There are a few 800 lb gorillas in the same room with science which remain unconquered. One is consciousness...
I agree that quite a few of those do exist,
Our consciousness, thoughts and memories are simply chemicals and flows of electrons...essentially particles...
Hi-ho MatskiMonk,
In the quoted Dotini/Scaff exchange which appeared shortly before your post, it was suggested that consciousness remains a problem which science has not solved with satisfaction. In fact there are dozens of competing explanations - variously claiming versions of matter, energy, quantum mechanics, other things or even none of these - and there is no consensus.
Hence it was a surprise to see your clear assertion that it was simply matter which gives rise to consciousness. Please accept this post in lieu of my rather hasty initial reply.
Now I do stipulate that the easy problems of consciousness (representing some ability, or the performance of some function or behavior) can ultimately be described with the materialist concept. Examples of "easy" problems:
- the ability to discriminate, categorize, and react to environmental stimuli;
- the integration of information by a cognitive system;
- the reportability of mental states;
- the ability of a system to access its own internal states;
- the deliberate control of behavior;
- the difference between wakefulness and sleep.
But the problem facing scientists and philosophers is called "the hard problem of consciousness".
Says David Chalmers,
The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of
experience. When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information-processing, but there is also a subjective aspect. As Nagel (1974) has put it, there is
something it is like to be a conscious organism. This subjective aspect is experience. When we see, for example, we
experience visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual field. Other experiences go along with perception in different modalities: the sound of a clarinet, the smell of mothballs. Then there are bodily sensations, from pains to orgasms; mental images that are conjured up internally; the felt quality of emotion, and the experience of a stream of conscious thought. What unites all of these states is that there is something it is like to be in them. All of them are states of experience.
Leibniz put it this way,
Moreover, it must be confessed that perception and that which depends upon it are inexplicable on mechanical grounds, that is to say, by means of figures and motions. And supposing there were a machine, so constructed as to think, feel, and have perception, it might be conceived as increased in size, while keeping the same proportions, so that one might go into it as into a mill. That being so, we should, on examining its interior, find only parts which work one upon another, and never anything by which to explain a perception.
Isaac Newton said this,
to determine by what modes or actions light produceth in our minds the phantasm of colour is not so easie.
TH Huxley actually said this,
how it is that any thing so remarkable as a state of consciousness comes about as the result of irritating nervous tissue, is just as unaccountable as the appearance of the Djin when Aladdin rubbed his lamp
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I'll pause here and hope this doesn't go too much farther, or we might have to start using words like ontology, monism, dualism, etc.