Russia cannot have done this cyber intrusion because Russia cannot be the bad guy because Russia cannot be the reason he won the 2016 election.
Yes. But you have to remember that it cost him the 2020 election, although the hack didn't happen, although it also
did happen because of Biden, and that's that. This isn't even mental gymnastics for a man whose own mind has no walls, barriers, or well-formed geometry of any kind.
I know little of cyber security so don't have much of an opinion. I'm still trying to wrap my head around the dimensions of the solarwinds/fireEye problem.
It's actually frighteningly simple. Software is made that allows connections for data upload/download. In any organisation worth its salt the software requires authentication (passwords, usernames) to access data. That data can be anything from the HVAC plans for nuclear power stations to minutes of the 3rd. Floor Soup Association's monthly meeting, and of course different users and security levels have access to different sets and classifications of data.
There are really two ways to hack databases. The best, most popular action is to hack the softest part of the system - the people. I was once part of an in-company experiment that had permission to hack the user accounts of some management personnel (with the permission and collaboration of their manager). We got all their passwords in one afternoon. We didn't log in but they verified their passwords to us. We used a phishing email attack for that using resources taken from the company main page on a vanilla, non-company laptop. The results were disseminated through the company and there was an immediate downturn in the number of cases of malicious attempts on various parts of the data network.
But that's not what happened here, or if it did it was very early in the chain of events.
There's another weakness in a database that should be far harder to exploit but which can be enormously profitable if an attacker makes it work. If an attacker can update the programming of the software itself then they can do all kinds of things including installing "back door" usernames, publishing user keys to remote addresses, all kinds of things.
And there's the weakness - the software
is changed all the time through authorised updates. In this case a genuine software update was altered to include malware (a Trojan attack) and every single place running the software received the update without question.
How far does this spread? The SolarWinds software is used globally and so the malicious update is installed globally. However, it seems that only specific organisations were targeted. These haven't been named but they're very likely departments or organisations with access to lots of security-critical data. For now the presumption will have to be that every single user of SolarWinds could credibly have been affected.
To muddy the waters there are suggestions from some researchers (including at Microsoft) that parts of this attack may pre-date the malicious update. I guess we'll know more about that when (if) a more detailed timeline is released.