Human Rights

  • Thread starter Danoff
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True, but even with myself taken out of the scenario I don't like the confines of a box and I will always look for an alternate option.

But ultimately the best decision is no decision. Of course that leads to the philosophical question of; Isn't that the same as deciding to to kill the original victims? Which is why I will always be compelled to find a way to derail the trolley or stop the gunman or sacrifice myself first. In my mind the limits these scenarios place on us leaves no 100% moral option. Someone will die due to either your action or inaction.

Forget about the scenario for a moment and just ask yourself the following moral questions:

- Would you sacrifice an innocent person to save more innocent people
- Would you sacrifice an innocent person to save loved ones

That's really the point.
 
Forget about the scenario for a moment and just ask yourself the following moral questions:

- Would you sacrifice an innocent person to save more innocent people
- Would you sacrifice an innocent person to save loved ones

That's really the point.
The answer in both cases is no. But in real-life I wouldn't accept that anyone has to die.
 
But in real-life I wouldn't accept that anyone has to die.
Then you'd better hope those dummies get their butts off the track in a real big hurry, because letting them fend for their own lives is the only reasonable solution to the problem. Whatever emotions you might feel afterward have no relevance to the situation at hand.

If you don't do anything at all, you can't be charged with contributory negligence.

EDIT: I forgot earlier, so I added a link to the article. Let me know if it works or if you have to sign in.
 
Then you'd better hope those dummies get their butts off the track in a real big hurry, because letting them fend for their own lives is the only reasonable solution to the problem.
I already said I'm not sacrificing anyone else. But real life isn't so constrained.

And asking, "Can we stop the trolley in some way?" is unreasonable?

If I have the power to make the decision this philosophical exercise claims then chances are that if there is a way to prevent any deaths I am the one who can do that as well. I think it would be unreasonable to look at the scenario, recognize that you have the power of life and death in your hands (a requirement for this to be a morality exercise) and then just shrug your shoulders. Choosing who dies is immoral, but trying to see if you can prevent all deaths without violating any other rights is not.
 
Then you'd better hope those dummies get their butts off the track in a real big hurry, because letting them fend for their own lives is the only reasonable solution to the problem. Whatever emotions you might feel afterward have no relevance to the situation at hand.

If you don't do anything at all, you can't be charged with contributory negligence.

As a general principle, I entirely agree with you. Nonfeasance is never a crime after all.


But...

Forget about the scenario for a moment and just ask yourself the following moral questions:

- Would you sacrifice an innocent person to save more innocent people
- Would you sacrifice an innocent person to save loved ones

That's really the point.
The answer in both cases is no. But in real-life I wouldn't accept that anyone has to die.

I'm not sure that the answer is really that clear cut. What if it's not an innocent person but a group of innocent people? Just like what I said in my previous post, 1000 of them? Taken to the extreme, what about the entire population of the whole world (except you and those closely related to you - eliminating the personal factor)?

What would you do? Still sit there and do nothing to change the result?



I already said I'm not sacrificing anyone else. But real life isn't so constrained.

And asking, "Can we stop the trolley in some way?" is unreasonable?

If I have the power to make the decision this philosophical exercise claims then chances are that if there is a way to prevent any deaths I am the one who can do that as well. I think it would be unreasonable to look at the scenario, recognize that you have the power of life and death in your hands (a requirement for this to be a morality exercise) and then just shrug your shoulders. Choosing who dies is immoral, but trying to see if you can prevent all deaths without violating any other rights is not.

Not that it's unreasonable or not, but thinking in that manner defeats the purpose of this exercise.....which is to force you either to act or to idle, both of which will result in the death of others.
 
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I'm not sure that the answer is really that clear cut. What if it's not an innocent person but a group of innocent people? Just like what I said in my previous post, 1000 of them? Taken to the extreme, what about the entire population of the whole world (except you and those closely related to you - eliminating the personal factor)?

What would you do? Still sit there and do nothing to change the result?

Unless the one person in "b" is "me", no, there won't be a threshold.

So... yeah.
 
I'm not sure that the answer is really that clear cut. What if it's not an innocent person but a group of innocent people? Just like what I said in my previous post, 1000 of them? Taken to the extreme, what about the entire population of the whole world (except you and those closely related to you - eliminating the personal factor)?

What would you do? Still sit there and do nothing to change the result?
Danoff clearly used singular and plural nouns. Tack on any number of zeros to the end of that number and my answer doesn't change.

Not that it's unreasonable or not, but thinking in that manner defeats the purpose of this exercise.....which is to force you either to act or to idle, both of which will result in the death of others.
Which is exactly why I hate these exercises and guidance counselors in school hated me. Like Admiral Kirk, I am not content accepting a no-win scenario.
 
That is, I believe.....hmm.... an entirely personal decision, as opposed to one that carries moral force and which could thus solve the dilemma :P

Not at all.

I don't get to decide how and when any other person's life ends. I only get to decide how and when my own life ends. Any action I take to end someone's life is fundamentally immoral. Not taking action and allowing someone's life to end is not.

I would not take an action that would result in anyone else's death, save for a situation where my life is threatened by that individual.
 
And asking, "Can we stop the trolley in some way?" is unreasonable?
It is when you're standing on a bridge next to a fat man.

If I have the power to make the decision this philosophical exercise claims then chances are that if there is a way to prevent any deaths I am the one who can do that as well. I think it would be unreasonable to look at the scenario, recognize that you have the power of life and death in your hands (a requirement for this to be a morality exercise) and then just shrug your shoulders. Choosing who dies is immoral, but trying to see if you can prevent all deaths without violating any other rights is not.
You could hurriedly try to convince the fat man to join you in stopping the train by jumping in tandem. Or perhaps, by chance, you know one of the workers and can call his cell phone. Hopefully it isn't on silent.

Fact is, you made the right choice and that's all that really matters. Now, hopefully in your quest to save these people you don't cross up somebody else. That's the reason I probably wouldn't do anything at all in real life, just as in the question, unless the solution that crosses no lines and saves everybody was as clear-cut as a fat man jumping off a bridge. Maybe if I were an angle and could pick them all up by the collars just in time as the train goes roaring underneath.
 
Not at all.

I don't get to decide how and when any other person's life ends. I only get to decide how and when my own life ends. Any action I take to end someone's life is fundamentally immoral. Not taking action and allowing someone's life to end is not.

I would not take an action that would result in anyone else's death, save for a situation where my life is threatened by that individual.


Imagine that you're a doctor. You now have two patients that urgently require a heart transplant within the next 10 mins. As you can already guess, you've only one heart in your hospital. What would you do?

Would you refuse to perform the surgery on either patient on the basis that it's too much for a man to decide whom to live and whom to die?

Or would you simply fall back on the utilitarian principle and assess the feasibility of recovery of either patient and their age, occupation, habits etc?

If you've ruled out inaction, then my question is - what's the difference between the trolley example and my hypothetical scenario? As far as I can see it, the difference merely lies in the fact that for the former example, there is a default position which the decision-maker can rely on and by doing so he/she can claim immunity as to the morality/correctness of his/her decision.

In other words, I start to think that some people's overemphasis on individual rights (as opposed to collective rights) (myself included) is only a defence mechanism shielding him/her from the moral remorse he/she may have if it turns out that the action is flawed.

If you ask me the question I've raised in my first post, my answer would be that - it depends on how many people are affected by my decision. If I sacrifice one only to save, say, 2 persons, I would be reluctant to do so. If however I may save 1000 by my election to act, I probably would do it.

Now think of real life examples.

You're on a long distance train. Sitting opposite to you is a man from middle east, with suspicious look carrying a large handbag which you seem to think it's a bomb (simply assume that you have every reasonable reason to make such a suspicion). You alert the staff on the train of this fact. Staff says "sorry we don't have the power to search any passenger's belongings without their consent".

You look outside the windows and realise that the train has already passed the state borders. You're now in a state with anti-terrorism laws which allows train staff to conduct such searches without warrants/permission from the courts/police (well again assume that the law's not yet been challenged).

As a person who's so concerned about individual human rights, will you invoke this particular law which its spirit runs contrary to your belief?


If you want to disregard the personal factor, simply substitute "you" with "he/she" and advise him/her what to do.
 

I don't get to decide how and when any other person's life ends. I only get to decide how and when my own life ends. Any action I take to end someone's life is fundamentally immoral. Not taking action and allowing someone's life to end is not.

This ^


I would not take an action that would result in anyone else's death, save for a situation where my life is threatened by that individual.

I'd like to say I would do the same, but I'm not so sure that I can't be coaxed into a moment of weakness to make a decision that i know to be immoral for my own personal gain (like saving a loved one by sacrificing an innocent). Naturally it doesn't change the morality of the situation, it's just a reflection of the fact that I can't be sure I'd always do the right thing.

This is one of my problems with these hypotheticals - that just because someone says they're willing to do something immoral doesn't mean that it has any bearing on whether the action is immoral. When discussing morality, people seem to assume that disagreement over what is moral, or whether one's actions have moral flaws, are somehow indications that morality itself is flexible. My admittance of personal weakness has no bearing on whether an act is moral, and so the hypothetical is moot.

Imagine that you're a doctor. You now have two patients that urgently require a heart transplant within the next 10 mins. As you can already guess, you've only one heart in your hospital. What would you do?

Would you refuse to perform the surgery on either patient on the basis that it's too much for a man to decide whom to live and whom to die?

Or would you simply fall back on the utilitarian principle and assess the feasibility of recovery of either patient and their age, occupation, habits etc?

Here you affirmatively act to save a life without forcibly sacrificing the life of another. Neither acting to save a life or refusing to act are immoral choices. In fact, there are no immoral choices in this hypothetical.

If you've ruled out inaction, then my question is - what's the difference between the trolley example and my hypothetical scenario?

The difference is that in the trolley example, there was an immoral choice, you could forcibly sacrifice an innocent person's life to save other innocent people. In the doctor example there are no wrong answers, in the trolley example there was one.

In other words, I start to think that some people's overemphasis on individual rights (as opposed to collective rights) (myself included) is only a defence mechanism shielding him/her from the moral remorse he/she may have if it turns out that the action is flawed.

The problem is that there are no collective rights involved in any of these hypotheticals. You stumble upon a situation in which you find that 5 people will die if you do nothing. That's not an issue of collective rights, they have no right to compel you to act on their behalf.

If you ask me the question I've raised in my first post, my answer would be that - it depends on how many people are affected by my decision. If I sacrifice one only to save, say, 2 persons, I would be reluctant to do so. If however I may save 1000 by my election to act, I probably would do it.

The number of people does not change the morality of the situation. You would make an immoral decision on the basis of an irrational emotional response, or perhaps on the basis of some sort of amoral calculus.

Using force against an innocent person is not a justifiable position, regardless of the motive.


As a person who's so concerned about individual human rights, will you invoke this particular law which its spirit runs contrary to your belief?

As an individual, there are times when I might take an immoral action and be prepared to face the consequences. Occasionally I might roll the dice based on limited information and hope that I was not violating the rights of an innocent person. This is no something the state has the luxury of doing.
 
This ^



I'd like to say I would do the same, but I'm not so sure that I can't be coaxed into a moment of weakness to make a decision that i know to be immoral for my own personal gain (like saving a loved one by sacrificing an innocent). Naturally it doesn't change the morality of the situation, it's just a reflection of the fact that I can't be sure I'd always do the right thing.

This is one of my problems with these hypotheticals - that just because someone says they're willing to do something immoral doesn't mean that it has any bearing on whether the action is immoral. When discussing morality, people seem to assume that disagreement over what is moral, or whether one's actions have moral flaws, are somehow indications that morality itself is flexible. My admittance of personal weakness has no bearing on whether an act is moral, and so the hypothetical is moot.



Here you affirmatively act to save a life without forcibly sacrificing the life of another. Neither acting to save a life or refusing to act are immoral choices. In fact, there are no immoral choices in this hypothetical.



The difference is that in the trolley example, there was an immoral choice, you could forcibly sacrifice an innocent person's life to save other innocent people. In the doctor example there are no wrong answers, in the trolley example there was one.



The problem is that there are no collective rights involved in any of these hypotheticals. You stumble upon a situation in which you find that 5 people will die if you do nothing. That's not an issue of collective rights, they have no right to compel you to act on their behalf.



The number of people does not change the morality of the situation. You would make an immoral decision on the basis of an irrational emotional response, or perhaps on the basis of some sort of amoral calculus.

Using force against an innocent person is not a justifiable position, regardless of the motive.




As an individual, there are times when I might take an immoral action and be prepared to face the consequences. Occasionally I might roll the dice based on limited information and hope that I was not violating the rights of an innocent person. This is no something the state has the luxury of doing.

I think you have missed the point. The trolley example, in it's simplest form, is only about individual vs collective rights. Who would switch the track only to sacrifice unknown stranger A to save unknown stranger B? The people or grp of people who benefit from the sacrifice must, in utilitarian terms, carry a greater value than the one being sacrificed.

So therefore just forget abt the examples which can always be distinguished. The real question is whether individual rights can ever be curtailed when faced with an overwhelming collective interest; or what is called public interest. This is ultimately a balancing exercise - eg should the courts grant a search warrant based on police speculation that suspect is a terrorist, but due to the confidentiality of the operation its details cannot be disclosed in open court? This is not a hypothetical example, this is one which the London courts are asked to deal with it squarely. This is not so much of there being a default position, but involves precise the core conflict within the trolley example - should the suspects individual rights be subjected to a greater interest of the public? How large of the public interest is enough to trump individual rights? That's precisely why numbers come into play - are you sure that inaction resulting in the demise of whole world yet preserving life of one is necessarily the moral choice?

You stated your view yes, your views coincide with John Stuart Mills ideas in On Liberty, but at the same time there are mant other philosophers expressing contrary views which are equally convincing.

I'm not raking sides at all, but only pointing out that the question isn't as simplistic as some might hv thought
 
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Any action I take to end someone's life is fundamentally immoral. Not taking action and allowing someone's life to end is not.

I would not take an action that would result in anyone else's death, save for a situation where my life is threatened by that individual.

Are there no instances where taking someone's life is not immoral? A topical example - should Gaddafi be assassinated? Gaddafi is currently using loyalists and paid militias to murder innocent people - he directly threatens the lives of thousands (and indirectly millions) of his own people... would taking him out in the name of protecting the rights of others be morally wrong?

I believe there are other examples where taking someone's life is not immoral - euthanasia, for example. But I was under the impression that one's rights can be rendered forfeit by one's own actions, such as threatening the lives of many people e.g. a suicide bomber or a genocidal dictator (two all too realistic present-day scenarios, never mind those dastardly runaway trolleys...)
 
Imagine that you're a doctor. You now have two patients that urgently require a heart transplant within the next 10 mins. As you can already guess, you've only one heart in your hospital. What would you do?

Would you refuse to perform the surgery on either patient on the basis that it's too much for a man to decide whom to live and whom to die?

Or would you simply fall back on the utilitarian principle and assess the feasibility of recovery of either patient and their age, occupation, habits etc?

What a ridiculous hypothetical. The person who is higher on the waiting list gets the donor organ.

If you ask me the question I've raised in my first post, my answer would be that - it depends on how many people are affected by my decision. If I sacrifice one only to save, say, 2 persons, I would be reluctant to do so. If however I may save 1000 by my election to act, I probably would do it.

Any action you take which ends the life of someone without their consent is immoral. It doesn't depend on how many people are affected - if the act is shoot a baby or the universe ends, it is still immoral to shoot the baby.

You're on a long distance train. Sitting opposite to you is a man from middle east, with suspicious look carrying a large handbag which you seem to think it's a bomb (simply assume that you have every reasonable reason to make such a suspicion). You alert the staff on the train of this fact. Staff says "sorry we don't have the power to search any passenger's belongings without their consent".

You look outside the windows and realise that the train has already passed the state borders. You're now in a state with anti-terrorism laws which allows train staff to conduct such searches without warrants/permission from the courts/police (well again assume that the law's not yet been challenged).

As a person who's so concerned about individual human rights, will you invoke this particular law which its spirit runs contrary to your belief?

What does law and belief have to do with anything?

I'd like to say I would do the same, but I'm not so sure that I can't be coaxed into a moment of weakness to make a decision that i know to be immoral for my own personal gain (like saving a loved one by sacrificing an innocent). Naturally it doesn't change the morality of the situation, it's just a reflection of the fact that I can't be sure I'd always do the right thing.

This is one of my problems with these hypotheticals - that just because someone says they're willing to do something immoral doesn't mean that it has any bearing on whether the action is immoral. When discussing morality, people seem to assume that disagreement over what is moral, or whether one's actions have moral flaws, are somehow indications that morality itself is flexible. My admittance of personal weakness has no bearing on whether an act is moral, and so the hypothetical is moot.

Epic this.

Are there no instances where taking someone's life is not immoral? A topical example - should Gaddafi be assassinated? Gaddafi is currently using loyalists and paid militias to murder innocent people - he directly threatens the lives of thousands (and indirectly millions) of his own people... would taking him out in the name of protecting the rights of others be morally wrong?

I believe there are other examples where taking someone's life is not immoral - euthanasia, for example. But I was under the impression that one's rights can be rendered forfeit by one's own actions, such as threatening the lives of many people e.g. a suicide bomber or a genocidal dictator (two all too realistic present-day scenarios, never mind those dastardly runaway trolleys...)

In the case of euthanasia - and DNR - the choice is made by the individual whose life would end.

With a suicide bomber - or Qaddafi - if I'm close enough to act, I'm close enough for my life to be under threat from that individual, which is why the additional example of the man on a train above is ridiculous. Regardless of local law, I may morally defend myself from an individual who would seek to violate my rights with force up to and including deadly force. If you assume I'm 800 yards away with a sniper rifle and not under direct threat, I'd have the decision of killing an individual who was threatening - or had already denied - the rights of others. They are, if you like, the man on the trolley holding the brake lever off...

Would it be moral for me to kill that individual? That would be an interesting question of morality. It wouldn't be moral for me to kill a third party that would stop that individual achieving their ends though.
 
What a ridiculous hypothetical. The person who is higher on the waiting list gets the donor organ.
Thanks. There are so many things wrong with this one that I coudln't list them all.

Three biggies though: 1) Not the doctor's call. 2) If they have ten minutes they're dead anyway. It's a three hour procedure. 3) It is almost a statistical impossibility that both potential recipients in the same hospital are matches. It is highly improbable.


Like I said, hypotheticals never work for me. Real life always gets in the way.

Keef
It is when you're standing on a bridge next to a fat man.
But I thought that I was standing next to the directional switch? In the exercise I am controlling the direction of the trolley/train whatever. You are changing the facts of the scenario. If I were standing with the fat man then my life is in danger as well.

You could hurriedly try to convince the fat man to join you in stopping the train by jumping in tandem.
This actually brings up another issue with this scenario that irks me. I can, from wherever I am, see the result of the choices I make, but don't have the power to tell the people to get off the tracks? Are the switch controls on the roof of a skyscraper?

Now, hopefully in your quest to save these people you don't cross up somebody else.
But see, that is why I ask more questions. If the scenario gives me all the facts there is no one else to involve.
 
What a ridiculous hypothetical. The person who is higher on the waiting list gets the donor organ.

Thank you for your very kind words.

With respect, may I point out that you have completely missed my point? This and the trolley example are very typical questions raised in a law school/medical school interview. I have been asked and have passed such tests a few years ago, and I must say, as I think restropectively, that the answer cannot be that clear cut.

Of course, the person who is higher on the waiting list gets the organ. But who's to determine who's higher on the list?

In practice, doctors consider, apart from who came to the hospital first, the feasibility of the operation on the patients and their utility respectively. What I mean is that their age, occupation, living habits will all be considered. That's because when resources are scarce, the doctors have to make a decision that generates the greater benefit to the society. If an old woman aged 93 and a young lawyer aged 32 both require the organ at the same time, very likely the organ will be given to the lawyer.

Now isn't that the same with the trolley example? The real issue is whether it is moral to treat humans as commodities, as an object with a "value"?

If you don't believe in me, have a look at this

http://www.medical-interviews.co.uk/interview-questions-medical-school-interviews.aspx

Question 189. You have one liver available for transplant, but two patients with equal medical need. One is an ex-alcoholic mother with two young children, the other a 13 year old with an inborn liver abnormality. How would you decide to whom it should be given?


Now would Famine your answer still be the same were you an interviewee? I'm sure you'll get an instant rejection if you insist on your answer.


Any action you take which ends the life of someone without their consent is immoral. It doesn't depend on how many people are affected - if the act is shoot a baby or the universe ends, it is still immoral to shoot the baby.

Now again, with utmost respect, I must ask did you even read my words?

I have never disputed that killing is immoral. I have never disputed that sacrificing an innocent man per se is unacceptable behaviour.

But the issue becomes slightly different when another group of individuals, which I assume in utilitarian sense carries greater "value", is at stake.

Before you even dismiss my question as unrealistic, I must say that the question of whether killing one to save two type scenarios have indeed come before the highest courts in the UK before. They are real cases. With real lawyers fighting them. And at the highest levels of the judicial system. They are not frivolous or hopeless cases that can be dismissed (summarily decided) straight away.

In legal terms, this is the defence of necessity.

Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] Fam 147

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Re_A_(Children)_(Conjoined_Twins:_Surgical_Separation)

This case is one of medical separation of twins thereby killing one of them. Court expressly stated that a defence of necessity existed at common law. Three necessary requirements were identified:-

1) the act was needed to avoid inevitable and irreparable evil;
2) no more was done than was reasonably necessary for the purpose to be achieved; and
3) the evil inflicted was not disproportionate to the evil avoided


It is after all a test of proportionality.

ANd it is this reason why the figures come into play. It is entirely reasonable to think that if killing one can save the whole world, one's immoral act would have been given sufficient moral force to render it justifiable.



Again, I'm not taking sides. I'm not, for the purpose of this thread, arguing for or against a proposition. I'm simply showing you that your argument

1) Killing is immoral

therefore

2) Killing one to save two (or any other figure) is also immoral

is flawed.

You have not addressed in any way why individual rights must trump collective rights in all circumstances.

You have not addressed why there cannot be a case where the collective right is so great that the individual right can be curtailed.


I hope I have made it easy enough for you to follow.
 
Of course, the person who is higher on the waiting list gets the organ. But who's to determine who's higher on the list?
In the US it is UNOS. And they have a very complex way that they work this out. Need, best fit, chance of rejection (lifestyle plays a part), wait time, etc. But the goal is not to choose one death over another, but to minimize the deaths by choosing the best candidate to survive after transplant.

In practice, doctors consider, apart from who came to the hospital first, the feasibility of the operation on the patients and their utility respectively. What I mean is that their age, occupation, living habits will all be considered.
In the US occupation is only considered if it puts them at risk of rejection. A doctor doesn't get choice over a middle manager in an unknown company purely because he is a doctor. I am sure some bureaucracy plays a role behind the scenes or if one of the potential recipients are the president or something, but it is not a stated policy.

That's because when resources are scarce, the doctors have to make a decision that generates the greater benefit to the society.
I am so glad it doesn't work like that in the US or I would be screwed. My benefit to society is very minimal. Yet, I have been told that I am an ideal recipient.

If an old woman aged 93 and a young lawyer aged 32 both require the organ at the same time, very likely the organ will be given to the lawyer.
In the US age limit is 60 or 70. You have to have an expectation that you will survive a minimum of five years after the transplant. That woman wouldn't even hear the word transplant mentioned. Poor example.

If you don't believe in me, have a look at this

http://www.medical-interviews.co.uk/interview-questions-medical-school-interviews.aspx

Question 189. You have one liver available for transplant, but two patients with equal medical need. One is an ex-alcoholic mother with two young children, the other a 13 year old with an inborn liver abnormality. How would you decide to whom it should be given?
Wait, wait, wait. I am expected to believe that a fully grown woman and a 13-year-old girl have equal sized livers? Granted, typically you do not need to transplant the entire liver, so size may not play as much of a role, but then live donor transplants are much, much easier to come by and are often donated to you by someone you know.

But we can pretend it is a very small woman and ignore that reality exists. With this large lack of details (seriously, my transplant file is an inch thick and they started compiling it in October) it goes to the 13-year-old girl because we have to assume the mother's alcoholism is the cause of her problem, she is only ex, because she'd be dead otherwise, and with a healthy liver she will continue her path of death. She's already dead. And I am sure there is other family in the picture to care for the children.

The worst part about this is that the example is a bad question. The doctor would never make that decision unless he was part of the group that decides these things, and then they would have tons more data to work with.
 
With respect, may I point out that you have completely missed my point?

Your point is flawed.

I have been asked and have passed such tests a few years ago, and I must say, as I think restropectively, that the answer cannot be that clear cut.

"Passed" how? You gave the answer that someone else determined to be correct?

Now would Famine your answer still be the same were you an interviewee? I'm sure you'll get an instant rejection if you insist on your answer.

My answer would be the same. The surgeon carrying out the operation does not get to decide who receives the organ.

I'm sure I would get an instant rejection, but that does not impose a change of reality.


Now again, with utmost respect, I must ask did you even read my words?

Yes. You determined that:

But the issue becomes slightly different when another group of individuals, which I assume in utilitarian sense carries greater "value", is at stake.

When it does not. Killing one innocent never becomes morally right, regardless of the weight you place upon the alternative outcome.

This case is one of medical separation of twins thereby killing one of them. Court expressly stated that a defence of necessity existed at common law. Three necessary requirements were identified:-

1) the act was needed to avoid inevitable and irreparable evil;
2) no more was done than was reasonably necessary for the purpose to be achieved; and
3) the evil inflicted was not disproportionate to the evil avoided

What is legal has no bearing on what is moral. Sadly, what is moral often has no bearing on what is legal either.

ANd it is this reason why the figures come into play. It is entirely reasonable to think that if killing one can save the whole world, one's immoral act would have been given sufficient moral force to render it justifiable.

An "immoral act" never has "moral force" to make it right. It's an immoral act!

Again, I'm not taking sides. I'm not, for the purpose of this thread, arguing for or against a proposition. I'm simply showing you that your argument

1) Killing is immoral

therefore

2) Killing one to save two (or any other figure) is also immoral

is flawed.

You have not addressed in any way why individual rights must trump collective rights in all circumstances.

You have not addressed why there cannot be a case where the collective right is so great that the individual right can be curtailed.

"Individual rights are not subject to a public vote; a majority has no right to vote away the rights of a minority ... and the smallest minority on earth is the individual"

You do not get to determine how and when my life ends. You get to determine how and when your life ends. There is no argument based in morality that allows you to end my life because you think the numbers stack up - if you want to stop that trolley killing anyone, you jump onto the tracks. If you want to murder me to stop other people from dying, you're still a murderer.


I hope I have made it easy enough for you to follow.

Hooray for condescension.
 
1) Killing is immoral

therefore

2) Killing one to save two (or any other figure) is also immoral

is flawed.

In the first trolley example (there are two examples FK, which is why you think the scenario is changing), you would have to kill 1 to save 5. The 5 do not have any "collective" right for me to act on their behalf. They do not have a "collective" right to force the 1 to forfeit his life on their behalf. They only have the right to be free from me forcing them to do something - which I am not in that hypothetical... regardless of my decision. This is why I said there are no "collective" rights at stake.

If the lever had been reversed, if the trolley had been headed to the 1 guy instead of the 5, then the "collective" rights of the 5 would have been preventing me from sacrificing them to save the 1. That scenario would have involved "collective" rights, but it's also an easy choice from the point of view of an amoral utilitarian calculus.

From what I've read of your arguments, the crux of your disagreement is that you don't feel that inaction is any different from action. You seem to think that by not switching the lever, I am killing the 5. This is absolutely incorrect. By not switching the lever, I am not saving the 5. This is fundamentally different from killing them in a very critical way. The 5 have a right not to be killed by me, but they do not have a right to compel me to save them.
 
Your point is flawed.



"Passed" how? You gave the answer that someone else determined to be correct?



My answer would be the same. The surgeon carrying out the operation does not get to decide who receives the organ.

I'm sure I would get an instant rejection, but that does not impose a change of reality.




Yes. You determined that:



When it does not. Killing one innocent never becomes morally right, regardless of the weight you place upon the alternative outcome.



What is legal has no bearing on what is moral. Sadly, what is moral often has no bearing on what is legal either.



An "immoral act" never has "moral force" to make it right. It's an immoral act!



"Individual rights are not subject to a public vote; a majority has no right to vote away the rights of a minority ... and the smallest minority on earth is the individual"

You do not get to determine how and when my life ends. You get to determine how and when your life ends. There is no argument based in morality that allows you to end my life because you think the numbers stack up - if you want to stop that trolley killing anyone, you jump onto the tracks. If you want to murder me to stop other people from dying, you're still a murderer.




Hooray for condescension.


Again with respect, you are giving a personal opinion that because killing per se is morally wrong, it cannot be justified as a morally correct action in any circumstances.

The quote you have given - "Individual rights are not subject to a public vote; a majority has no right to vote away the rights of a minority ... and the smallest minority on earth is the individual" - may I ask why kind of reasoning is this?

Notice the use of words "are not subject to" and "has no right to"... What's the supporting arguments for these two propositions may I ask? It's an ideal political slogan, a motto for some, but never a good argument for academic discussion.

If you really want to know what qualifies as an argument, take a look at this, it's really worth it

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Case_of_the_Speluncean_Explorers

The full text: http://www.nullapoena.de/stud/explorers.html


This is the extended version of the trolley example. Facts as quoted from wikipedia

The Case of the Speluncean Explorers is a famous hypothetical legal case used in the study of law, which was written by Lon Fuller in 1949 for the Harvard Law Review.

In the hypothetical case, a trapped team of five spelunkers determine via radio contact with physicians that they will have starved to death by the time they are rescued, and thus elect to eat one of their party. Once the remaining four spelunkers are rescued, they are all indicted for the murder of their fifth member. The article proceeds to examine the case from the perspectives of five different legal principles, with widely varying conclusions as to whether or not the spelunkers are guilty, and whether or not they should be executed (as is the mandatory punishment for murder in the fictitious commonwealth where the case takes place).


As you see, all four judges (except for the one who abstained) all gave logical and convincing reasonings, and yet their conclusion is entirely different.

Before you say that the law does not equate to morality, this piece is written by Lon Fuller who is a philosopher and jurist. His modified natural law theory represents his attempt to revive the proposition that all laws are based on morality.



On the point that my post was condescending....well I thought that's how I should write when someone insults what I deal with day in day out as "ridiculous".


------

Re Foolkiller,



http://depts.washington.edu/bioethx/topics/resall.html

You may be interested in the section titled "Can I make allocation decisions based on judgments about "quality of life"?"

Yes it seems that the US position is that those factors I've listed are generallly not relevant. It's different from that in the UK though.

But my point really is that allocation of resources has to be based on justice and fairness - which can be determined either objectively (need) or subjectively (social status)
 
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The quote you have given - "Individual rights are not subject to a public vote; a majority has no right to vote away the rights of a minority ... and the smallest minority on earth is the individual" - may I ask why kind of reasoning is this?

The only legitimate kind of reasoning - reason.

Human rights exist as a product of reason, and they dictate that no majority can ever nullify them.

As you see, all four judges (except for the one who abstained) all gave logical and convincing reasonings, and yet their conclusion is entirely different.

They are guilty of murder. They sacrificed 1 to save 5 (the trolley examples). The 1 has rights that compel the 5 not to act. The 5 do not have rights to kill the 1. (see my post just prior to yours)

Allow me to give you a new hypothetical.

There are two people in the world who have never interacted. One of them discovers the other one, sets a trap, captures him, shackles him, and forces him to do his will, as his slave, from then on.

In this scenario, one person's will is being subjugated to another's. Can this action be justified objectively? Is there an objective reason why one person should be allowed to subjugate another who has done him no harm?
 
There are two people in the world who have never interacted. One of them discovers the other one, sets a trap, captures him, shackles him, and forces him to do his will, as his slave, from then on.

In this scenario, one person's will is being subjugated to another's. Can this action be justified objectively? Is there an objective reason why one person should be allowed to subjugate another who has done him no harm?

Let's recast this just slightly. It's 500 AD. There are two tribes of people instead of two people on the island. There's not enough resources for both, so the stronger conquers and enslaves the weaker, raping some, eating others. Subjugation is objectively desirable on the grounds of survival and evolution of the species. True or False?
 
Re Foolkiller,



http://depts.washington.edu/bioethx/topics/resall.html

You may be interested in the section titled "Can I make allocation decisions based on judgments about "quality of life"?"

Yes it seems that the US position is that those factors I've listed are generallly not relevant. It's different from that in the UK though.

But my point really is that allocation of resources has to be based on justice and fairness - which can be determined either objectively (need) or subjectively (social status)
The system is designed with minimizing deaths in mind, no other considerations. The only time my occupation came up was to determine whether I can continue working now and return to work after.

I do find it ironic though that a health system with socialized medicine allows social status to play a role in these decisions while a privatized medical system is purely based on minimizing deaths.
 
Let's recast this just slightly. It's 500 AD. There are two tribes of people instead of two people on the island. There's not enough resources for both, so the stronger conquers and enslaves the weaker, raping some, eating others. Subjugation is objectively desirable on the grounds of survival and evolution of the species. True or False?

False.
 
Let's recast this just slightly. It's 500 AD. There are two tribes of people instead of two people on the island. There's not enough resources for both, so the stronger conquers and enslaves the weaker, raping some, eating others. Subjugation is objectively desirable on the grounds of survival and evolution of the species. True or False?

True. History is littered with stories with that exact scenario.

Edit:
Yet this is exactly what has happened time and time again over human history. Can we say then that human history is not objectively desirable or justified?

Beat me by seconds.
 
Yet this is exactly what has happened time and time again over human history. Can we say then that human history is not objectively desirable or justified?

It means that there have been many actions in human history that are not objectively justifiable. (I would call them "rights violations")

What we've determined is that "might does not make right". The ability to produce force does not objectively confer the right to produce it. Furthermore, there is no objective justification for the use of force against an innocent person. This is the basis of human rights, and it is the reason that you are not justified in pushing the fat man onto the trolley track (in the 2nd trolley example). The only action that requires no justification is the lack of force. If you had to justify the lack of force, you're back into the first scenario, justifying the use of force to compel the use of force.
 
Yet this is exactly what has happened time and time again over human history. Can we say then that human history is not objectively desirable or justified?
That's pretty much a given. You don't even need to go back a full century to find examples of this that today are considered undesirable or unjustified.
 
That's pretty much a given. You don't even need to go back a full century to find examples of this that today are considered undesirable or unjustified.

If we squinted, we might even see bits of it in our own history.
 
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