Air Crash Thread: Boeing MAX and Other Problems

[TenEightyOne]

It always amuses me when a ship is sinking how many others want to go down that are not the Captain.

If you read back through the thread you'll see that I've made my opinion clear - I believe that Boeing are to blame for the way MCAS was implemented and the resulting impossibility of given pilots adequate training. I think that's been a hugely causative factor in the loss of two aircraft filled with passengers. I've added several times that I think the FAA also need to be held to account for the apparent way (if reports are correct) Boeing were able to self-certify the MCAS parameters and rollout.

Your tirade above wasn't triggered by that though, it was in response to a storage flight that lost power in an engine on take-off. I suspect that very very few people are going to somehow see that as a Boeing problem, even fewer of those are ever going to be in the position of making the choice of buying a Boeing or an Airbus.

 

[Dotini]

If you read back through the thread you'll see that I've made my opinion clear - I believe that Boeing are to blame for the way MCAS was implemented and the resulting impossibility of given pilots adequate training. I think that's been a hugely causative factor in the loss of two aircraft filled with passengers. I've added several times that I think the FAA also need to be held to account for the apparent way (if reports are correct) Boeing were able to self-certify the MCAS parameters and rollout.

Your tirade above wasn't triggered by that though, it was in response to a storage flight that lost power in an engine on take-off. I suspect that very very few people are going to somehow see that as a Boeing problem, even fewer of those are ever going to be in the position of making the choice of buying a Boeing or an Airbus.

I concur.

With regard to the FAA outsourcing certification to Boeing, we think that the FAA lacked resources of time, money and expertise to do that mandated job, and Boeing, for reasons of the marketplace, leaped at the mouthwatering opportunity to increase profits. This is a straightforward example of government collusion with industry to sacrifice integrity, and ultimately people's lives, on the altar of the almighty dollar. I'm sure Boeing never intended to kill people, they simply succumbed to the lure of gold and shortcuts. Perhaps it could be called corruption.

 

[Danoff]

I'm sure Boeing never intended to kill people, they simply succumbed to the lure of gold and shortcuts.

My goodness. So judgy.

*plane has engineering problems*

"Boeing has succumbed to greed, is taking shortcuts, and sacrificing lives on the altar of profits"

Whew... Maybe they're trying to make a great plane that enables a wider portion of the globe to travel safely with reduced environmental impact. No? Not possible?

 

[TenEightyOne]

Maybe they're trying to make a great plane that enables a wider portion of the globe to travel safely with reduced environmental impact. No? Not possible?

Of course it's possible, and they're very very good at it. The question is more specific - were Boeing right to take control of certifying MCAS and its documentation and were the FAA right to let them do so? The problem isn't that MCAS didn't work but that pilots around the world (including the US) were not aware of how it worked and how to switch it off even after official Boeing type training.

If Boeing are found to have requested the changes to the certification procedure in order to deliver planes more quickly or more cheaply then @Dotini's slant on the story could be correct - that would be profit over best-safety-possible.

 

[Danoff]

Of course it's possible, and they're very very good at it. The question is more specific - were Boeing right to take control of certifying MCAS and its documentation and were the FAA right to let them do so? The problem isn't that MCAS didn't work but that pilots around the world (including the US) were not aware of how it worked and how to switch it off even after official Boeing type training.

If Boeing are found to have requested the changes to the certification procedure in order to deliver planes more quickly or more cheaply then @Dotini's slant on the story could be correct - that would be profit over best-safety-possible.

I seriously doubt that Boeing sees the FAA requirements as contributing to safety. Similarly, medical device companies and pharmaceuticals view the FDA as merely hoop to jump through. I'm not convinced that either of these government organizations actually contribute to safety. Boeing doesn't want to put a product out that will kill their customers not because the FAA won't let them, but because it's bad for business.

Boeing no doubt has some serious management issues though (as is common with large corporate and government structures), and those management issues resulted in a a product that is not up to the usual safety standards. That should be a wake-up call for them.

It's all just people, people who take pride in their jobs, and who want to deliver a quality product. The engineers are looking to deliver a product that saves fuel and money. The managers are looking to deliver the product on time. The regulatory group is looking to keep costs down and stay on the right side of the law. Sometimes management pushes engineering too hard, but it's not because they're looking to trade blood for dollars, they genuinely think they're doing their job. Separately, regulatory pushed hard, and had some success saving money. And eventually (as was bound to happen) when something goes wrong, that regulatory success looks nefarious. It's not something that they'd have thought about. Don't get me wrong, there's blame to be assigned here, I'm just not willing to subscribe to the black and white good guy bad guy evil greedy nasty corporation simplification.

If there was a cover-up, if people knew it was unsafe, that's a job for the court system.

Ethiopian Air is also not an organization that I'm going to demonize, but I'm shocked at how little flack you're all willing to send their way. They knew about the Lion Air crash. I know that you're going to say that Boeing did too, but Boeing was at least taking steps to address that issue. Ethiopian Air seems to have abdicated their responsibility for their fleet to the manufacturer, but how do you do that? A plane went down, one you fly, and you know that it was caused by engineering problems, and a poor response to those engineering problems. How do you just ignore that? How do you not at least get a memo in front of your pilots detailing what went down on that plane and make sure that at least your MAX pilots have read a synopsis of the events? Really? No steps? I wouldn't push so hard on the EA angle if it weren't for that fact that nobody seems to be.

 

[TenEightyOne]

I seriously doubt that Boeing sees the FAA requirements as contributing to safety. Similarly, medical device companies and pharmaceuticals view the FDA as merely hoop to jump through. I'm not convinced that either of these government organizations actually contribute to safety. Boeing doesn't want to put a product out that will kill their customers not because the FAA won't let them, but because it's bad for business.

Boeing no doubt has some serious management issues though (as is common with large corporate and government structures), and those management issues resulted in a a product that is not up to the usual safety standards. That should be a wake-up call for them.

It's all just people, people who take pride in their jobs, and who want to deliver a quality product. The engineers are looking to deliver a product that saves fuel and money. The managers are looking to deliver the product on time. The regulatory group is looking to keep costs down and stay on the right side of the law. Sometimes management pushes engineering too hard, but it's not because they're looking to trade blood for dollars, they genuinely think they're doing their job. Separately, regulatory pushed hard, and had some success saving money. And eventually (as was bound to happen) when something goes wrong, that regulatory success looks nefarious. It's not something that they'd have thought about. Don't get me wrong, there's blame to be assigned here, I'm just not willing to subscribe to the black and white good guy bad guy evil greedy nasty corporation simplification.

If there was a cover-up, if people knew it was unsafe, that's a job for the court system.

I agree, although if Boeing are found to have an endemic corporate attitude to FAA mandates such as the one you describe then something needs to change. The FAA don't make up the rules for the fun of it, they investigate incidents and developments (via the NTSB and internationally-comparable bodies) and set minimum safety standards. It appears that the judgement of Boeing, the FAA or both was flawed in this case.

Ethiopian Air is also not an organization that I'm going to demonize, but I'm shocked at how little flack you're all willing to send their way. They knew about the Lion Air crash. I know that you're going to say that Boeing did too, but Boeing was at least taking steps to address that issue. Ethiopian Air seems to have abdicated their responsibility for their fleet to the manufacturer, but how do you do that? A plane went down, one you fly, and you know that it was caused by engineering problems, and a poor response to those engineering problems. How do you just ignore that? How do you not at least get a memo in front of your pilots detailing what went down on that plane and make sure that at least your MAX pilots have read a synopsis of the events? Really? No steps? I wouldn't push so hard on the EA angle if it weren't for that fact that nobody seems to be.

So, you're in a plane with 1,000 feet clearance below you that's going into a dive at around 300 knots. That gives you five or six seconds to do something before you don't have space/lift to begin a climb that's greater than the rising terrain below you.

Here's how I see this kind of emergency playing out in the future: PiC and FO will each get warnings in front of them that there's an AoA disagree, Stall, MCAS override. The classroom and simulator training will kick in immediately and they'll deactivate the systems that they need to deactivate within seconds. That's how many flight-critical events (engine failure, rejected take-off, windshear) are handled now - and simulator practice is key to that. I've had a joyride in an Airbus simulator and can assure you that the cockpit environment is (almost) overwhelmingly complex when an emergency is in progress - it's mental. The pilot's 8,000+ hours are significant as is his up-to-date simulator training.

The problem, as I'll say again, is that as one of the world's premier airlines Ethiopian Air were a day-one customer for the MAX simulator but it hadn't been delivered at the time of the crash. The pilot's simulation training was up-to-date. In the emergency he started doing all the things he was trained to do (according to early reports). However, you could ride a MAX simulator today and it would not teach you to handle AoA Disagree + MCAS override. It isn't there yet, and Boeing said initially that additional simulator training wasn't needed for type conversion.

Boeing said that pilots who had flown earlier models did not need additional simulator training, and even after the October crash in Indonesia, the FAA agreed.

That's self-evidently incorrect. I'd broadly agree that if this had happened with 9,000 feet of radar altitude the pilots might be expected to figure it out, depending on exactly how the warnings were presented to them. Given how low they were they need to instinctively have the reactions trained into them, and that was impossible to do.

From the NASA-arbitrated (and verified) anonymous aircraft complaints that I linked earlier in the thread;

 

[Danoff]

The problem, as I'll say again, is that as one of the world's premier airlines Ethiopian Air were a day-one customer for the MAX simulator but it hadn't been delivered at the time of the crash. The pilot's simulation training was up-to-date. In the emergency he started doing all the things he was trained to do (according to early reports). However, you could ride a MAX simulator today and it would not teach you to handle AoA Disagree + MCAS override. It isn't there yet, and Boeing said initially that additional simulator training wasn't needed for type conversion.

A memo, Ten. A memo. An email. I don't care what it was, how do you not take any steps at all to make sure that your pilots who are flying that plane are aware of the circumstances with that plane. Just a "hey did you hear about that crash? crazy huh... so you read about what was going on there right?"

Seriously, the most basic of steps.

 

[TenEightyOne]

A memo, Ten. A memo. An email. I don't care what it was, how do you not take any steps at all to make sure that your pilots who are flying that plane are aware of the circumstances with that plane. Just a "hey did you hear about that crash? crazy huh... so you read about what was going on there right?"

It would be unbelievable to think that a MAX pilot wouldn't have read as much as possible about the crash, I agree. It's also unbelievable that the airline and its pilots didn't have discussions about it.

I believe that we see how that played out in a plane that overrode the pilots (and/or autopilot) and went into a dive at low altitude, all the instinctive things would have been done first to try to understand what the warnings were telling them. Without the instruments being clear about what was happening (AoA disagree, MCAS override) the pilots had very little time to figure it out. If they figured it out after 10 seconds it was probably too late to recover - full elevator (which is what MCAS can deploy up to) is a dramatic thing in large jet at that speed.

It will be interesting to see what communications Ethiopian Air had with Boeing about updating their own MAX fleet (six aircraft, I think) to take the extra sensor and the (then still optional) extra warnings. Which Boeing had made optional implying that they weren't critical, a situation which will surely change. It will also be interesting, in retrospect, to see if the accident reports suggest that the FAA should have recognised the full criticality of MCAS and grounded MAX aircraft after the first Emergency Airworthiness directive to ensure that airlines, pilots and simulator operators were in a position to deliver training on emergency MCAS scenarios.

 

[Danoff]

It would be unbelievable to think that a MAX pilot wouldn't have read as much as possible about the crash, I agree. It's also unbelievable that the airline and its pilots didn't have discussions about it.

And yet... if they did... you'd have to think that as your plane (a MAX) headed for the ground, it might dawn on you that there was a recent crash, and you'd have discussed why that happened... So which is less believable? That the airline never had a conversation? Or that the pilots never thought about the recent crash in the plane they were crashing in?

I find both to be implausible, and can't escape the idea that one of them must be correct.

 

[Liquid]

you'd have to think that as your plane (a MAX) headed for the ground, it might dawn on you that there was a recent crash, and you'd have discussed why that happened [...] the pilots never thought about the recent crash in the plane they were crashing in?

At the time they were crashing? You can't know that for sure. Even with a CVR you cannot know what the respective pilots were thinking. I would argue that it is more plausible to believe that in a crashing plane, the pilots were too distracted by their imminent contact with the ground to think "Ohhhh, this must be what happened in the Lion Air crash! Right, now I get it. Hang on, let me see if I can do something correctly that they did wrongly."

It's not like in The Simpsons when Homer wakes up in his burning living room and tries to remember the "When the fire starts to burn..." song; in similar circumstances you'd get the 🤬 out of there as soon as you could. The panic and mortality of the situation would almost certainly lead to you not thinking rationally in a way that information recall or anecdotal help is no longer a calm and collected process.

 

[Novalee]

https://globalnews.ca/news/5101313/boeing-faa-oversight-senate/

The Federal Aviation Administration plans to revamp oversight of airplane development after the two deadly crashes of Boeing’s new 737 Max raised questions of whether the FAA has gone too far in letting companies regulate themselves, according to testimony prepared for a Capitol Hill hearing on Wednesday.

A step in the right direction.

Still though it is crazy it takes the threat of a oversight hearing to bring changes they fully admite was to save money.Not passengers but money .

For decades, the FAA has delegated some authority for certifying new aircraft to the manufacturers, reducing government costs and, defenders say, speeding the rollout of new models.

 

[Danoff]

At the time they were crashing? You can't know that for sure. Even with a CVR you cannot know what the respective pilots were thinking. I would argue that it is more plausible to believe that in a crashing plane, the pilots were too distracted by their imminent contact with the ground to think "Ohhhh, this must be what happened in the Lion Air crash! Right, now I get it. Hang on, let me see if I can do something correctly that they did wrongly."

It's not like in The Simpsons when Homer wakes up in his burning living room and tries to remember the "When the fire starts to burn..." song; in similar circumstances you'd get the 🤬 out of there as soon as you could. The panic and mortality of the situation would almost certainly lead to you not thinking rationally in a way that information recall or anecdotal help is no longer a calm and collected process.

It's not like trying to remember whether you locked your car. The was a crash, due to engineering and pilot response, on a plane that these people were flying. It was the kind of crash that stands out. I'd expect them to be on top of it. It was their job after all to know how to pilot the plane. This is not background noise, this is something you remember if you review it and then go fly that plane.

https://globalnews.ca/news/5101313/boeing-faa-oversight-senate/

The Federal Aviation Administration plans to revamp oversight of airplane development after the two deadly crashes of Boeing’s new 737 Max raised questions of whether the FAA has gone too far in letting companies regulate themselves, according to testimony prepared for a Capitol Hill hearing on Wednesday.

A step in the right direction.

Still though it is crazy it takes the threat of a oversight hearing to bring changes they fully admite was to save money.Not passengers but money .

For decades, the FAA has delegated some authority for certifying new aircraft to the manufacturers, reducing government costs and, defenders say, speeding the rollout of new models.

But now it's the reason why this happened... Or perhaps not.

 

[Exorcet]

It's not like trying to remember whether you locked your car. The was a crash, due to engineering and pilot response, on a plane that these people were flying. It was the kind of crash that stands out. I'd expect them to be on top of it. It was their job after all to know how to pilot the plane. This is not background noise, this is something you remember if you review it and then go fly that plane.

They would still have to diagnose the problem. Depending on the exact sequence of events, the pilots might not have made a link to the previous crash until it was too late. I'm not a pilot and I only fly in my own home simulators, but even if I'm aware of an issue it usually takes me time to react unless I've encountered that specific problem many times before. Off the top of my head the most common issue I face is pilot induced oscillation, which might be relevant here, and it will usually take me a couple of cycles to break out of the pattern and correct myself. I think @Keef mentioned that the plane was in the air for a while before crashing, which should have increased the chances of the pilots making a link to the MCAS issue though.

 

[Danoff]

They would still have to diagnose the problem. Depending on the exact sequence of events, the pilots might not have made a link to the previous crash until it was too late. I'm not a pilot and I only fly in my own home simulators, but even if I'm aware of an issue it usually takes me time to react unless I've encountered that specific problem many times before. Off the top of my head the most common issue I face is pilot induced oscillation, which might be relevant here, and it will usually take me a couple of cycles to break out of the pattern and correct myself. I think @Keef mentioned that the plane was in the air for a while before crashing, which should have increased the chances of the pilots making a link to the MCAS issue though.

There is a lot of information that these pilots need to keep in their heads. But the Lion Air crash was weird, and memorable. I find it hard to believe that a pilot having read through the circumstances that led up to that crash would not recognize those same, very unique and memorable, circumstances (nose down for no apparent reason fighting pilot input) when confronted with it a short time later in the same plane.

Does it not go through your head at all to even think, as you walk on the plane "this is a relatively new plane, and one of them went down recently, anyway, checklist item number 23,568"? I mean, you have to think about the plane a little when you're about to fly the plane.

 

[Exorcet]

Does it not go through your head at all to even think, as you walk on the plane "this is a relatively new plane, and one of them went down recently, anyway, checklist item number 23,568"? I mean, you have to think about the plane a little when you're about to fly the plane.

That should have definitely been part of their thought process. I just don't think it would be enough to allow them to make the link in every set of circumstances, at least without knowing what they were seeing/feeling in the cockpit and how much time they had to react. Although going back to Keef's post, it seems like they were fighting it for a while.

 

[Danoff]

That should have definitely been part of their thought process. I just don't think it would be enough to allow them to make the link in every set of circumstances, at least without knowing what they were seeing/feeling in the cockpit and how much time they had to react. Although going back to Keef's post, it seems like they were fighting it for a while.

I don't buy it. I mean I agree that it's possible, but I don't buy it as a realistic explanation of what happened. I don't think, as a pilot, you can put that event (which happened what... October?) out of your head when you go to pilot one of those planes. I deal with lots of details at work (in between posting to you guys) and I can still remember memorable circumstances, major occurrences, and even memorable GTPlanet posts when the circumstances arise.

I think the pilots were not familiar (granted, that doesn't seem all that much more realistic).

 

[Liquid]

When the original Boeing 737 had its rudder hardover issues, it might have occurred the crew of USAir 427 to think "Oh, we're in a rudder hardover like United Airlines 585 was" and then to the crew of Eastwind 517 to think "Oh, we're in a rudder hardover like United Airlines 585 was and USAir 427 was". It's possible, yes, but that doesn't make it any more certain that the pilots would immediately think of the previous incidents and recognise the problem given the stresses and pressures they would have been under at the time.

I'm fairly certain that it was pure luck that the Eastwind flight serendipitously corrected itself and the pilots were able to successfully land, unlike the previous two flights which resulted in a combined 157 deaths. Following that, a definitive link to the previous two flights and a defect in the rudder PCU was established.

I think you're being overly critical and assuming of the Ethiopian pilots when certain information and facts aren't yet publicly available.

 

[TenEightyOne]

Although going back to Keef's post, it seems like they were fighting it for a while.

They regained control during the initial climb out, there appear to have been three incidents with the last occuring just under a minute before terrain impact.

I don't buy it. I mean I agree that it's possible, but I don't buy it as a realistic explanation of what happened. I don't think, as a pilot, you can put that event (which happened what... October?) out of your head when you go to pilot one of those planes. I deal with lots of details at work (in between posting to you guys) and I can still remember memorable circumstances, major occurrences, and even memorable GTPlanet posts when the circumstances arise.

I think the pilots were not familiar (granted, that doesn't seem all that much more realistic).

There are a number of things that can cause the dive, they were treating it according to their training. What they didn't know (because it's not on the panel) is that the MCAS had taken over. The automatic trim isn't necessarily a sign of that (a 737-800, previous generation to MAX) was lost in those circumstances. They could only fly what they had on the panel - stall, pull-up, terrain, airspeed. The pilot was fully trained and the company (like all other customers) was told by Boeing that there was no significant difference requiring extra training. I'm not sure why you don't consider that a serious, major factor? You seem to think that they should have diagnosed the fault during a close-to-the-ground dive when there was no specific warning (or checklist on the FMC) for what was occurring.

I think you're being overly critical and assuming of the Ethiopian pilots when certain information and facts aren't yet publicly available.

This. They were flying according to all the things they know the 737 can do including an uncommanded nose down, something that most often happens in the transition to autopilot on the climb out or when acquiring a localiser for landing. There's no reason why that wouldn't handle that emergency at face value from their own flying, training and simulating experience.

 

[Danoff]

When the original Boeing 737 had its rudder hardover issues, it might have occurred the crew of USAir 427 to think "Oh, we're in a rudder hardover like United Airlines 585 was" and then to the crew of Eastwind 517 to think "Oh, we're in a rudder hardover like United Airlines 585 was and USAir 427 was". It's possible, yes, but that doesn't make it any more certain that the pilots would immediately think of the previous incidents and recognise the problem given the stresses and pressures they would have been under at the time.

I'm fairly certain that it was pure luck that the Eastwind flight serendipitously corrected itself and the pilots were able to successfully land, unlike the previous two flights which resulted in a combined 157 deaths. Following that, a definitive link to the previous two flights and a defect in the rudder PCU was established.

I think you're being overly critical and assuming of the Ethiopian pilots when certain information and facts aren't yet publicly available.

I remember the rudder hardover issues, and I think about it regularly when flying. I would hope that the pilots of every plane I board are intimately aware of it. It was a very noteworthy event. I don't know that it was as recoverable as this though, and I don't know that the solution to the issue was easy and widely reported. So I think you're picking a very dissimilar example.

They regained control during the initial climb out, there appear to have been three incidents with the last occuring just under a minute before terrain impact.



There are a number of things that can cause the dive, they were treating it according to their training. What they didn't know (because it's not on the panel) is that the MCAS had taken over. The automatic trim isn't necessarily a sign of that (a 737-800, previous generation to MAX) was lost in those circumstances. They could only fly what they had on the panel - stall, pull-up, terrain, airspeed. The pilot was fully trained and the company (like all other customers) was told by Boeing that there was no significant difference requiring extra training. I'm not sure why you don't consider that a serious, major factor? You seem to think that they should have diagnosed the fault during a close-to-the-ground dive when there was no specific warning (or checklist on the FMC) for what was occurring.



This. They were flying according to all the things they know the 737 can do including an uncommanded nose down, something that most often happens in the transition to autopilot on the climb out or when acquiring a localiser for landing. There's no reason why that wouldn't handle that emergency at face value from their own flying, training and simulating experience.

October... nose down... same plane... if you read about it, how does that not cross your mind before the terrain does?

 

[Novalee]

If the end result of this investigation is proper testing by Faa , instead of allowing manufactures to , better designs for systems, and better transparency then i think the people will have not died in vain and Boeing can start to gain pride again .


Watching the senate hearings , sen blumenthal just brought up why his reports he has from nasa , is different from what the FAA has said , in regards to pilot complaints on the 737 max .


Sen blunt asked the FAA person if they allowed Boeing to self certification and he said no , yet in the seattle times article which they say Boeing employies said otherwise and both FAA were made aware of this article raises some interesting questions .

https://www.seattletimes.com/busine...-max-system-implicated-in-the-lion-air-crash/

As Boeing hustled in 2015 to catch up to Airbus and certify its new 737 MAX, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) managers pushed the agency’s safety engineers to delegate safety assessments to Boeing itself, and to speedily approve the resulting analysis


Current and former engineers directly involved with the evaluations or familiar with the document shared details of Boeing’s “System Safety Analysis” of MCAS, which The Seattle Times confirmed.

Both Boeing and the FAA were informed of the specifics of this story and were asked for responses 11 days ago, before the second crash of a 737 MAX on March 10.

 

[TenEightyOne]

Another interest report from the Seattle Times.

 

[Danoff]

Another interest report from the Seattle Times.

Some of that is exactly what I predicted. Management thinks they're doing right by constraining the engineering design to avoid new simulator time. And the engineers deliver... at least as best they can. That story really makes it look like Boeing has management issues.

 

[TenEightyOne]

This 777 pilot says that in addition to the auto stab trim the throttles are also automatically pushed forward by MCAS (21:00-ish). I've also read on a pilots' forum that the extent of auto trim means that once the stab trim is unswitched it's a lot of manual winding on the trim wheel to get level with no indication of optimum (because AoA is already broken).

 

[Keef]

you'd have to think that as your plane (a MAX) headed for the ground, it might dawn on you that there was a recent crash,

Why on earth would I do that? The only thing I'm thinking about during such a situation is solving the problem at hand with the knowledge and tools available.

 

[TenEightyOne]

Boeing are ready to begin issuing their software update for MAX aircraft. MCAS warnings will be standard. It's not clear if three AoA vanes will be used for "two out of three" fault detection, I guess we'll find out more.

 

[LMSCorvetteGT2]

Some of that is exactly what I predicted. Management thinks they're doing right by constraining the engineering design to avoid new simulator time. And the engineers deliver... at least as best they can. That story really makes it look like Boeing has management issues.

Boeing has always had management issues yet no one important in the industry or on the government side ever seems to stop and question them diligently enough on it, or more so bring them to task. Couple the current issues with being backlogged on 777 and 787 air-frames and the supposed rush and overtime they're putting in and you start to get a clear image (among past Boeing issues) of just how bad their management is.

I didnt write the article. But lets examin some facts.

We do know boeing and FAA agreed to allow Boeing to self certify .We do know Boeing tried to down play with Faa backing them upby saying no pilots in America reported any trouble yet soon after we heard from sources 5 pilots did infact complain .

We also know Boeings reuptation has taken a hit because they are trying to deflect.

We also know that no company is worth defending it from it self .Boeing isits own worst enemy at this point .

We also know from reading the comments of this latest story where ever it gets published is mostly negative towards Boeing because they are being percieved to be not forthright.


We have all seen what happens when a company trys to say hey we havnt done nothing wrong , itis not our fault ,its them other guys fault.

Until Boeing denounces self certification they are not in my opinion worth defending .

It always amuses me when a ship is sinking how many others want to go down that are not the Captain.

Heres more

In testing performed in a simulator, Boeing test pilots recreated the conditions aboard Lion Air Flight 610 when it went down in the Java Sea in October, killing 189 people. The tests showed that the crew of the 737 MAX 8 would have only had 40 seconds to respond to the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System’s (MCAS’s) attempts to correct a stall that wasn’t happening before the aircraft went into an unrecoverable dive

Less than a minute to make a corrective descision is not much time considering Boeing seemed to think if the reports are true , that the little bit of extra training Boeing deemed was enough really was not enough.

Heres more

While the test pilots were able to correct the issue with the flip of three switches, their training on the systems far exceeded that of the Lion Air crew—and that of the similarly doomed Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302, which crashed earlier this month. The Lion Air crew was heard on cockpit voice recorders checking flight manuals in an attempt to diagnose what was going on moments before they died.

https://arstechnica.com/information...737-crew-had-little-time-to-prevent-disaster/

This from one comments below the article which i fully agree with

I feel Boeing execs should be made to attend each funeral of the victims and bear witness the anguish these families must feel.

A lot of what you've said here is your personal view and not actual fact, or anything I've found from the other avid aviator posters here that seems to indicate this post being vastly true. Or rather searching myself on major aviation sites I frequent. I agree with many here however that Boeing has a systemic issue, but what I also agree and believe is that you wanting to making a vague connection just to churn the story more and more, is not a very intellectual way of debating and or discussing this topic.

I don't feel Boeing execs should have to attend funerals, I highly doubt they're in the business of having people die on their planes, and I think such a response purely emotional and not logical. Nor does it help fix the issue currently at hand. Also again I agree somewhat with Danoff, operators have a big part in ensuring safe travel just as the aircraft builder. And so to do the administrative bodies that are in charge of writing up the FARs (and Foreign equivalents) and making sure those certifications are done correctly. Why you've seemed to opt this entire time to not actually take their responsibilities into view is concerning.

 

[Novalee]

A lot of what you've said here is your personal view and not actual fact or nothing I've found from the other avid aviator posters here that seems to indicate this post being vastly true. I agree with many here however that Boeing has a systemic issue, but what I also agree and believe is that you wanting to making a vague connection just to churn the story more and more, is not a very intellectual way of debating and or discussing this topic.

You can think what you want
Everyone has opinions is part of a saying .

But facts are Boeing staff have said that they self certified some of the maxs systems and of course some americans wont like those facts.

We also know that Boeing wanted to save money as they admited it which has been posted farther back which i am not reposting.

We also know that both the Faa and Boeing said on the record that no american pilots complained yet a short time later atleast 5 did with if i heard the Faa person correctly at the oversight hearing today said there was more than 5 .

We also know that Canada grounded the max after data suggested both max crashes looked the same , yet US and Faa kept the max flying after Canada had shared that data .

It wasnt until trump called news conference that the US finally grounded the max .

As far as the quote i posted from a news article about Boeing going to honor the dead from the crashes i agree with ,but idid not publish it as i am not a jounalist .

Did you watch the whole oversighthearing ?

Do you want all media to stop making Boeing look bad ? Is that the answer to Boeings troubles ?

I dont think so .

Boeings and Faa reputation is damaged because of their actions and that is just life . The fact countries like canada and others will not just trust Boeing or Faa is not a opinion,it is a fact of life .

Now the good news is Boeing is going to impliment changes that will slowly gain that trust back and that is a good thing .

My grampa once told me do not let pride get in the way of progress .in cases like this i think it is fair advice .


This is from the oversight commitee notes ,not my opinion

Boeing, through the Organization Designation Authorization program, was able to choose its own employees to help government regulators certify the 737 Max. When asked by the subcommittee’s chairwoman, Senator Susan Collins, Republican of Maine, about concerns that the arrangement “sacrifices potentially the safety of the traveling public,” Ms. Chao said that the possibility was “troubling.”


Full text is here

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/27/business/boeing-hearings.html

Happy reading .

Now if you want to read what Boeing staff said the seattle times put out a article which was posted twice above by me and another poster.

 

[LMSCorvetteGT2]

You can think what you want
Everyone has opinions is part of a saying .

But facts are Boeing staff have said that they self certified some of the maxs systems and of course some americans wont like those facts.

We also know that Boeing wanted to save money as they admited it which has been posted farther back which i am not reposting.

We also know that both the Faa and Boeing said on the record that no american pilots complained yet a short time later atleast 5 did with if i heard the Faa person correctly at the oversight hearing today said there was more than 5 .

We also know that Canada grounded the max after data suggested both max crashes looked the same , yet US and Faa kept the max flying after Canada had shared that data .

It wasnt until trump called news conference that the US finally grounded the max .

As far as the quote i posted from a news article about Boeing going to honor the dead from the crashes i agree with ,but idid not publish it as i am not a jounalist .

Did you watch the whole oversighthearing ?

Do you want all media to stop making Boeing look bad ? Is that the answer to Boeings troubles ?

I dont think so .

Boeings and Faa reputation is damaged because of their actions and that is just life . The fact countries like canada and others will not just trust Boeing or Faa is not a opinion,it is a fact of life .

Now the good news is Boeing is going to impliment changes that will slowly gain that trust back and that is a good thing .

My grampa once told me do not let pride get in the way of progress .in cases like this i think it is fair advice .

Who cares what Americans like or don't like that wasn't at all the point of my post. The point is much of what you say at this moment being speculative and claimed by non-official sources. That again isn't logical or productive thus I'm not personally going to entertain it, or the whimsical views. I also know how the grounding process went. The suggested reasons for the MAX not being grounded sooner was due to the lack of issues "seen" or "dealt" with stateside with airliners/pilots.

Also I don't care who or what makes Boeing look bad, don't conflate me wanting logical and intelligent conversation and fact gathering with me wanting to protect Boeing. I have no stake in Boeing and in fact as said previously when someone jumped to this conclusion due to lack of a tangible argument, I really don't care for Boeing at all and find them to be a very awful group in an industry with many suggested awful groups from what I've heard working and talking with other Aero Engineers.

As for money saving, every aerospace company I've ever heard of is in the market for money saving, they all do it, it's taught to us during our schooling and is quite the integral part of the work place. Hardly a crime, and you'd be hard pressed to make a case out of it unless you plan to bring the entire industry to task for it.

 

[Novalee]

As for money saving, every aerospace company I've ever heard of is in the market for money saving, they all do it, it's taught to us during our schooling and is quite the integral part of the work place. Hardly a crime, and you'd be hard pressed to make a case out of it unless you plan to bring the entire industry to task for it.

Like i said think what you want , it does not change anything .

Yes saving money is fine as long as safe travels is still part of the experiance .

Atleast that his how i see it .That is my opinion.

Are you going to back up your accusations with articles against the articles not written by me or not ? I would love to see those articles be wrong as i do like Boeing and want them to fix this .

You never answered if you watched the hearings today ?

 

[TenEightyOne]

You never answered if you watched the hearings today ?

Let's move this on... I saw the hearing (edits, anyway), which bit did you find the most interesting?