Air Crash Thread: Boeing MAX and Other Problems

[Danoff]

More potential bad news for Boeing.


https://globalnews.ca/news/5080690/boeing-planes-optional-safety-features/

The two Boeing 737 MAX 8 planes involved in deadly crashes in the past six months lacked safety features — because they came at an added cost to airlines, The New York Times has reported.

You mean bad news for those airlines... right?

 

[Novalee]

You mean bad news for those airlines... right?

No .i mean Boeing since they have now made atleast one the parts standard .

While it’s unclear what caused the planes to crash, Boeing has said it will make the light a standard feature on the planes.

Why would Boeing do that if it was up to the airlines?
At this point im surprised Boeing did not try to charge extra for wings .

 

[Danoff]

No .i mean Boeing since they have now made atleast one the parts standard .

While it’s unclear what caused the planes to crash, Boeing has said it will make the light a standard feature on the planes.

Why would Boeing do that if it was up to the airlines?
At this point im surprised Boeing did not try to charge extra for wings .

Why would airlines not spring for an indicator light? They do charge for the wings. They charge for everything on the plane (wings may not be a la carte though).

Seriously, the airline is responsible for the custom configuration of the plane, and for allocating pilots (multiple sets of pilots) that are apparently untrained on the aircraft procedures. I don't understand how they're getting a free pass here.

 

[TenEightyOne]

The two Boeing 737 MAX 8 planes involved in deadly crashes in the past six months lacked safety features — because they came at an added cost to airlines, The New York Times has reported.

Page two of this thread, they are indeed optional.

Why would airlines not spring for an indicator light? They do charge for the wings. They charge for everything on the plane (wings may not be a la carte though).

Seriously, the airline is responsible for the custom configuration of the plane, and for allocating pilots (multiple sets of pilots) that are apparently untrained on the aircraft procedures. I don't understand how they're getting a free pass here.

All sorts of things are optional on passenger jets, airlines typically fit the things that suit their operations best or setups which make it easy to transition their pilots from one type to a replacement type.

I think the airlines in question here would argue quite strongly that they (like all other airlines) had no idea about MCAS at the time they made the purchase, had no idea that the onboard checklists didn't feature the two vital procedures and no idea that their training should include failure diagnostics and procedures. It seems that none of that information was well known by anybody outside Boeing, possibly even to the FAA, before the FAA made the Flight Manual updates mandatory in December 2018. I'd say the onus was on Boeing to make the AoA warning and extra vane a mandatory fitting given what we know about the strength of the system's override ability and/or the responsibility of the FAA to mandate the fitting of it. Given that Boeing seem to have downplayed the importance of the system I'm not surprised if airlines on a budget didn't want to spring for systems they couldn't see the need for.

In fact, it would be interesting to know how many airlines have chosen the 'correct' warning systems and extra vane. Let's say the cost is $50,000 per aircraft (quite credible), Lion Air were going to buy 200 before they decided to put the order on hold. That's $10,000,000 dollars on a non-FAA-mandated system that doesn't appear in the warning manuals and whose importance appears to have been strongly downplayed by the manufacturer. Why would airlines spend that extra?

 

[Danoff]

Page two of this thread, they are indeed optional.



All sorts of things are optional on passenger jets, airlines typically fit the things that suit their operations best or setups which make it easy to transition their pilots from one type to a replacement type.

I think the airlines in question here would argue quite strongly that they (like all other airlines) had no idea about MCAS at the time they made the purchase, had no idea that the onboard checklists didn't feature the two vital procedures and no idea that their training should include failure diagnostics and procedures. It seems that none of that information was well known by anybody outside Boeing, possibly even to the FAA, before the FAA made the Flight Manual updates mandatory in December 2018. I'd say the onus was on Boeing to make the AoA warning and extra vane a mandatory fitting given what we know about the strength of the system's override ability and/or the responsibility of the FAA to mandate the fitting of it. Given that Boeing seem to have downplayed the importance of the system I'm not surprised if airlines on a budget didn't want to spring for systems they couldn't see the need for.

In fact, it would be interesting to know how many airlines have chosen the 'correct' warning systems and extra vane. Let's say the cost is $50,000 per aircraft (quite credible), Lion Air were going to buy 200 before they decided to put the order on hold. That's $10,000,000 dollars on a non-FAA-mandated system that doesn't appear in the warning manuals and whose importance appears to have been strongly downplayed by the manufacturer. Why would airlines spend that extra?

I dunno, ask American Airlines - who bought them beforehand. Southwest appears to have not bought them originally and then changed their tune after Lion Air. United stated that they still don't need it because their pilots are trained.

If you're Boeing, and AA wants it, and United doesn't (and Southwest is apparently on the fence). You tell United that they have to buy it, and they say "we're taking our business elsewhere if you're going to put unnecessary junk on our plane when our pilots are trained to handle this".... what do you do? It seems like there are a lot of customers for Boeing planes with different requirements. And some of the budget airlines tried to get away with not buying safety equipment AND not training their pilots.

 

[TenEightyOne]

I dunno, ask American Airlines - who bought them beforehand. Southwest appears to have not bought them originally and then changed their tune after Lion Air. United stated that they still don't need it because their pilots are trained.

Clearly it's a required system if the FAA mandate it which they appear to be about to do. I'd suggest that no airline is going to spend money on something it doesn't see a need for. In the case of AA it was a feature they'd always had since their NG 800 days - that goes to what I was saying about type-to-type similarities in orders.

It seems like there are a lot of customers for Boeing planes with different requirements.

Of course, many airlines fly many different route/load configurations.

And some of the budget airlines tried to get away with not buying safety equipment...

That's certainly true. That's why the FAA mandates essential safety equipment - something they didn't do here and something they've begun to correct with December's Airworthiness Notice.

...AND not training their pilots.

There's little evidence that Lion Air or Ethiopian Air, both big airlines with very strong safety records, have a deficit in crew training. It's moot in the case of Lion Air - Boeing hadn't put the system or checklist in the manual at that time. With the Ethiopian Air crash it remains to be seen how that addition to the manual had been handled. CVR suggests that the crew were combing the manual for a solution as they crashed (as you posted).

 

[Danoff]

There's little evidence that Lion Air or Ethiopian Air, both big airlines with very strong safety records, have a deficit in crew training.

It cited it in the case of Lion Air, a ride-along pilot knew what to do but the crew didn't. And the next crew didn't. How does that not speak to deficient training?

It's moot in the case of Lion Air - Boeing hadn't put the system or checklist in the manual at that time. With the Ethiopian Air crash it remains to be seen how that addition to the manual had been handled. CVR suggests that the crew were combing the manual for a solution as they crashed (as you posted).

I think it was Lion Air that were combing the manual.

 

[TenEightyOne]

I think it was Lion Air that were combing the manual.

My mistake.

It cited it in the case of Lion Air, a ride-along pilot knew what to do but the crew didn't. And the next crew didn't. How does that not speak to deficient training?

It definitely speaks to deficient training. The question is did airlines know that there was something they needed to know? Evidently many didn't. It's in the remit to train their crews according to the manufacturer's instructions. In this case the manufacturer demonstrably omitted certain critical instructions and were ordered by the FAA to distribute them as a matter of urgency. I'm not calling the Lion Air cockpit situation "easy" for anybody but it was definitely easier for the jump seat to take a considered overview while the flying crew had their hands literally full. The point of training, updated manuals and checklists is to remove the need for pilots to make a guess about what unseen mechanisms are overriding their control inputs. For all we know the jump seat had simply read about the system on one of the many pilot forums, we certainly don't know that he'd been trained and the others hadn't - it wasn't in Boeing's training or manuals after all.

 

[Exorcet]

No .i mean Boeing since they have now made atleast one the parts standard .

While it’s unclear what caused the planes to crash, Boeing has said it will make the light a standard feature on the planes.

Why would Boeing do that if it was up to the airlines?
At this point im surprised Boeing did not try to charge extra for wings .

As much as I would like to see an AoA indicator in any plane that I would fly, the lack of them isn't something limited to Boeing and doesn't stick out as a lack of awareness on their part.

At this point it looks like Boeing handled the implementation of MCAS very poorly. However pilots have flown for decades without AoA indicators and have continued to do in the wake of other fatal crashes where AoA could have been considered a factor:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447#Angle-of-attack_indication

An AoA indicator provides potentially useful information, but it's the furthest thing from necessary when it comes to flying a plane. The only thing that would make it especially relevant on the 737 compared to other planes is MCAS malfunctioning.

 

[TenEightyOne]

As much as I would like to see an AoA indicator in any plane that I would fly, the lack of them isn't something limited to Boeing and doesn't stick out as a lack of awareness on their part.

Boeing have had a physical indicator linked to AoA for a long time in the form of the "stick shaker".

In the case of a flight system that can dramatically override pilot input it is critical that AoA readout and warnings are standard. That seems to be the way the FAA are going at least. The NTSB have had them on the "advised equipment" list for many years but their reach isn't the same as the FAA (ie worldwide for aircraft manufactured in their jurisdiction).

An AoA indicator provides potentially useful information, but it's the furthest thing from necessary when it comes to flying a plane. The only thing that would make it especially relevant on the 737 compared to other planes is MCAS malfunctioning.

Given the last part of your statement it's clear that on MAX aircraft the AoA indicator and alarm are flight-critical. From the articles @Dotini posted it seems that Boeing's self-cerification may have downgraded AoA malfunction to non-catastrophic.

At this point it looks like Boeing handled the implementation of MCAS very poorly.

Definitely.

However pilots have flown for decades without AoA indicators and have continued to do in the wake of other fatal crashes where AoA could have been considered a factor

As I said, Boeings have had stick shakers for many years. Airbuses can't have them for obvious reasons.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447#Angle-of-attack_indication

As other pilots noted the crew did get a stall warning (part of the AoA alarm in alternate law transition) and failed to act on the pitch/attitude information. The pilots didn't work through the unreliable airspeed checks, they didn't confer on the readable data, and they failed to realise that they were no longer in normal law leading them to believe that they couldn't stall the airplane. That's all in your link. I agree with Sullenberger (hard not to, I think) that AoA indication should be active on all passenger aircraft. All glass Boeings have it, it's just not switch on in the software unless its paid for... which is another discussion I guess.

 

[Exorcet]

Boeing have had a physical indicator linked to AoA for a long time in the form of the "stick shaker".

Right there are other systems in place to provide AoA warnings besides a direct readout.

In the case of a flight system that can dramatically override pilot input it is critical that AoA readout and warnings are standard. That seems to be the way the FAA are going at least. The NTSB have had them on the "advised equipment" list for many years but their reach isn't the same as the FAA (ie worldwide for aircraft manufactured in their jurisdiction).



Given the last part of your statement it's clear that on MAX aircraft the AoA indicator and alarm are flight-critical. From the articles @Dotini posted it seems that Boeing's self-cerification may have downgraded AoA malfunction to non-catastrophic.

At this point yes, it looks like the indicators should be active in every plane, but given that Boeing presumably thought the system was safe (even if they were wrong) the lack of a readout isn't odd for an airliner.

As other pilots noted the crew did get a stall warning (part of the AoA alarm in alternate law transition) and failed to act on the pitch/attitude information. The pilots didn't work through the unreliable airspeed checks, they didn't confer on the readable data, and they failed to realise that they were no longer in normal law leading them to believe that they couldn't stall the airplane. That's all in your link.

I'm not actually sure if you're agreeing or disagreeing with me here. I'm for AoA readouts in all aircraft though I can arguments for and against absolute necessity. It could have helped, but the pilots were also ignoring so many other warnings.

I agree with Sullenberger (hard not to, I think) that AoA indication should be active on all passenger aircraft. All glass Boeings have it, it's just not switch on in the software unless its paid for... which is another discussion I guess.

Fully agree here.

 

[Danoff]

It definitely speaks to deficient training. The question is did airlines know that there was something they needed to know? Evidently many didn't.

I suppose if there was no training on the subject, and the ride-along pilot only knew about the procedure due to word-of-mouth which was passed through unofficial channels, rather than actual training on how to handle that situation, and he passed that word of mouth along as a suggested course of action during an emergency instead of following actual procedure, then Boeing might still take the blame for lack of pilot training.

In pretty much every other scenario Lion Air gets some major egg on their face for lacking training so much that 4 out of 5 pilots didn't know how to operate the aircraft they were flying in a failure scenario (the 5th one not even flying the aircraft). Sullenberger's comment looms here, as we know that some of these airlines (Ethiopian Air) have been accused of putting people in the cockpit that are lacking in training and experience.

 

[TenEightyOne]

I suppose if there was no training on the subject, and the ride-along pilot only knew about the procedure due to word-of-mouth which was passed through unofficial channels, rather than actual training on how to handle that situation, and he passed that word of mouth along as a suggested course of action during an emergency instead of following actual procedure, then Boeing might still take the blame for lack of pilot training.

It's looking that way, at least in part. The simulators weren't upgraded until early 2019, seemingly another effect of Boeing 'downplaying the differences between NG and Max'. In any case only four MAX simulators had been distributed worldwide by the time the FAA forced Boeing to update the MCAS information available to pilots.

It seems that you're pursuing a line of "bad training" when Ethiopian Air were one of the first (flawed) simulator customers and seemingly have a very good passenger safety record in previous years.

we know that some of these airlines (Ethiopian Air) have been accused of putting people in the cockpit that are lacking in training and experience.

That certainly seems true of the first officer in the Ethiopian crash if reports that he had only 200 hours on type are correct. The PiC had 8,000 hours though and wasn't in a position to receive the correct training:

The B737 Max full flight simulator is not designed to simulate the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) problems.

Why not? Because those problems weren't in the Boeing-issued manuals, weren't in the Boeing-issued checklists and weren't in the Boeing-originated communications to the FAA. It's easy to think of Ethiopian air as some tinpot third world outfit flying old DC-3s on arms runs but they're far from that, and a good number of very experienced pilots in the US (arguably one of the strictest aviation regimes in the world) have a lot of concerns about their own lack of knowledge on MCAS problems. You can't train people in something the manufacturer doesn't tell them about. That is the core of the US investigation.

 

[Danoff]

It's looking that way, at least in part. The simulators weren't upgraded until early 2019, seemingly another effect of Boeing 'downplaying the differences between NG and Max'. In any case only four MAX simulators had been distributed worldwide by the time the FAA forced Boeing to update the MCAS information available to pilots.

It seems that you're pursuing a line of "bad training" when Ethiopian Air were one of the first (flawed) simulator customers and seemingly have a very good passenger safety record in previous years.

That certainly seems true of the first officer in the Ethiopian crash if reports that he had only 200 hours on type are correct. The PiC had 8,000 hours though and wasn't in a position to receive the correct training:

I'm pursuing the "bad training" angle for two reasons. One, we know that the co-pilot in Ethiopian air was woefully under-experienced. And that's not something that the other pilot can necessarily take up the slack for (I'm citing Sullenberger for this). Two, we know that a random pilot in Lion Air was able to save the plane on the flight prior to its crash. Somehow that random pilot knew what to do, and I seriously doubt that it was hearsay. I fault those Lion Air pilots for not communicating that to the next crew somehow.

Ethiopian air may be a reputable airline (you've posted that before), but a random fly-through pilot on Lion air knew what to do when 4 straight Lion air pilots did not, and the Ethiopian Air pilots did not after the Lion Air crash (if indeed they're related, which seems likely). So we have a case where it looks like some pilots are being trained on this procedure and some are not. United Airlines stated that they felt that the indicator wasn't needed because their pilots know what to do. Southwest (my go-to airline for flying) obviously felt that there might have been some training lacking with their pilots and ordered indicators to help (between crashes). Or maybe they just wanted to take no chances. AA seemed to be all over it.

Following the Lion Air crash, Boeing updated their procedures (and I guess there is still speculation as to whether the simulation that was due for the Ethiopian Air pilot included that specific scenario). I definitely fault Ethiopian Air for not staying on top of the Lion Air crash (if they're indeed related, which seems to be likely). They had information from that crash that they didn't sufficiently act on. The fact that at least one pilot knew what to do at the time of the Lion Air crash makes the Ethiopian Air scenario even worse (if they're indeed related).

There's plenty of blame to go around here.

 

[Liquid]

That certainly seems true of the first officer in the Ethiopian crash if reports that he had only 200 hours on type are correct. The PiC had 8,000 hours though and wasn't in a position to receive the correct training

This raises a question of how many logged hours are enough to deem a pilot suitably experienced? To me it's a bit like the old routine about needing a job to get experience but needing experience to get a job. At some point a pilot will have to fly in a new plane he has only recently become familiar with. There have been other plane crashes where pilots had very, very few hours in a particular aeroplane; in the case of British Midland Flight 92, which was coincidentally also a Boeing 737, the pilots had only 76 hours of flight time on that particular series between them; the captain had 53 hours and the first officer had 23 hours.

In that particular incident, the pilots' lack of familiarity with the cockpit readouts in the newer plane led them to shutting down the wrong engine. They were familiar with the previous Boeing 737 but not the then-new 737-400. The pilots had no simulator training for that plane because at the time in 1989 there wasn't a simulator for the 737-400 in the UK.

 

[Danoff]

To me it's a bit like the old routine about needing a job to get experience but needing experience to get a job. At some point a pilot will have to fly in a new plane he has only recently become familiar with.

Just like with getting a job, you do one that's not so demanding first, get good at it, and make a small incremental move forward based on the easier-to-get experience. And just like getting a job, there are metrics you can use to test a pilot's know-how as they move up.

 

[Liquid]

Just like with getting a job, you do one that's not so demanding first, get good at it, and make a small incremental move forward based on the easier-to-get experience. And just like getting a job, there are metrics you can use to test a pilot's know-how as they move up.

I know, it wasn't a perfect analogy. But if the First Officer of the Ethiopian flight only having 200 hours on type is cited as a factor in the crash or highlighted in the findings, how many hours is enough to be deemed suitably experienced? 500? 1,000? 10,000?

 

[Danoff]

I know, it wasn't a perfect analogy. But if the First Officer of the Ethiopian flight only having 200 hours on type is cited as a factor in the crash or highlighted in the findings, how many hours is enough to be deemed suitably experienced? 500? 1,000? 10,000?

Only Sully knows for sure.

 

[TenEightyOne]

The fact that at least one pilot knew what to do at the time of the Lion Air crash makes the Ethiopian Air scenario even worse (if they're indeed related).

The KNKT seem to be casting some doubt on that story, although we'll have to wait for their official report to know for sure.

On Mar 21st 2019 the KNKT reported another fully qualified Boeing 737-MAX 8 pilot was travelling home off duty on flight JT-43 from Denpasar to Jakarta, the flight immediately preceding the accident flight, which had encountered similiar problems as the accident flight, the crew of which however managed to land the aircraft at the destination. The pilot was interviewed by the KNKT. No further comments can be made. The KNKT also states, that media reports of what the CVR revealed do not match the actual CVR recordings and at the very best resemble just the personal opinions of people used as source for such media reports. The KNKT estimates the release of the final report for August or September 2019. The KNKT can not comment on possible similiarities between JT-610 and ET-302, however, have offered cooperation to the Ethiopian Authorities. Earlier media reports had suggested part of the CVR had been leaked to media, in addition media had reported a third pilot had occupied the observer's seat in the cockpit of flight JT-43 and was the one, who identified the automatic trim runaway issue at hand and initiated the trim cut out switches to be used.

 

[Novalee]

Seems the african airline is pushing back against american news reports

On Thursday, the airline said it was disappointed at a report carried by the New York Times which suggested pilot of the ET 302 was not properly trained.

The article titled “Ethiopian Airlines Had a Max 8 Simulator, but Pilot on Doomed Flight Didn’t Receive Training,” reported that the airline was complicit in the crash but Ethiopian insisted that its pilots had completed all necessary training for the planes they handle.

“We urge all concerned to refrain from making such uninformed, incorrect, irresponsible and misleading statements during the period of the accident investigation,” the statement read in part.

https://www.africanews.com/2019/03/22/ethiopian-airlines-crash-all-you-need-to-know/


And then there is this news

https://globalnews.ca/news/5084825/boeing-max-8s-order-cancelled/

JAKARTA, Indonesia — In a blow for Boeing, Indonesia’s flag carrier is seeking the cancellation of a multibillion dollar order for 49 of the manufacturer’s 737 MAX 8 jets, citing a loss of confidence after two crashes in the past six months

 

[TenEightyOne]

Some interesting reports (and reactions) from US pilots.

 

[Novalee]

https://globalnews.ca/news/5098917/southwest-boeing-737-max-emergency-landing/


Southwest Airlines Boeing 737 MAX 8 that was on its way to California to be grounded had to make an emergency landing shortly after take-off at Orlando International Airport on Tuesday.

Southwest 8701, which was occupied by a pair of pilots and no passengers, took off from Orlando just before 3 p.m. local time, a spokesperson for the airline told Global News.

That cant be good for public relations .

 

[Liquid]

Wow, an emergency landing on its way to being grounded. That is spectacularly ironic.

 

[TenEightyOne]

That cant be good for public relations .

True, but the engines are made by General Electric and Safran, not Boeing.

 

[Novalee]

True, but the engines are made by General Electric and Safran, not Boeing.

I never said who made the engines , but the reality is the headlines say Boeing max 8 ,the damage is done to Boeings reputation .

If Boeing or its supporters think trying to blame suppliers is their redemption, i have a bridge in Brooklyn for sale .

 

[Liquid]

True, but the engines are made by General Electric and Safran, not Boeing.

At this point a "performance issue" with the engine is spin not too far away from "engines pushed the nose down again". But as you inferred, let's wait for the full facts to come to light and not forget that the engines are a General Electric product, not directly Boeing.

 

[TenEightyOne]

I never said who made the engines , but the reality is the headlines say Boeing max 8 ,the damage is done to Boeings reputation .

I don't know, Rolls-Royce get a lot of stick on various aviation forums for their time as an Airbus supplier, I think many people separate the airframe from the bolt-on engines.

If Boeing or its supporters think trying to blame suppliers is their redemption, i have a bridge in Brooklyn for sale .

I'm not sure that blaming an engine manufacturer for an engine problem (and they happen regularly, if not often, that's why ETOPS is a thing) is trying to redeem Boeing in any way... it's just a fact that the engine isn't a Boeing engine.

Further to your original link the plane wasn't on its way to being grounded, it had already been grounded - the flight was seemingly a storage relocation trip. What's interesting is that a) The plane was flying in US airspace after being grounded (without pax, obviously) and b) Boeing have an update that they want to test. I wonder if these flights are the way they'll get some sneaky airtesting in

At this point a "performance issue" with the engine is spin not too far away from "engines pushed the nose down again". But as you inferred, let's wait for the full facts to come to light and not forget that the engines are a General Electric product, not directly Boeing.

They lost power in the starboard engine as they climbed from the runway, circled the airport and landed again. It sounds like a classic birdstrike scenario but there's no preliminary report yet.

 

[Dotini]

Boeing used to make the best airplanes in the world. Maybe they still do. But the 737 Max is a topheavy gal weighed down by her oversized nacelles.

 

[LMSCorvetteGT2]

I never said who made the engines , but the reality is the headlines say Boeing max 8 ,the damage is done to Boeings reputation .

If Boeing or its supporters think trying to blame suppliers is their redemption, i have a bridge in Brooklyn for sale .

Only if you're the type who reads into stuff without context just to get excited...like say a news organization. If it isn't actually compounding the issue by an official source like the NTSB or FAA then it's nothing but conjecture. If it is, then there is cause for Boeing to be embarrassed more so and work faster and efficiently to fix the issue if they already are not.

 

[Novalee]

Only if you're the type who reads into stuff without context just to get excited...like say a news organization. If it isn't actually compounding the issue by an official source like the NTSB or FAA then it's nothing but conjecture. If it is, then there is cause for Boeing to be embarrassed more so and work faster and efficiently to fix the issue if they already are not

I didnt write the article. But lets examin some facts.

We do know boeing and FAA agreed to allow Boeing to self certify .We do know Boeing tried to down play with Faa backing them upby saying no pilots in America reported any trouble yet soon after we heard from sources 5 pilots did infact complain .

We also know Boeings reuptation has taken a hit because they are trying to deflect.

We also know that no company is worth defending it from it self .Boeing isits own worst enemy at this point .

We also know from reading the comments of this latest story where ever it gets published is mostly negative towards Boeing because they are being percieved to be not forthright.


We have all seen what happens when a company trys to say hey we havnt done nothing wrong , itis not our fault ,its them other guys fault.

Until Boeing denounces self certification they are not in my opinion worth defending .

It always amuses me when a ship is sinking how many others want to go down that are not the Captain.

Heres more

In testing performed in a simulator, Boeing test pilots recreated the conditions aboard Lion Air Flight 610 when it went down in the Java Sea in October, killing 189 people. The tests showed that the crew of the 737 MAX 8 would have only had 40 seconds to respond to the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System’s (MCAS’s) attempts to correct a stall that wasn’t happening before the aircraft went into an unrecoverable dive

Less than a minute to make a corrective descision is not much time considering Boeing seemed to think if the reports are true , that the little bit of extra training Boeing deemed was enough really was not enough.

Heres more

While the test pilots were able to correct the issue with the flip of three switches, their training on the systems far exceeded that of the Lion Air crew—and that of the similarly doomed Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302, which crashed earlier this month. The Lion Air crew was heard on cockpit voice recorders checking flight manuals in an attempt to diagnose what was going on moments before they died.

https://arstechnica.com/information...737-crew-had-little-time-to-prevent-disaster/

This from one comments below the article which i fully agree with

I feel Boeing execs should be made to attend each funeral of the victims and bear witness the anguish these families must feel.