to happen. You're getting too close to my seat at that point. And an incompetent pilot is somewhat criminal (depending on the details of course).

I hope this explains my reactions to some of these stories.
 
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This is concerning. They haven't even completed the investigation of Ethiopian Air (to the best of my knowledge). I haven't even heard it reported that it has been identified as a linked event. I mean, I get that everyone assumes it will be, and that the evidence so far has pointed us in that direction, but to date I've not seen findings that say it's the same phenomenon. I've heard nothing about black box recordings of the pilot on EA, I've heard nothing about what procedures they tried or didn't try during that flight. Perhaps I'm just not well connected enough to the news (I'm not the most connected person here), but this seems extremely premature, and it seems premature precisely because of how much money Boeing and all of the airlines they service are losing during the grounding. So if you're looking for a money grab at the expense of safety, this kinda looks like that to me.

The FAA mandated some changes after the Lion Air crash, it seems likely that these updates would have been made in response to that accident and the concerns of pilots' unions in any case. With respect to the Ethiopian Air crash the rate-of-climb and speed profiles are very very similar. As you say there's no public information that allows a stronger link put nonetheless the aircraft in each incident did the same very unusual thing over and over again.
 
But the FAA is the one I trust the least.
You really do gain a different perspective when you're involved in the industry. I'm sure you remember how much philosophical and political learning I did during GTP discussions, and that I developed a pretty strong libertarian mindset, but that doesn't apply to my view on "the FAA". When I consider the FAA and its procedures, I don't see an intangible bureaucracy which is unconcerned with my well being. While some procedures are truly obnoxious (my medical cert problem for example), the people are real people with real concern. The vast majority have taken the same training I have, they've assessed and taken the same risks I have, they've encountered the same problems, and they take every opportunity to teach others the lessons they've learned in an effort to prevent them in the future. The FAA is actually one of very few governmental bodies I trust besides NASA. Virtually all the rules I have to follow exist because somebody killed themselves, and all of us have experienced moments that make us realize how easy it is to make a fatal mistake. I can't speak for the politicians at the top, but people working for the FAA are trustworthy. A pain in the ass, perhaps, but trustworthy, and the overwhelming support to keep the FAA public, even among libertarian pilots, is evidence of how much all of us in the industry rely on each other to be genuine and thorough. Every one of us has to be at that level - there is no police-like separation of authority, there is only equal thoroughness of knowledge and responsibility.
 
You really do gain a different perspective when you're involved in the industry. I'm sure you remember how much philosophical and political learning I did during GTP discussions, and that I developed a pretty strong libertarian mindset, but that doesn't apply to my view on "the FAA". When I consider the FAA and its procedures, I don't see an intangible bureaucracy which is unconcerned with my well being. While some procedures are truly obnoxious (my medical cert problem for example), the people are real people with real concern. The vast majority have taken the same training I have, they've assessed and taken the same risks I have, they've encountered the same problems, and they take every opportunity to teach others the lessons they've learned in an effort to prevent them in the future. The FAA is actually one of very few governmental bodies I trust besides NASA. Virtually all the rules I have to follow exist because somebody killed themselves, and all of us have experienced moments that make us realize how easy it is to make a fatal mistake. I can't speak for the politicians at the top, but people working for the FAA are trustworthy. A pain in the ass, perhaps, but trustworthy, and the overwhelming support to keep the FAA public, even among libertarian pilots, is evidence of how much all of us in the industry rely on each other to be genuine and thorough. Every one of us has to be at that level - there is no police-like separation of authority, there is only equal thoroughness of knowledge and responsibility.

I don't mean to say that the people working at the FAA aren't good people, or that they don't understand the job, or that they are incompetent in any way. I don't mean to say that about the people at Boeing either, or Ethiopian Air. I'm sure they're wonderful people and very intelligent and very honorable. All of them, at each organization.

It's the structure that I don't trust. I believe you when you say that every rule exists because somebody killed themselves, but that's not a good way to run an organization, and it doesn't protect against situations like this one. Situations like this one require people to be forward thinking, understanding how the technology is evolving. I don't trust them to keep me alive based on how people have killed themselves in the past, I need people to be thinking about the new ways that I'm going to die.

Don't trust NASA either. I worked there. I've got folks on the inside right now (specifically JSC and JPL). The people that I worked with at NASA were some of the most brilliant people I have ever worked with. They were truly innovative and forward thinking. And I saw some extraordinarily dumb decisions come out of the fact that it all relies on government money. I saw some absolutely mind boggling management decisions. The DOJ clip that someone posted somewhere around here (some movie about a troop carrier tank thing) reminded me a lot of my time at NASA. Don't get me wrong, they get amazing things done, and I'm proud to have been a part of it. I'm also not particularly unhappy to be done with it.

My wife works for a very large company, one of the bigger private companies on Earth. And honestly, it's a mess. Some of it reminds me of NASA.

Edit:

Long story short, Danoff trusts aviation folks more the closer they get to actually being in the plane with him.
 
This Vox article makes a pretty good point. This 'scandal' will probably blow over (politically, anyways) because:

It was the Obama-era FAA that certified the plane, meaning it's not likely democrats will push the issue around too aggressively.
Republicans are probably not inclined to inflict any damage on Boeing, which is a huge employer and one of the few remaining heavy-hitting industrial exporters.
The acting Sec. Def. is a former executive at Boeing.

This will probably be resolved in the marketplace honestly. If I were to guess, Boeing is probably accelerating plans to replace the 737 in anticipation of fallout from the issue. They are going to feel some financial pain, to be sure, but I doubt they'll face much heat from Washington.


You really do gain a different perspective when you're involved in the industry. I'm sure you remember how much philosophical and political learning I did during GTP discussions, and that I developed a pretty strong libertarian mindset, but that doesn't apply to my view on "the FAA". When I consider the FAA and its procedures, I don't see an intangible bureaucracy which is unconcerned with my well being. While some procedures are truly obnoxious (my medical cert problem for example), the people are real people with real concern. The vast majority have taken the same training I have, they've assessed and taken the same risks I have, they've encountered the same problems, and they take every opportunity to teach others the lessons they've learned in an effort to prevent them in the future. The FAA is actually one of very few governmental bodies I trust besides NASA.

To be honest, I think many areas of the governmental bureaucracy are like this. I don't ever work with feds, but state and local officials with construction & planning oversight are basically the same, and I have a similar attitude as you towards them. Former fire fighters, architects, contractors, engineers, etc. There isn't a separate education system for 'regulators', they come from the industry they preside over in probably all/most cases. And you better believe buildings would be a lot less safe if there wasn't a relentless amount of code enforcement. Also everywhere would become like Houston, and nobody wants that. :lol:

I think with regards to airplane manufacturers, yes there is definitely a market incentive to building safe airplanes. But sometimes corners are cut, even if seemingly non-consequential ways.
 
I like to remind folks that the place where government competes directly with private industry is in hiring. The staff of a government operation is made up of the same normal people that the staff of anyplace else is made up of.

And you better believe buildings would be a lot less safe if there wasn't a relentless amount of code enforcement.

Yea, I wouldn't have had to move that outlet when I remodeled my entry room, I could have merely deleted it. I was honestly concerned that I'd have to install a bathroom fan in a room that wasn't a bathroom just because of code. And don't get me started on arc fault breakers.

This is my problem with government, not the inspectors, but the structure. They have a checklist, they go down the checklist (it is their job, they're required to do so), and if they find that you're lacking a bathroom fan somewhere, they require it whether it makes sense or is safe or not.
 
I like to remind folks that the place where government competes directly with private industry is in hiring. The staff of a government operation is made up of the same normal people that the staff of anyplace else is made up of.



Yea, I wouldn't have had to move that outlet when I remodeled my entry room, I could have merely deleted it. I was honestly concerned that I'd have to install a bathroom fan in a room that wasn't a bathroom just because of code. And don't get me started on arc fault breakers.

This is my problem with government, not the inspectors, but the structure. They have a checklist, they go down the checklist (it is their job, they're required to do so), and if they find that you're lacking a bathroom fan somewhere, they require it whether it makes sense or is safe or not.

It's the only tenable solution. Otherwise everything would be subject to a case by case decision making process, which would be far more onerous. And I understand your frustration completely. The amount of times on any given day where I say out loud "this code requirement is stupid" is numerous. But codes are amended and made better, and inspectors have authority to interpret, which they do. But if there wasn't a code, we would go back to the bad old days when lots and lots of people died in fires very often. Why would a developer pay for panic hardware on an egress door or provide multiple means of egress if it isn't required? They probably wouldn't even considering market forces (they didn't before they were required, why would they now?). I think we've become somewhat insulated to the risk of fire specifically because they don't happen nearly as much as they used to, and because buildings are much easier to escape now.

All of this is to say that regulation does play an important/critical role in improving public safety.
 
It's the only tenable solution. Otherwise everything would be subject to a case by case decision making process, which would be far more onerous. And I understand your frustration completely. The amount of times on any given day where I say out loud "this code requirement is stupid" is numerous. But codes are amended and made better, and inspectors have authority to interpret, which they do. But if there wasn't a code, we would go back to the bad old days when lots and lots of people died in fires very often. Why would a developer pay for panic hardware on an egress door or provide multiple means of egress if it isn't required? They probably wouldn't even considering market forces (they didn't before they were required, why would they now?). I think we've become somewhat insulated to the risk of fire specifically because they don't happen nearly as much as they used to, and because buildings are much easier to escape now.

Codes seem to mostly be amended in more and more onerous directions. I have a bunch of PITA GFIs which were horrid enough, now they have arc fault too - which is a total headache. Fires don't happen so much in part because people smoke less. I used to live in a house with no GFIs and no arc fault circuits (you probably live somewhere without arc fault now), and of course nobody came close to be electrocuted and the house didn't burn down.

Builders put in all kinds of stuff they're not legally required to put in because customers want it. Nobody requires stone slab countertops, garbage disposals, air conditioning, or garage door openers. Yet people want them so they get them.
 
Codes seem to mostly be amended in more and more onerous directions. I have a bunch of PITA GFIs which were horrid enough, now they have arc fault too - which is a total headache. Fires don't happen so much in part because people smoke less. I used to live in a house with no GFIs and no arc fault circuits (you probably live somewhere without arc fault now), and of course nobody came close to be electrocuted and the house didn't burn down.

Builders put in all kinds of stuff they're not legally required to put in because customers want it. Nobody requires stone slab countertops, garbage disposals, air conditioning, or garage door openers. Yet people want them so they get them.

I'm trying to understand what you are getting at. You seem to be holding it a bit at arms length. Critiquing the usage/implementation of code is one thing, and it's reasonable. But I think you are saying there just shouldn't be a code. Or am I misunderstanding? You tend to be absolute...

And I'm not sure if you were serious when you were equating convenience and luxury features that an owner might use every day with life safety equipment they might never use? Residential construction isn't really as analogous to airplane safety as public buildings are. But if you had issues with the residential code...ohhhh man don't ever become a high rise developer. :lol:
 
I don't trust them to keep me alive based on how people have killed themselves in the past, I need people to be thinking about the new ways that I'm going to die.
This idea has layers to it for sure. On the one hand, I'm upset that Boeing engineers pushed the envelope of the airframe beyond the stable characteristics we all expect from GA planes to the point of requiring a bandaid, and that the FAA didn't take issue with it. But on the other hand, the FAA has given me the "freedom" to be 100% responsible for the safety of my flight, to the point where I don't "need" people to think ahead for me because that's my job. Then again, I can only do so much if the equipment doesn't cooperate.
 
I'm trying to understand what you are getting at. You seem to be holding it a bit at arms length. Critiquing the usage/implementation of code is one thing, and it's reasonable. But I think you are saying there just shouldn't be a code. Or am I misunderstanding? You tend to be absolute...

It's complicated. Deed restrictions for zoning and code are legit only to the degree that they weren't put in place by force - which is possible. Let's say, for example, that your local city owns a piece of land. And the city decides to sell it to a developer to turn into a residential area. The city can enforce code on the transaction all they want, it is "their" land. Examples only get more complex from there, and it touches on how to properly enact eminent domain. It goes way beyond this thread, but I'm happy to talk about it somewhere else.
 
You're surprised? If you were head of an Airline and your shareholders and passengers didn't want the Max you think the order for you placed would still go through?

This is going to cost Boeing a hell of a lot more than they currently suspect it will.
Surprised? Lol who told you that? Actually, you're right. I was surprised about the part where Boeing STILL needs to agree with Garuda's cancellation of ordering the aircraft though, not the airline's decision on why they cancelled it in the first place. Now I'm wondering why they didn't push through with the cancellation right away when Garuda immediately informed them their own decision about that.
 
I was surprised about the part where Boeing STILL needs to agree with Garuda's cancellation of ordering the aircraft though, not the airline's decision on why they cancelled it in the first place. Now I'm wondering why they didn't push through with the cancellation right away when Garuda immediately informed them their own decision about that.

Because ordering an aircraft isn't a simple process. If Boeing have started building them then Garuda will be under contract to purchase them. Presumably they've already passed the cancellation cut-off point if the order wasn't immediately cancellable. Another fair presumption would be that Garuda are attempting to exercise a later-stage cutoff clause. Boeing may feel that accepting such a cancellation could set a precedent for other customers whose orders are at the same stage.
 
Because ordering an aircraft isn't a simple process. If Boeing have started building them then Garuda will be under contract to purchase them. Presumably they've already passed the cancellation cut-off point if the order wasn't immediately cancellable. Another fair presumption would be that Garuda are attempting to exercise a later-stage cutoff clause. Boeing may feel that accepting such a cancellation could set a precedent for other customers whose orders are at the same stage.
Oh. So it looks like there's no turning back then.
 
Now it seems a whistle blower has come forward


Senate panel investigates whistleblower claims of poor FAA training in Boeing 737 Max approval process





    • The committee's chairman, Sen. Roger Wicker, said he's looking into whistleblower claims that FAA employees lacked proper training to review the jets.
"In light of recent 737 crashes in Indonesia and Ethiopia, the committee is investigating any potential connection between inadequate training and certification of Aviation Safety Inspectors who may have participated in the FSB evaluation of the 737 MAX," Sen. Roger Wicker, R-Miss., chairman of the committee, wrote to FAA Acting Administrator Daniel Elwell on Tuesday.


https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/02/sen...s-of-poor-faa-training-on-boeing-737-max.html





Pilots flying Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 initially followed emergency procedures that were laid out by Boeing before the plane nose-dived into the ground, according to preliminary findings reported in the Wall Street Journal.

Citing unnamed sources familiar with the investigation, the WSJ reported that despite following the steps, which included turning off an automated flight-control system, pilots could not regain control of the Boeing 737 MAX 8.


https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/03/africa/ethiopian-airlines-emergency-procedures-intl/index.html


 
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Now it seems a whistle blower has come forward


Senate panel investigates whistleblower claims of poor FAA training in Boeing 737 Max approval process





    • The committee's chairman, Sen. Roger Wicker, said he's looking into whistleblower claims that FAA employees lacked proper training to review the jets.
"In light of recent 737 crashes in Indonesia and Ethiopia, the committee is investigating any potential connection between inadequate training and certification of Aviation Safety Inspectors who may have participated in the FSB evaluation of the 737 MAX," Sen. Roger Wicker, R-Miss., chairman of the committee, wrote to FAA Acting Administrator Daniel Elwell on Tuesday.


https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/02/sen...s-of-poor-faa-training-on-boeing-737-max.html


article
Wicker said that the FAA may have been notified about these deficiencies as early as August 2018 and that an agency investigation into the allegations may have already been completed.
 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news...iopian-airlines-pilots-lion-crash/3350372002/

This is why I called Boeing's fix premature, and it answers my question about Ethiopian Airlines. Not that I knew about this, of course, I can't see the future. But you had to allow for this possibility.

How could EA not have taken steps to make sure that the Lion Air crash wasn't repeated. They did, at least they did well enough to follow the right procedures. How could their pilots not be trained on this issue? They were. Does adding the indicators to the cabin fix the problem? No. Was it needed for the EA flight? Nope.

So what happened during that EA flight? Why did Boeing's procedures not solve the problem? Is it another problem that needs another procedure? I'm only getting more critical of the rush to fix the perceived issue and get these planes back in the air.
 
Is it another problem that needs another procedure?

It's entirely possible that it could be a different problem as well as a further problem; the possibility that the two crashes, as unfortunate as they are, were for two different reasons is not beyond the realms of possibility but given that two similar crashes of identical plane types happened within the space of a few weeks or months, it's easy to jump to a conclusion that both are causally linked.

I'm interested to read that the Lion Air accident has opened up the possibility of a faulty sensor rather than an inherent system flaw.

The Lion Air crash probe has focused in part on a faulty sensor that was repaired in a U.S. aircraft maintenance facility before the tragedy, Bloomberg reports, citing investigative documents. Erroneous signals from that sensor caused the anti-stall system to repeatedly try to push down the nose, according to a preliminary Indonesian investigation.

A faulty sensor could be for any number of reasons, especially if it had recently undergone maintenance. Maintenance mechanics have inadvertently caused crashes by leaving engineering tape over sensors, failing to spot a particular fault or incorrectly fixing a fault.

From that USA Today article, I get the impression that the preliminary report concludes the Ethiopian pilots followed procedure as correctly and to the best of their abilities as they could.
 
It's entirely possible that it could be a different problem as well as a further problem; the possibility that the two crashes, as unfortunate as they are, were for two different reasons is not beyond the realms of possibility but given that two similar crashes of identical plane types happened within the space of a few weeks or months, it's easy to jump to a conclusion that both are causally linked.

I'm interested to read that the Lion Air accident has opened up the possibility of a faulty sensor rather than an inherent system flaw.

One could argue that a single-point failure for a sensor is an inherent system flaw. But it depends on what you consider to be a failure. That seems to have been what Boeing have focused their efforts on addressing.

From that USA Today article, I get the impression that the preliminary report concludes the Ethiopian pilots followed procedure as correctly and to the best of their abilities as they could.

Seems that way. And that's a serious concern. Boeing has been operating under the assumption that following this procedure will prevent a crash.
 
I'm interested to read that the Lion Air accident has opened up the possibility of a faulty sensor rather than an inherent system flaw.

It can be both - how does the system respond to a faulty sensor? Faults in vanes and pitots are reasonably common, they're fragile and exposed. Having a system that can authorise such dramatic action on the basis of a single sensor is a poor idea.

One could argue that a single-point failure for a sensor is an inherent system flaw. But it depends on what you consider to be a failure. That seems to have been what Boeing have focused their efforts on addressing.

Quite. One might argue that allowing a single sensor to drive that whole system tree and to make warnings (or extra sensors) an option whose importance is played down to domestic and foreign customers was negligent. There are no surprises in Boeing addressing the failings around the system, particularly as (in part) they've been legally ordered to do so.
 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news...iopian-airlines-pilots-lion-crash/3350372002/

This is why I called Boeing's fix premature, and it answers my question about Ethiopian Airlines. Not that I knew about this, of course, I can't see the future. But you had to allow for this possibility.

How could EA not have taken steps to make sure that the Lion Air crash wasn't repeated. They did, at least they did well enough to follow the right procedures. How could their pilots not be trained on this issue? They were. Does adding the indicators to the cabin fix the problem? No. Was it needed for the EA flight? Nope.

So what happened during that EA flight? Why did Boeing's procedures not solve the problem? Is it another problem that needs another procedure? I'm only getting more critical of the rush to fix the perceived issue and get these planes back in the air.

I'm no expert when it comes to aviation, but I have a feeling that it was not an instantaneous realization of what was happening and I wonder if, after deactivating the automatic systems, whether or not the trim automatically returns to a neutral position? I get the feeling that it doesn't. Keep in mind this all happened in about FIVE minutes. So that means the crew had to:

1. Realize what was causing the problem (deactivating the automatic systems when the nose of the plane drops is probably not instinctual, maybe a different failure would have been more obvious, like a bird strike cutting engine power?)

2. Follow written (?) procedures (I wonder how long this would take?)

3. Physically disable automatic systems

4. Manually re-adjust the trim setting

I get the feeling that by the time they disabled the system, the plane was already in pretty bad shape, and if the tail didn't correct itself, it was continuing to get worse. The pilots reported an issue with the flight systems 1 minute into the flight and crashed 6 minutes into the flight. There was probably about a minute of unrecoverable dive, so really they had something like 4 minutes, or 240 seconds, to understand and fix the problem....while the aircraft was diving uncontrollably. There just wasn't enough time nor altitude to correct the problem it seems. It really is a tragedy.
 
I'm no expert when it comes to aviation, but I have a feeling that it was not an instantaneous realization of what was happening and I wonder if, after deactivating the automatic systems, whether or not the trim automatically returns to a neutral position? I get the feeling that it doesn't. Keep in mind this all happened in about FIVE minutes. So that means the crew had to:

1. Realize what was causing the problem (deactivating the automatic systems when the nose of the plane drops is probably not instinctual, maybe a different failure would have been more obvious, like a bird strike cutting engine power?)

2. Follow written (?) procedures (I wonder how long this would take?)

3. Physically disable automatic systems

4. Manually re-adjust the trim setting

I get the feeling that by the time they disabled the system, the plane was already in pretty bad shape, and if the tail didn't correct itself, it was continuing to get worse. The pilots reported an issue with the flight systems 1 minute into the flight and crashed 6 minutes into the flight. There was probably about a minute of unrecoverable dive, so really they had something like 4 minutes, or 240 seconds, to understand and fix the problem....while the aircraft was diving uncontrollably. There just wasn't enough time nor altitude to correct the problem it seems. It really is a tragedy.

I don't know what actions they took after disabling the system. What's being reported so far is that they followed Boeing's procedure and crashed anyway. It's possible that the outcome of this will be that ultimately they didn't follow the procedure. But so far what we know is that it looks like they did, so I'm proceeding based on that.

It's possible that following Boeing's procedure for a faulty sensor to the letter would still have resulted in a crash here, and that's what's being reported at the moment (possibly erroneously). But if that is what happened, then the procedure is no good, and we don't know why. This is what concerns me most about the rush to get these planes back in the air - we don't have all of the information. What we do know is that he pilots were at least aware of the potential for the automatic system to be causing the problem, and properly disabled it. That rules out my complaint that they were unaware of the Lion Air incident, and it rules out the notion that this scenario simply failed to enter their minds. It did enter their minds, they were aware of it, and it is something they tried.

At the moment, based on only my pure conjecture here, my response to you would be that I'm sure that those pilots tried to recover with the system off and that their attempts at recovery failed. I very much doubt that pilots (one of whom had many hours) would have failed to attempt to recover with the system off after having correctly diagnosed that turning the system off might help.
 
I'm no expert when it comes to aviation, but I have a feeling that it was not an instantaneous realization of what was happening and I wonder if, after deactivating the automatic systems, whether or not the trim automatically returns to a neutral position? I get the feeling that it doesn't. Keep in mind this all happened in about FIVE minutes. So that means the crew had to:
There are some videos on youtube show the procedure for recovering from runaway trim. Not exactly the same issue, but similar:



 
There are some videos on youtube show the procedure for recovering from runaway trim. Not exactly the same issue, but similar:





This is quite illuminating. Its pretty clear whats happening based on the automatic movement of trim wheels, so it's not as if the pilots could have had no idea what was happening. It's also clear that MCAS can alter the trim much, much faster than a (single) human can do manually, and disabling MCAS does not return the trim to its original position. I think the pilots ran out of time and that even following procedures was not enough.

deeper conjecture: I remember reading that the plane wreckage revealed that the jackscrew for the trim was in its most extended position. So either:

a-the pilots did not attempt to re-trim the airplane after disabling MCAS
b-when the pilots re-enabled MCAS, it continued to trim the airplane
c-the trim had a mechanical failure and became stuck

I'd say scenario b is most likely.
 
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