shale is prevalent in the western states of Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming.The resource potential of these shales is estimated to be the equivalent of
1.8 trillionbarrels of oil in place. Retorted oil shale yields liquid hydrocarbons in the range ofmiddle-distillate fuels, such as jet and diesel fuel. However, because oil shales havenot proved to be economicallyrecoverable, theyare considered a contingentresourceand not true reserves. It remains to be demonstrated whether an economicallysignificant oil volume can be extracted under existing operating conditions. Incomparison,
Saudi Arabia reportedly holds proved reserves of 267 billion barrels.Federal interest in oil shale dates back to the early20thCentury, when the NavalPetroleum and Oil Shale Reserves were set aside. Out of World War II concerns fora secure oil supply, a Bureau of Mines program began research into exploiting theresource. Commercial interest followed during the 1960s. After a second oilembargo in the 1970s, Congress created a synthetic fuels program to stimulate large-scale commercial development of oil shale and other unconventional resources. Thefederal program proved short-lived, and commercially backed oil shale projectsended in the early 1980s when oil prices began declining.The current high oil prices have revived the interest in oil shale. The EnergyPolicyAct of 2005 (EPACT) identified oil shale as a strategicallyimportant domesticresource, among others, that should be developed. EPACT also directed theSecretary of Defense to develop a separate strategy to use oil shale in meetingDepartment of Defense (DOD) requirements when doingso isin the national interest.Tapping unconventional resources, such as oil shale, has been promoted as a meansof reducing dependence on foreign oil and improving national security.Opponents of federal subsidies for oil shale argue that the price and demand forcrude oil should act as sufficient incentives to stimulate development. Projectionsof increased demand and peaking petroleum production in the coming decades tendto support the price-and-supply incentive argument in the long term.The failure of oil shale has been tied to the perennially lower price of crude oil,a much less risky conventional resource. Proponents of renewing commercial oilshale developmentmightalsoweighwhether other factors detract from the resource’spotential. Refiningindustryprofitabilityis overwhelminglydriven bylight passengervehicle demand for motor gasoline, and oil-shale distillate does not make idealfeedstock for gasoline production. Policies that discourage the wider use of middle-distillates as transportation fuels indirectly discourage oil shale development.Because the largest oil shale resources reside on federal lands, the federalgovernment would have a directinterest and rolein thedevelopment of this resource.This report will be updated as new developments occur.
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CRS-1027Garfield County, Colorado, Garfield County Comprehensive Plan Revision, Study AreaFive, adopted version, Apr. 24, 2002, at [
http://garfield-county.com/home/index.asp?page=664], visited Mar. 28, 2006.28H.Rept. 99-196, Part 1, July 11, 1985.Department of Energy Synthetic Fuels ProgramThe Department of Energy (DOE) encouraged interest in large-scale oil shaledevelopment through its Synthetic Fuels Program. DOE initially promoted twoprototype lease tracts in the Piceance Basin of Rio Blanco County, Colorado (NOSRtracts C-a and C-b).27Amoco later produced 1,900 barrels using in situ retorting intract C-a, and Occidental Petroleum planned a similar effort for tract C-b.The InteriorDepartmentAppropriationsAct(P.L. 96-126) and the SupplementalAppropriations Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-304) appropriated $17.522 billion to the EnergySecurity Reserve fund in the Treasury Department. Of that amount, $2.616 billionwas committed by the Department of Energy to three synthetic fuels projects. Twoof the projects were approved under the Defense Production Act: Union OilCompany’s Parachute Creek project in Garfield County, Colorado, and Exxon-Tosco’s Colony oil shale project, also in Garfield County. Union Oil Companyreceived a $0.4 billion price guarantee for the Parachute Creek Shale Oil Project, andthe Exxon-Tosco ColonyOil Shale Projectreceived a loan guarantee of $1.15 billion(applied to the 40% owned by Tosco).28Union Oil was expected to produce 10,400bpd at $42.50/bbl, which, adjusted for inflation, equaled $51.20/bbl by March 1,1985.As an additional stimulus to producing alternative fuels — for which oil shale,among others, qualified — Congress provided a $3.00 /bbl production tax creditprovision in the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-223). The creditwould take full effect when crude oil prices fell below $23.50 /bbl (in 1979 dollars)and would gradually phase out as prices rose above to $29.50/bbl.Tosco’s interest in the Colony project was sold in 1979, and again in 1980, toExxon Company for the Colony II development. Exxon planned to invest up to $5billion in a planned 47,000 bpd plant using a Tosco retort design. After spendingmore than $1 billion, Exxon announced on May 2, 1982, that it was closing theproject and laying off 2,200 workers.U.S. Synthetic Fuels CorporationThe Energy Security Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-294, Title I, Part B) established theUnited States Synthetic Fuels Corporation (SFC) with the authority to providefinancial assistance to qualified projects that produced synthetic fuel from coal, oilshale, tar sands, and heavy oils. The SFC’s loan commitments would be paid fromthe Energy Security Reserve fund. Executive Order 12346 (Synthetic Fuels) laterprovided for an orderlytransition of DOE’s earlier syntheticfuelprogram to theSFC.
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CRS-1129Daniel Yergin, The Prize, Touchstone, 1991, pp. 722-725.Between 1981 and 1984, the SFC received 34 proposals for oil shale projectsin three rounds of solicitations. Only three letters of intent were ever issued. UnionOil’s Parachute Creek Phase II80,000 bpd plant was to receive a $2.7 billion fundingcommitment and a guarantee of $60/bbl, escalated up to $67 /bbl; another $0.5billion in price and loan guarantees was added in October 1985 to Union’s ParachuteCreek Phase I. Cathedral Bluffs, a 14,300 bpd plant based on a Union Oil design,was to receive a $2.19 billion loan guarantee and a $60/bbl price guarantee. SeepRidge Oil Shale’s 1,000 bpd plant was to receive $45 million in price and loanguarantees. None of the oil shale projects that received SFC loan guarantees everreceived actual funding, as Congress rescinded $2 billion originallyappropriated forthe EnergySecurityReserve fund in the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (P.L. 98-369)and later abolished the SFC.
In 1984, Congress asked the General Accounting Office (GAO) to report on theprogress of synthetic fuels development and to specifically respond to the question“Whyhave project sponsors dropped synthetic fuels projects?” GAO answered thatoil had become plentiful, with about 8 to 10 million barrels per day in excessworldwide capacity, and the trend in rising oil prices had reversed after early 1981.President Reagan’s Executive Order 12287 had removed price and allocationcontrols on crude oil and refined petroleum products in 1981. For the first time sincethe early 1970s, market forces replaced regulatory programs and domestic crude oilprices were allowed to rise to a market-clearing level. Decontrol also set the stagefor the relaxation of export restrictions on refined petroleum products. Oil demandhad also declined, due in part to energy conservation measures and a worldwideeconomic recession. A more fundamental change had taken place in the waythat oilcommodities were traded.
Prior to 1980, the price of crude oil was determined bylong-term contracts, with 10% or so of internationally traded oil exchanged on thespot market.29By the end of 1982, more than half of the internationally traded oilwas exchanged on the spot market or tied to the spot market price. The mostsignificant change occurred in 1983, with the introduction of crude oil futures bytheNew York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX). All served to undermine price settingby the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).Tax incentives for oil shale projects had also been reduced. Some of thegenerous oil depreciation allowances under the 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act(P.L. 97-48) were rescinded in 1982 bythe Tax Equityand Fiscal ResponsibilityAct(P.L. 97-248), reducing potential project sponsors’ after-tax rates of return.The House began considering a bill to abolish the SFC in 1985, and Congressterminated the Corporation the following year under the Consolidated OmnibusBudget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-272). The Appendix to this reportprovides a more complete legislative history of the Synthetic Fuels program.
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CRS-1541“U.S. Oil Dumping Case Wins Investigation By Commerce,” Oil & Gas Journal, Oct. 2,2000.421980 vs. 2004 Refinery Inflation Index and 1980 vs. 2004 Refinery Operating Index fromthe Nelson-Farrar Cost Indexes, Oil & Gas Journal (published first issue each month).43“U.S. appears to have built last refinery,” Alexander’s Gas & Oil Connections, vol. 6,issue 13, Jul. 17, 2001.44U.S. DOE EIA, Performance Profiles of Major Energy Producers 2004, Table 15, U.S.(continued...)been dumped on the American market.41Though unsuccessful, the suit does saysomething further about bottom-line production costs (the crude oil price equivalentthat producers could not compete below) and the production costs that oil shale mayneed to compete against. For several years precedingthe price drop, crude oil rangedfrom $20 to $30/bbl.The perception that oil shale serves as a crude oil substitute overlooks thelimited fungibility of the middle distillates that are extractable — they make poorfeedstock for gasoline production. That does not necessarily prevent oil-shaledistillates from beingusedasgasolinefeedstock, but additional energyand hydrogenare needed to crack them. The loss may be even greater considering the lower fuelefficiency of spark-ignition engines that use gasoline, compared with compressionignition engines that use diesel distillate fuels.Other incentives or disincentives may include the cost and size of an oil shaleprocessing facility, conventional refining profitability, and the cost and availabilityof refined commodities. Certain environmental and tax regulations that act asincentivesto usinggasolinein light-dutyvehiclesdiscouragemiddle-distillatedieselfuel use, and thus oil-shale distillates as substitute motor fuels.The Cost of Constructing an Oil Shale FacilityA reliable cost estimate for producing oil shale has proved challenging, if notcontroversial. The cost of resources extraction had depended on whetherconventional underground or strip-mining methods were employed. Because therewas aconsiderableexperiencein mining, reliablecost estimates could bedeveloped.A second variable — the cost of constructing and operating an oil shale facility —had to be accounted for separately. The former OTA estimated in 1979 that a 50,000bpd oil shale facility (based on above-ground retorting technology) would haverequired an investment of $1.5 billion and operating costs of $8 to $13/bbl. Usingthe Nelson-Farrar Cost Indexes to adjust refineryconstruction and operation costs to2004 dollars, the investment would be equivalent to $3.5 billion, with operatingcostsof $13 to $21/bbl.42This excludes the cost of shale extraction.In comparison, the cost of building a new conventional refinery has beenestimated to range between $2 and $4 billion as recently as 2001.43The cost ofoperating a refinery (marketing, energy, and other costs) averaged nearly $6/bblduring 2003-2004, as reflected in the difference between gross and net margins(where the gross margin reflects the refiner’s revenue minus the cost of crude oil).44
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