Human Rights

[Danoff]

The right to life is an exception to this (at least in nations without the death penalty). From a bioethical view the salient point is the quality of life, which can be that human's current state or their long term future. Treating it like other human rights, by tying it to cognition, ignores the inherent value of a human life and opens the door to places I don't think many societies would be comfortable going to. A major principle in medical ethics is that of beneficence, and terminating a healthy life that isn't infringing on someone else's would, in my opinion, contravene it - as may experimentation in certain circumstances.

Your argument here is that the right to life is somehow different from all other rights. It's your onus to make that case, not mine. You don't simply get to assert "this one's different" and jog on. You need to actually materially explain why - precisely because it is not. It's hard enough to derive rights, you need to derive multiple kinds and explain the differences. Good luck.

Your argument is that you're "uncomfortable" with some stuff, and that you think it's not "beneficial" to terminate life. That's not much of an argument. It's not beneficial to a tree to chop it down, but it's not immoral either.

As to your discomfort, you need to do some analysis as to where that comes from.

I'm interested why you think of the stroke patient as passing a cognitive threshold but seem fine with a newborn not making it? And also your thinking process around answering the question of gene editing humans to take out pain receptors. Would you have been as reticent if it were mice?

I explained it clearly earlier. Your stroke patient had a much more advanced level of cognitive ability than a newborn. As for gene editing, that seems to unnecessarily muddy the waters with no clear benefit to our conversation.

 

[HenrySwanson]

Your argument here is that the right to life is somehow different from all other rights. It's your onus to make that case, not mine. You don't simply get to assert "this one's different" and jog on. You need to actually materially explain why - precisely because it is not. It's hard enough to derive rights, you need to derive multiple kinds and explain the differences. Good luck.

Because it's that human's very existence, and is inextricably linked with the principles of bioethics, some of which have been followed for over two thousand years. As such, there has to be a certain respect for that life, but not to the extreme that there is a "sanctity of life" (something which may have religious origins). This should be in the background of all decisions around the supporting of, or termination of a life, with additional pertinent facts weighed up in each case. If we go with cognition being the bar for a right to life you will significantly devalue many humans' existence. It would be the only case where the patient's best interests are ignored (that is, patients that are unable to consent).

There's also the practical problem of coming up with criteria to determine a limit, and if the right should be enforced strictly temporally or if there could be exceptions made for individuals who are delayed in meeting that threshold. You say that you clearly explained that the stroke patient has a much more advanced level of cognition than a newborn but I'm not sure you have. Did you reach this conclusion solely on their ability to generate a two word phrase?

As for gene editing, that seems to unnecessarily muddy the waters with no clear benefit to our conversation.

How would it muddy the waters?

If we're comparing certain humans to trees what harm can there be in creating a line impervious to pain that could replace animal models in scientific experimentation?

 

[Danoff]

Because it's that human's very existence, and is inextricably linked with the principles of bioethics, some of which have been followed for over two thousand years.

...two thousand years makes it seem stupid, not important. Two thousand years ago humanity didn't know its backside from a hole in the ground.

As such, there has to be a certain respect for that life

You mean by not chopping down trees?

, but not to the extreme that there is a "sanctity of life" (something which may have religious origins). This should be in the background of all decisions around the supporting of, or termination of a life, with additional pertinent facts weighed up in each case.

The pertinent facts being cognition. Not only in my own estimation, or in rational estimation, but in the estimation of society in general, and two-thousand-year-old ethical systems.

If we go with cognition being the bar for a right to life you will significantly devalue many humans' existence.

It is what we use now. And no, it doesn't "devalue" anything. Do you think a tree is not valuable simply because it has no right to life?

It would be the only case where the patient's best interests are ignored (that is, patients that are unable to consent).

The best interests of trees, fish, and even stray dogs are ignored all the time.

There's also the practical problem of coming up with criteria to determine a limit, and if the right should be enforced strictly temporally or if there could be exceptions made for individuals who are delayed in meeting that threshold.

...which is something law is concerned with now, today, in every civilization on the planet.

You say that you clearly explained that the stroke patient has a much more advanced level of cognition than a newborn but I'm not sure you have. Did you reach this conclusion solely on their ability to generate a two word phrase?

That and that it was directed at people in (presumably) certain circumstances. It doesn't matter. This is not some kind of trap. If you were to demonstrate to me, convincingly, that the stroke patient had no more cognition than a newborn, I would simply say that the stroke patient had no right to life.

Even well developed brains which have much cognitive ability can lack a right to life. These are people on the receiving end of lethal self-defense or people who are sentenced to death for major crimes. Those brains are not functioning well enough in the respect that matters for rights.

How would it muddy the waters?

If we're comparing certain humans to trees what harm can there be in creating a line impervious to pain that could replace animal models in scientific experimentation?

I honestly have no idea how that's related.

 

[HenrySwanson]

...two thousand years makes it seem stupid, not important. Two thousand years ago humanity didn't know its backside from a hole in the ground.

Could be either stupid or important - it depends on context. Bioethics has evolved in concert with scientific progress. For example, the Hippocratic Oath has been supplanted by a modern version or a different ethical code entirely to reflect the work of a modern doctor. The principle of beneficence has, however, stood the test of time.

You mean by not chopping down trees?

Trying to show that a tree is different to a human.

The pertinent facts being cognition. Not only in my own estimation, or in rational estimation, but in the estimation of society in general, and two-thousand-year-old ethical systems.

I believe it's quality of life (and prognosis) at present, which includes cognition.

It is what we use now. And no, it doesn't "devalue" anything. Do you think a tree is not valuable simply because it has no right to life?

....But if it was cognition, wouldn't the 23 week premature infant have no right to life currently?

The best interests of trees, fish, and even stray dogs are ignored all the time.

Again, is there no differentiation for human life?

...which is something law is concerned with now, today, in every civilization on the planet.

Yes, and it will be fraught with difficulties, nicely leading into....

That and that it was directed at people in (presumably) certain circumstances. It doesn't matter. This is not some kind of trap. If you were to demonstrate to me, convincingly, that the stroke patient had no more cognition than a newborn, I would simply say that the stroke patient had no right to life.

Why does the ability of being able to say two words indicate cognition? A newborn can cry in response to a stimulus, because it requires something, or another reason (or none entirely). We don't even know why this stroke patient is repeating their phrase.

Even well developed brains which have much cognitive ability can lack a right to life. These are people on the receiving end of lethal self-defense or people who are sentenced to death for major crimes. Those brains are not functioning well enough in the respect that matters for rights.

All the rights you listed in a previous post rely on cognition - either cognitive ability, or as a result of that person's actions. Life is independent of that, and therefore an exception.

I honestly have no idea how that's related.

Think about it.

We currently use animal models in preclinical trials because, based on current convention, most experimentation on living human foetuses is considered unethical. If we go with the suggestion that a newborn should be devoid of the right to life, why couldn't we use one that has been abandoned by their guardians in experiements before terminating their life? And if the objection to that is because of pain, why couldn't we create foetuses who don't experience pain for the explicit purpose of experimentation?

 

[Danoff]

Trying to show that a tree is different to a human.

It is. But it is "life". This is completely non-responsive to the context of my statement. You posted this:

As such, there has to be a certain respect for that life

to which I responded:

You mean by not chopping down trees?

You said respect for "life". Trees are "life". The point is that you DO NOT want to show that there has to be certain respect for "life". You want to show how that there has to be certain respect for "human life". But you need to do the work of actually differentiating "human life" from "life" in a meaningful capacity. You haven't done that, and you don't seem to be interested in trying. But that's precisely the reason why you keep running into this problem of "so is a tree". Because you haven't done the work you need to do to make your argument make sense.

The reason you don't want to do the work, is that you'll land, as I have, on cognition as THE key differentiation between "human life" and other "life". Dodging this point does not further the discussion. You have dodged it here, by responding out of context. I'd encourage you to think on this point more purposefully to really investigate. The remainder of your post is all tied up in this key issue. So I'll shorthand the rest. What I wrote above is where your work is.

I believe it's quality of life (and prognosis) at present, which includes cognition.

Quality of a tree's life is not important morally. See above.

....But if it was cognition, wouldn't the 23 week premature infant have no right to life currently?

This entire argument is about abortion laws, so this is begging the question.

Again, is there no differentiation for human life?

See above.

Yes, and it will be fraught with difficulties, nicely leading into....

Why does the ability of being able to say two words indicate cognition? A newborn can cry in response to a stimulus, because it requires something, or another reason (or none entirely). We don't even know why this stroke patient is repeating their phrase.

All the rights you listed in a previous post rely on cognition - either cognitive ability, or as a result of that person's actions. Life is independent of that, and therefore an exception.

See above. You must actually do the work of differentiating "independent" in this case. When you do, you will land inevitably on cognition (unless you decide to go mystical and claim a soul or somesuch, in which case you know where this conversation goes and you don't care for that outcome).

Think about it.

We currently use animal models in preclinical trials because, based on current convention, most experimentation on living human foetuses is considered unethical. If we go with the suggestion that a newborn should be devoid of the right to life, why couldn't we use one that has been abandoned by their guardians in experiements before terminating their life? And if the objection to that is because of pain, why couldn't we create foetuses who don't experience pain for the explicit purpose of experimentation?

So the point of this hypothetical is to present to me something that you consider obviously unethical that follows from my reasoning and see if it'll change my mind? That's a fair argument technique, but I can cut this short for you. No that does not change my mind. The reason it does not change my mind is because we're talking about a being that is lacking (usually severely) in key characteristics for human rights. Any time you want to go down this line of reasoning, just substitute "fetus" for "mouse" and see if the argument still feels as devastating as you thought it did.

 

[HenrySwanson]

Hmmmm, before giving a detailed response to your post, could I ask what you think should have happened to the defendant in this case:

R v Woollin - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[Danoff]

Hmmmm, before giving a detailed response to your post, could I ask what you think should have happened to the defendant in this case:

R v Woollin - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Pragmatically it makes sense that we have laws that identify 3-month-old children as individuals with a right to life. It's simply hard to do any better than that today. So my answer is that I have no issue with this being declared murder. It may not be strictly morally required to be murder, but in implementing moral considerations it is a reasonable attempt.

 

[HenrySwanson]

Pragmatically it makes sense that we have laws that identify 3-month-old children as individuals with a right to life. It's simply hard to do any better than that today. So my answer is that I have no issue with this being declared murder. It may not be strictly morally required to be murder, but in implementing moral considerations it is a reasonable attempt.

But, since we are arguing about a future where rights are determined based on cognition, this would be an unacceptable outcome in said future.

(Also, I thought it was in the wiki link I posted but the murder conviction was changed to manslaughter by the House of Lords)

https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199798/ldjudgmt/jd980722/wool.htm

 

[Danoff]

But, since we are arguing about a future where rights are determined based on cognition

The future is now.

this would be an unacceptable outcome in said future.

No, this is our best attempt at an executable implementation of that notion now.

 

[HenrySwanson]

The future is now.

No, this is our best attempt at an executable implementation of that notion now.

Isn't that contradictory?

That human has no right to life....but if you take its life you should be punished.

 

[Danoff]

Isn't that contradictory?

That human has no right to life....but if you take its life you should be punished.

Legal vs. Moral. Moral perfection* is something that legal rights should strive for, but if they cannot achieve perfection, they should approximate it.

*As judged by the most objective standard of human rights achievable.

 

[HenrySwanson]

Legal vs. Moral. Moral perfection* is something that legal rights should strive for, but if they cannot achieve perfection, they should approximate it.

*As judged by the most objective standard of human rights achievable.

That is a good quote, but....

It's saying in a purely objective, moral sense, the defendant's actions were excusable.

This makes sense for the robots in I, Robot or Isaac in The Orville but for human society? Is that what we should be striving to achieve?

 

[Danoff]

That is a good quote, but....

It's saying in a purely objective, moral sense, the defendant's actions were excusable.

Yes it becomes a regulatory infraction rather than a moral trangression.

This makes sense for the robots in I, Robot or Isaac in The Orville but for human society? Is that what we should be striving to achieve?

No. It isn't what we should be striving to achieve. We should strive for perfection. But we should also recognize when perfection can't be achieved and implement something practical that actually works instead of throwing our hands up and giving up on the whole business of law entirely. I didn't say we were striving for this, I said the opposite of that:

Moral perfection* is something that legal rights should strive for

A law that is a pure regulatory infraction is a flaw. But if it is a necessary flaw, and this is case I think it is, then we put up with the flaw until we can get it more correct. I think it's reasonable to recognize that it's not perfect, but also recognize that we don't have a better alternative right now. If one comes along, we move to that.

 

[TexRex]

Self-ownership and bodily integrity are human rights so fundamental that they are the basis for self-defense and consent. I'd suggest that they can't be distinguished from the right to life because life absent self-ownership and bodily integrity is mere biological condition without any substance.

Commonly, those who violate the rights of others which are so fundamental are themselves deprived of rights by the criminal justice system, and when the rights violation is so egregious, those who have perpetrated it may be deprived of life itself.

But let's get back to self-defense, especially as a means to preserve rights so fundamental. When one poses a legitimate threat to another, self-defense frequently exists as an affirmative defense in criminal prosecution for grievous bodily harm inflicted during measures to prevent or interrupt rights violation.

So what of one who would deprive another of rights so fundamental, not on the basis that one has violated anyone's rights, but on the broad basis that one has the capacity to carry new life into the world? One individual has no natural claim to any part of another's body, and yet laws that prohibit exercise affirming self-ownership and bodily integrity effectively create a legal right to exactly that, often referred to explicitly as a "right to life," which exists already, and weighs that legal right disproportionately against natural rights so fundamental.

Does depriving one of such fundamental rights so broadly, indeed violating said rights, not pose a threat to those rights? Is inflicting gross bodily harm really wrong when it serves to protect an individual's rights? Granted it may well be against the law, but is it morally wrong?

I've touched on this before, but where do you draw the line when determining who perpetrates the rights violation in this weighing of a legal right against a natural right? Is it the executive who serves as chief law enforcement officer? Is it the legislator who votes on laws that get to the executive, even by veto-busting majority? Is it the voting public who elects the legislators and executive? What of one who merely advocates for violation of such rights? Do those who show such disregard for the rights of others really retain rights themselves?

 

[TexRex]

Self-ownership and bodily integrity are rights so fundamental that they are frequently enshrined in law such that consent prior to death is required for organs to be available for transplant. Organs of those who have recently died may postpone the death of others, and yet consent is [appropriately] required because no individual has the natural right to any part of another's body, even when it's a matter of life and death.

What this means in effect is as abortion prohibitions are enacted or enforcement of existing prohibitions halted by Roe v. Wade resume in the United States, it's increasingly the case that the consent of literal corpses is more likely to be recognized than that of living women and other individuals who happen to be pregnant.

Granted, there's no guarantee that tissue transplantation will prolong an individual's life, but this is a whole person who has lived life to some extent, who has made choices, who may have social relations, who may have responsibilities, whose lungs have likely filled with air...none of which can be said of a fetus yet to leave the womb.

To what extent is consent recognized or not? It stands to reason that one who rejects the consent of someone who may be pregnant to make available their body for another may also reject consent to sexual contact, including that of those who aren't sufficiently aged that their individual consent is't recognized by law. You could include recognition of consent of the dead, in which case rape of a living person, including one who is underaged, may be permissible but defiling a corpse for sexual gratification may not.

Perhaps this reasoning is objectionable, but is it really wrong? Why? Should those who disregard consent relevant to abortion prohibitions not be viewed with the same contempt as those who disregard consent relevant to rape and child molestation simply for that shared disregard?

 

[Danoff]

What this means in effect is as abortion prohibitions are enacted or enforcement of existing prohibitions halted by Roe v. Wade resume in the United States, it's increasingly the case that the consent of literal corpses is more likely to be recognized than that of living women and other individuals who happen to be pregnant.

Not something I had considered and somewhat startling.

 

[UKMikey]

Please ignore - I didn't read the comment properly. Carry on.

 

[HenrySwanson]

Not something I had considered and somewhat startling.

Having worked in healthcare and a funeral home, you can make a similar case for dignity and respect in some cases. When transferring the deceased away, for example, a FSO (funeral service operative) should not place the restraining straps over the body's neck.

No. It isn't what we should be striving to achieve. We should strive for perfection. But we should also recognize when perfection can't be achieved and implement something practical that actually works instead of throwing our hands up and giving up on the whole business of law entirely. I didn't say we were striving for this, I said the opposite of that:

Talking about moral perfection here. Is the pinnacle of moral rectitude showing indifference when someone causes the death of a 3 month old?

Is inflicting gross bodily harm really wrong when it serves to protect an individual's rights? Granted it may well be against the law, but is it morally wrong?

I follow the rest of your post (I think), but who is the one inflicting gross bodily harm and against whom here?

 

[Danoff]

Talking about moral perfection here. Is the pinnacle of moral rectitude showing indifference when someone causes the death of a 3 month old?

Indifference? Again, replace the 3 month old with a mouse and read it back (ignore that a 3 month old may be more advanced cognitively than a mouse in some respects). Is the pinnacle of moral rectitude showing indifference when someone kills a mouse? Obviously not. Is it immoral to kill a mouse?

 

[TexRex]

I follow the rest of your post (I think), but who is the one inflicting gross bodily harm and against whom here?

The first part of your question is answered by the part of my post that you quoted and the second part is answered by the rest of it. I don't think you followed it at all and I'm not sure how.

In law, defense of oneself or of another commonly exists as an affirmative defense against criminal prosecution when one inflicts [grievous] bodily harm to prevent or interrupt assault, physical or sexual, which itself represents a violation of the rights to self-ownership and bodily integrity.

Now the law typically establishes standards such as a reasonable expectation of harm and imminence, the latter of which exists to resolve ambiguity, but I'm talking about that which is moral rather than that which is lawful. Frequently the law runs not merely alongside morality but even wholly counter to it.

Would it be wrong to inflict grievous bodily harm when another would violate one's rights as such, not limited to prohibition of abortion, but also of a non-exhaustive list of examples that includes fully consensual (non-coercive and where participants are aged sufficiently for consent to be recognized by law) same-sex sexual relations, fully consensual, contractual sexual relations (as in prostitution), personal consumption of substances which are themselves prohibited, and even death on one's own terms (provided the means of affecting it doesn't directly endanger others as diving off of a skyscraper or darting into traffic might)?

Is it wrong to disregard rights so fundamental, even by inflicting grievous bodily harm which may even be lethal, of one who would disregard those fundamental rights of others by enacting, enforcing, or even merely advocating for such prohibitions?

 

[HenrySwanson]

The first part of your question is answered by the part of my post that you quoted and the second part is answered by the rest of it. I don't think you followed it at all and I'm not sure how.

In law, defense of oneself or of another commonly exists as an affirmative defense against criminal prosecution when one inflicts [grievous] bodily harm to prevent or interrupt assault, physical or sexual, which itself represents a violation of the rights to self-ownership and bodily integrity.

Now the law typically establishes standards such as a reasonable expectation of harm and imminence, the latter of which exists to resolve ambiguity, but I'm talking about that which is moral rather than that which is lawful. Frequently the law runs not merely alongside morality but even wholly counter to it.

Would it be wrong to inflict grievous bodily harm when another would violate one's rights as such, not limited to prohibition of abortion, but also of a non-exhaustive list of examples that includes fully consensual (non-coercive and where participants are aged sufficiently for consent to be recognized by law) same-sex sexual relations, fully consensual, contractual sexual relations (as in prostitution), personal consumption of substances which are themselves prohibited, and even death on one's own terms (provided the means of affecting it doesn't directly endanger others as diving off of a skyscraper or darting into traffic might)?

Is it wrong to disregard rights so fundamental, even by inflicting grievous bodily harm which may even be lethal, of one who would disregard those fundamental rights of others by enacting, enforcing, or even merely advocating for such prohibitions?

Is the difference the potential to effect change? Harming a Supreme Court judge may not alter the violation of rights in the same way self defence might.

Maybe the problem is that it's hard to identify who's culpable, as you previously suggested.

Indifference? Again, replace the 3 month old with a mouse and read it back (ignore that a 3 month old may be more advanced cognitively than a mouse in some respects). Is the pinnacle of moral rectitude showing indifference when someone kills a mouse? Obviously not. Is it immoral to kill a mouse?

I could have misunderstood what you meant by moral perfection. Are you talking strictly about the differentiation between what is moral versus immoral?

If that's the case, it depends on the situation as to whether it's immoral to kill a mouse.

 

[TexRex]

Is the difference the potential to effect change? Harming a Supreme Court judge may not alter the violation of rights in the same way self defence might.

Maybe the problem is that it's hard to identify who's culpable, as you previously suggested.

I don't know how reasonable it would be to find a member of the Court culpable in the deprivation/violation of rights.

So a five member majority decided in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health, seemingly based on ideology rather than reason or law, that the United States Constitution doesn't confer a right to an abortion (though the Ninth Amendment states that a right's being unenumerated isn't a basis for depriving one of it) and overturned Roe v. Wade, which removed federal protection of the right and allowed states to deprive individuals of it by enacting/resuming prohibition. It's worth noting that Chief Justice Roberts concurred with the majority that Louisiana's near-total prohibition after 15 weeks wasn't unconstitutional (also seemingly based on ideology), but wouldn't have overturned Roe--thus the decision to overturn precedent was 5-4 rather than 6-3.

That there are states which have declined to prohibit it and therefore recognize self-ownership and bodily integrity, at least with regard to termination of unwanted pregnancy, suggests the Court may not be culpable.

If an action is to have the potential to affect change is a requirement, consider that defense of oneself or another doesn't have to remove another's capacity to violate rights and may instead dissuade further violation.

Certainly more culpable would be the executive, as it's responsible for enforcement of law, which would do the dirty work of violating rights by prosecuting individuals breaking the law by exercising rights. How culpable is the executive? That depends. One function of it is to veto bills passed by a legislature, requiring a greater majority to push a bill through into law. If an executive declines to veto a law which violates rigts, that executive certainly is culpable, but if the executive vetoes a bill and the legislature can override that veto with a greater majority, the executive may not be culpable.

That brings us to the legislature which would seem to be most culpable, except when prohibitions are affected by popular vote, in which case the voting public would be culpable. But then the public is vulnerable to coercion by advocates and activists.

Culpability isn't easy, but still not addressed is whether harm that serves to hinder violation of rights by governing actors through law, or advocates for such laws, is morally wrong.

Another right that occurs to me (I did say the list of examples wasn't exhaustive) is that of self-defense, which the right to bear arms enables. If one is incapable of defending oneself effectively because law makes acquiring firearms burdensome, one is effectively deprived of the right.

If one recognizes that personal harm may come to pass as a consequence of disregarding rights, as may already be the case in accordance with the law (as by self-defense or as by criminal prosecution), one may be dissuaded from disregarding rights.

I could have misunderstood what you meant by moral perfection. Are you talking strictly about the differentiation between what is moral versus immoral?

The law should serve to affect some objective moral result, say one which is founded on rights rather than mere feelings. I frequently refer to law as, ideally, preserving the rights of all without violating the rights of any. When the law achieves this result, that would be moral perfection. Moral perfection may be difficult to achieve, and so we settle with moral imperfection while, ideally, still striving for perfection.

 

[HenrySwanson]

I don't know how reasonable it would be to find a member of the Court culpable in the deprivation/violation of rights.

So a five member majority decided in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health, seemingly based on ideology rather than reason or law, that the United States Constitution doesn't confer a right to an abortion (though the Ninth Amendment states that a right's being unenumerated isn't a basis for depriving one of it) and overturned Roe v. Wade, which removed federal protection of the right and allowed states to deprive individuals of it by enacting/resuming prohibition. It's worth noting that Chief Justice Roberts concurred with the majority that Louisiana's near-total prohibition after 15 weeks wasn't unconstitutional (also seemingly based on ideology), but wouldn't have overturned Roe--thus the decision to overturn precedent was 5-4 rather than 6-3.

That there are states which have declined to prohibit it and therefore recognize self-ownership and bodily integrity, at least with regard to termination of unwanted pregnancy, suggests the Court may not be culpable.

If an action is to have the potential to affect change is a requirement, consider that defense of oneself or another doesn't have to remove another's capacity to violate rights and may instead dissuade further violation.

Certainly more culpable would be the executive, as it's responsible for enforcement of law, which would do the dirty work of violating rights by prosecuting individuals breaking the law by exercising rights. How culpable is the executive? That depends. One function of it is to veto bills passed by a legislature, requiring a greater majority to push a bill through into law. If an executive declines to veto a law which violates rigts, that executive certainly is culpable, but if the executive vetoes a bill and the legislature can override that veto with a greater majority, the executive may not be culpable.

That brings us to the legislature which would seem to be most culpable, except when prohibitions are affected by popular vote, in which case the voting public would be culpable. But then the public is vulnerable to coercion by advocates and activists.

Another right that occurs to me (I did say the list of examples wasn't exhaustive) is that of self-defense, which the right to bear arms enables. If one is incapable of defending oneself effectively because law makes acquiring firearms burdensome, one is effectively deprived of the right.

If one recognizes that personal harm may come to pass as a consequence of disregarding rights, as may already be the case in accordance with the law (as by self-defense or as by criminal prosecution), one may be dissuaded from disregarding rights.

Even if we could unanimously agree on who was culpable, in such circumstances it's hard to justify actual harm....

The post before this got me thinking about the Iraq War.

In the UK it's quite common in some circles to think Tony Blair was the best of the recent Prime Ministers, but that his legacy will always be tainted by his involvement in the Iraq War. Are we, as Brits, fair in ascribing culpability in this way? Would an Iraqi who lost their family because of a coalition airstrike only have a legitimate grievance with the pilot/gunner, or could Blair (and others) be implicated too....

Culpability isn't easy, but still not addressed is whether harm that serves to hinder violation of rights by governing actors through law, or advocates for such laws, is morally wrong.

Using the Blair example, even if it was agreed upon that he was culpable I don't think there would be uniform agreement that causing harm to him is morally acceptable. This might be because of the distance between him and the action that directly caused the loss of life. Since it isn't as direct a link as a soldier killing or a man raping there's an unseen buffer that may afford him protection in the minds of many. I can't even say if that's warranted, and it gets even murkier when we are talking about laws depriving people of rights.

If we go into thinking that the voting public is culpable, that's been used as justification for terror attacks against civilians, and I think it's a stretch to say that isn't immoral.

The law should serve to affect some objective moral result, say one which is founded on rights rather than mere feelings. I frequently refer to law as, ideally, preserving the rights of all without violating the rights of any. When the law achieves this result, that would be moral perfection. Moral perfection may be difficult to achieve, and so we settle with moral imperfection while, ideally, still striving for perfection.

Oh ok, I haven't heard of moral perfection used in that context before, and my comprehension skills let me down again.

What, in a morally perfect legal system, would be the appropriate punishment in R vs Woollin, and why is it not the case?

 

[Danoff]

If that's the case, it depends on the situation as to whether it's immoral to kill a mouse.

Give me an example where it is immoral to kill a mouse, and explain why it is immoral.

 

[TexRex]

Even if we could unanimously agree on who was culpable, in such circumstances it's hard to justify actual harm....

Is it irrational to say that rape is wrong because it violates the right to bodily integrity and self-ownership, where bodily integrity is the inviolability of the physical body and self-ownership is the basis for consent? If so, why?

If it isn't, is use of force (including lethal) to prevent or halt such a violation justified, not legally but morally? If not, why?

When state force is used in prohibiting termination of a non-consensual pregnancy (because no individual has a natural right to another's physical body, though consent may be given), either directly as by penalty or prosecution of the pregnant individual, or indirectly as by penalty or prosecution of one who would provide the means of terminating a non-consensual pregnancy in a manner that doesn't likely and meaningfully endanger the life of the pregnant individual, the individual's right to bodily integrity and self-ownership is violated. Why would the use of force (including lethal) to prevent or halt such a violation of rights so fundamental not be morally justified?

In the UK it's quite common in some circles to think Tony Blair was the best of the recent Prime Ministers, but that his legacy will always be tainted by his involvement in the Iraq War. Are we, as Brits, fair in ascribing culpability in this way?

Yes. You've established his involvement as a certainty and as such he is culpable for directing military intervention. Unless his hands were tied and he had no legal basis for subverting the will of another, perhaps legislative, body? I'm not familiar with the circumstances of his involvement.

Would an Iraqi who lost their family because of a coalition airstrike only have a legitimate grievance with the pilot/gunner, or could Blair (and others) be implicated too....

That would depend on the nature of a particular grievance--the conditions thereof. Could a grievance with actors removed from those immediately responsible for execution of the action be legitimate? Yes.

Using the Blair example, even if it was agreed upon that he was culpable I don't think there would be uniform agreement that causing harm to him is morally acceptable. This might be because of the distance between him and the action that directly caused the loss of life.

Again, I'd suggest that the conditions of both his involvement and the loss of life should also be factored. Loss of life as a result of military intervention is nearly certain but the conditions vary and the taking of life may or may not be justified, hinging on rights.

Since it isn't as direct a link as a soldier killing or a man raping there's an unseen buffer that may afford him protection in the minds of many.

And in some of those minds may be the notion that no loss of life in military conflict is unjustified, or even that rape isn't actually wrong. I would suggest that such a mind may be that of a sociopath.

Is conditioning morality on uniform agreement while sociopaths--those who have no regard for morality--exist...is that rational?

I can't even say if that's warranted, and it gets even murkier when we are talking about laws depriving people of rights.

The deprivation of rights absent a violation of rights is itself a violation of rights. Granting a legal right to an individual (indeed one that is deemed an individual by the granting of a legal right, as by so-called "fetal personhood" laws) and weighting it against natural rights is a violation of rights.

If we go into thinking that the voting public is culpable, that's been used as justification for terror attacks against civilians, and I think it's a stretch to say that isn't immoral.

That perpetrators of terror attacks have sought to justify such attacks by thinking the voting public is culpable in...something...should have no bearing on thinking the voting public may be culpable, particularly where terror attacks are indiscriminate in definition and in fact, rarely, if ever, claiming only members of the voting public and rarer still, if ever, claiming only those who voted in support of that...something.

If the granting of a legal right to be weighted against natural rights, thereby violating rights, is put to a popular vote and passes, how are those who voted for the granting of such a legal right not culpable in any violation of rights? Maybe those who voted in support of passage aren't principally culpable, perhaps if they have been influenced by deceptive campaigns, but why wouldn't they culpable at all? In spite of their having been influenced by deceptive campaigns, I would certainly think them to be more culpable than, say, those who voted for a representative in a legislative body that votes to violate rights, even if said representative votes in support of said violation. Of course candidates for representative roles in government frequently campaign on such a violation of rights, and so one who votes for such a candidate may be more culpable in the violation of rights if it comes to pass, while candidates for representative roles also frequently lie about their intentions, and so one who votes for such a candidate may not be so culpable.

What, in a morally perfect legal system, would be the appropriate punishment in R vs Woollin, and why is it not the case?

I don't know, not least because I'm not familiar with the facts of the case.

 

[HenrySwanson]

Give me an example where it is immoral to kill a mouse, and explain why it is immoral.

If it's someone else's pet. The harm is to the owner.

Is it irrational to say that rape is wrong because it violates the right to bodily integrity and self-ownership, where bodily integrity is the inviolability of the physical body and self-ownership is the basis for consent? If so, why?

If it isn't, is use of force (including lethal) to prevent or halt such a violation justified, not legally but morally? If not, why?

Morally justifiable.

When state force is used in prohibiting termination of a non-consensual pregnancy (because no individual has a natural right to another's physical body, though consent may be given), either directly as by penalty or prosecution of the pregnant individual, or indirectly as by penalty or prosecution of one who would provide the means of terminating a non-consensual pregnancy in a manner that doesn't likely and meaningfully endanger the life of the pregnant individual, the individual's right to bodily integrity and self-ownership is violated. Why would the use of force (including lethal) to prevent or halt such a violation of rights so fundamental not be morally justified?

It would be.... if we could identify who we mean by the "state". This should only be an option, however, if all efforts to force a peaceful resolution have been exhausted, and there is no choice but to turn to violence.

With America seeing the rise of white Christian nationalism I see similarities with a theocratic state like Iran. My question is, do you think violence is morally justifiable against the Mullahs?

And in some of those minds may be the notion that no loss of life in military conflict is unjustified, or even that rape isn't actually wrong. I would suggest that such a mind may be that of a sociopath.

Is conditioning morality on uniform agreement while sociopaths--those who have no regard for morality--exist...is that rational?

A better phrase would be strong agreement rather than uniform.

The deprivation of rights absent a violation of rights is itself a violation of rights. Granting a legal right to an individual (indeed one that is deemed an individual by the granting of a legal right, as by so-called "fetal personhood" laws) and weighting it against natural rights is a violation of rights.

My point is I don't know if the buffer is warranted.

I don't know, not least because I'm not familiar with the facts of the case.

It's the case of the 3 month old dying as a result of being thrown by his father (linked to earlier)

https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199798/ldjudgmt/jd980722/wool.htm

 

[Danoff]

If it's someone else's pet. The harm is to the owner.

I think it's quite telling that in your example the fact that the mouse is even alive is immaterial.

 

[TexRex]

Morally justifiable.

What of the first part? What makes rape wrong as such that grievous bodily harm inflicted upon a perpetrator (or would-be perpetrator) is morally justifiable? Is it not the violation of bodily integrity and self-ownership? If not, what?

It would be.... if we could identify who we mean by the "state".

Must the individual actor most culpable in the violation of rights be identified? Why? What if the violation of rights is affected not by the state itself but by a subset of the population subject to the enforcement of the state, as in a representative democracy?

This should only be an option, however, if all efforts to force a peaceful resolution have been exhausted, and there is no choice but to turn to violence.

What constitutes exhaustion when the state has a monopoly on the legal use of force, especially when the law serves not to preserve the rights of the individual but to satisfy the wants and wills of a subset of the population subject to those laws? The imposition of such a last resort requirement seems like a cop-out to continue to deprive individuals of rights so fundamental.

With America seeing the rise of white Christian nationalism I see similarities with a theocratic state like Iran. My question is, do you think violence is morally justifiable against the Mullahs?

If we're talking about the same kind of rights violations, I can't see any reason they would be exempt. Am I supposed to?

A better phrase would be strong agreement rather than uniform.

What's the difference? For that matter, what marks the absence of a strong agreement?

It's the case of the 3 month old dying as a result of being thrown by his father (linked to earlier)

https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199798/ldjudgmt/jd980722/wool.htm

I still don't know.

 

[HenrySwanson]

What of the first part? What makes rape wrong as such that grievous bodily harm inflicted upon a perpetrator (or would-be perpetrator) is morally justifiable? Is it not the violation of bodily integrity and self-ownership? If not, what?

It is. Sorry, assumed it would be redundant to include that.

Must the individual actor most culpable in the violation of rights be identified? Why? What if the violation of rights is affected not by the state itself but by a subset of the population subject to the enforcement of the state, as in a representative democracy?

Is it possible to re-word this? Who is the "subset of the population subject to the enforcement of the state"?

What constitutes exhaustion when the state has a monopoly on the legal use of force, especially when the law serves not to preserve the rights of the individual but to satisfy the wants and wills of a subset of the population subject to those laws? The imposition of such a last resort requirement seems like a cop-out to continue to deprive individuals of rights so fundamental.

Taking America as an example, from your previous posts it appears you hold the executive as most responsible. What is the democratic process of changing the executive?

If we're talking about the same kind of rights violations, I can't see any reason they would be exempt. Am I supposed to?

I ask because it's common to believe that Iranians should stage a revolution against their governance, and was interested to see if the same logic could be applied to America.

I think it's quite telling that in your example the fact that the mouse is even alive is immaterial.

I still don't know.

Well now....

To me, if the 3 month old doesn't have a right to life, the morally just thing in a legal respect would be to notch it down as a careless mistake and nothing more.

Imagine this scenario:

There's a building on fire and there are three lives at stake. One is a full term newborn, another an adult mouse and the last an infirm, elderly person with advanced dementia.

You can only rescue one of them at a time.

What order do you rescue them in?

 

[UKMikey]

I'd stick all three on the trolley and get the truck out of there.