US and Iran Make Breakthrough Nuclear Deal

[NissanSkylineN1]

Here are the details:
Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Nuclear Program
Media Note
Office of the Spokesperson
Washington, DC
April 2, 2015
Below are the key parameters of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear program that were decided in Lausanne, Switzerland. These elements form the foundation upon which the final text of the JCPOA will be written between now and June 30, and reflect the significant progress that has been made in discussions between the P5+1, the European Union, and Iran. Important implementation details are still subject to negotiation, and nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. We will work to conclude the JCPOA based on these parameters over the coming months.
Enrichment

• Iran has agreed to reduce by approximately two-thirds its installed centrifuges. Iran will go from having about 19,000 installed today to 6,104 installed under the deal, with only 5,060 of these enriching uranium for 10 years. All 6,104 centrifuges will be IR-1s, Iran’s first-generation centrifuge.

• Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium over 3.67 percent for at least 15 years.

• Iran has agreed to reduce its current stockpile of about 10,000 kg of low-enriched uranium (LEU) to 300 kg of 3.67 percent LEU for 15 years.

• All excess centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure will be placed in IAEA monitored storage and will be used only as replacements for operating centrifuges and equipment.

• Iran has agreed to not build any new facilities for the purpose of enriching uranium for 15 years.

• Iran’s breakout timeline – the time that it would take for Iran to acquire enough fissile material for one weapon – is currently assessed to be 2 to 3 months. That timeline will be extended to at least one year, for a duration of at least ten years, under this framework.

Iran will convert its facility at Fordow so that it is no longer used to enrich uranium

• Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium at its Fordow facility for at least 15 years.

• Iran has agreed to convert its Fordow facility so that it is used for peaceful purposes only – into a nuclear, physics, technology, research center.

• Iran has agreed to not conduct research and development associated with uranium enrichment at Fordow for 15 years.

• Iran will not have any fissile material at Fordow for 15 years. 2

• Almost two-thirds of Fordow’s centrifuges and infrastructure will be removed. The remaining centrifuges will not enrich uranium. All centrifuges and related infrastructure will be placed under IAEA monitoring.

Iran will only enrich uranium at the Natanz facility, with only 5,060 IR-1 first-generation centrifuges for ten years.

• Iran has agreed to only enrich uranium using its first generation (IR-1 models) centrifuges at Natanz for ten years, removing its more advanced centrifuges.

• Iran will remove the 1,000 IR-2M centrifuges currently installed at Natanz and place them in IAEA monitored storage for ten years.

• Iran will not use its IR-2, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, or IR-8 models to produce enriched uranium for at least ten years. Iran will engage in limited research and development with its advanced centrifuges, according to a schedule and parameters which have been agreed to by the P5+1.

• For ten years, enrichment and enrichment research and development will be limited to ensure a breakout timeline of at least 1 year. Beyond 10 years, Iran will abide by its enrichment and enrichment R&D plan submitted to the IAEA, and pursuant to the JCPOA, under the Additional Protocol resulting in certain limitations on enrichment capacity.

Inspections and Transparency

• The IAEA will have regular access to all of Iran’s nuclear facilities, including to Iran’s enrichment facility at Natanz and its former enrichment facility at Fordow, and including the use of the most up-to-date, modern monitoring technologies.

• Inspectors will have access to the supply chain that supports Iran’s nuclear program. The new transparency and inspections mechanisms will closely monitor materials and/or components to prevent diversion to a secret program.

• Inspectors will have access to uranium mines and continuous surveillance at uranium mills, where Iran produces yellowcake, for 25 years.

• Inspectors will have continuous surveillance of Iran’s centrifuge rotors and bellows production and storage facilities for 20 years. Iran’s centrifuge manufacturing base will be frozen and under continuous surveillance.

• All centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure removed from Fordow and Natanz will be placed under continuous monitoring by the IAEA.

• A dedicated procurement channel for Iran’s nuclear program will be established to monitor and approve, on a case by case basis, the supply, sale, or transfer to Iran of 3 certain nuclear-related and dual use materials and technology – an additional transparency measure.

• Iran has agreed to implement the Additional Protocol of the IAEA, providing the IAEA much greater access and information regarding Iran’s nuclear program, including both declared and undeclared facilities.

• Iran will be required to grant access to the IAEA to investigate suspicious sites or allegations of a covert enrichment facility, conversion facility, centrifuge production facility, or yellowcake production facility anywhere in the country.

• Iran has agreed to implement Modified Code 3.1 requiring early notification of construction of new facilities.

• Iran will implement an agreed set of measures to address the IAEA’s concerns regarding the Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) of its program.

Reactors and Reprocessing

• Iran has agreed to redesign and rebuild a heavy water research reactor in Arak, based on a design that is agreed to by the P5+1, which will not produce weapons grade plutonium, and which will support peaceful nuclear research and radioisotope production.

• The original core of the reactor, which would have enabled the production of significant quantities of weapons-grade plutonium, will be destroyed or removed from the country.

• Iran will ship all of its spent fuel from the reactor out of the country for the reactor’s lifetime.

• Iran has committed indefinitely to not conduct reprocessing or reprocessing research and development on spent nuclear fuel.

• Iran will not accumulate heavy water in excess of the needs of the modified Arak reactor, and will sell any remaining heavy water on the international market for 15 years.

• Iran will not build any additional heavy water reactors for 15 years.

Sanctions

• Iran will receive sanctions relief, if it verifiably abides by its commitments.

• U.S. and E.U. nuclear-related sanctions will be suspended after the IAEA has verified that Iran has taken all of its key nuclear-related steps. If at any time Iran fails to fulfill its commitments, these sanctions will snap back into place. 4

• The architecture of U.S. nuclear-related sanctions on Iran will be retained for much of the duration of the deal and allow for snap-back of sanctions in the event of significant non-performance.

• All past UN Security Council resolutions on the Iran nuclear issue will be lifted simultaneous with the completion, by Iran, of nuclear-related actions addressing all key concerns (enrichment, Fordow, Arak, PMD, and transparency).

• However, core provisions in the UN Security Council resolutions – those that deal with transfers of sensitive technologies and activities – will be re-established by a new UN Security Council resolution that will endorse the JCPOA and urge its full implementation. It will also create the procurement channel mentioned above, which will serve as a key transparency measure. Important restrictions on conventional arms and ballistic missiles, as well as provisions that allow for related cargo inspections and asset freezes, will also be incorporated by this new resolution.

• A dispute resolution process will be specified, which enables any JCPOA participant, to seek to resolve disagreements about the performance of JCPOA commitments.

• If an issue of significant non-performance cannot be resolved through that process, then all previous UN sanctions could be re-imposed.

• U.S. sanctions on Iran for terrorism, human rights abuses, and ballistic missiles will remain in place under the deal.

Phasing

• For ten years, Iran will limit domestic enrichment capacity and research and development – ensuring a breakout timeline of at least one year. Beyond that, Iran will be bound by its longer-term enrichment and enrichment research and development plan it shared with the P5+1.

• For fifteen years, Iran will limit additional elements of its program. For instance, Iran will not build new enrichment facilities or heavy water reactors and will limit its stockpile of enriched uranium and accept enhanced transparency procedures.

• Important inspections and transparency measures will continue well beyond 15 years. Iran’s adherence to the Additional Protocol of the IAEA is permanent, including its significant access and transparency obligations. The robust inspections of Iran’s uranium supply chain will last for 25 years.

• Even after the period of the most stringent limitations on Iran’s nuclear program, Iran will remain a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which prohibits Iran’s development or acquisition of nuclear weapons and requires IAEA safeguards on its nuclear program. 5

________http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/04/240170.htm

________http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/IranDealParameters04022015.pdf - PDF

 

[Sanji Himura]

None of that is legally binding unless it is ratified by the Senate.

He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.

*emphasis mine.

The same could be said when Obama rammed through the START 3 accords even though START 2 hadn't been ratified.

 

[Johnnypenso]

Iran will be required to grant access to the IAEA to investigate suspicious sites or allegations of a covert enrichment facility, conversion facility, centrifuge production facility, or yellowcake production facility anywhere in the country.

I don't know if this is all the substance or just a summary but "grant access" sounds suspiciously like calling up Iran and saying, "Hey we'd like to come and inspect your nuclear facilities, how is the third thursday next month sound?". I'd sure like to know what the exact terminology is of the inspection process and if the inspections can be done any time, without prior notice.

 

[prisonermonkeys]

I'd sure like to know what the exact terminology is of the inspection process and if the inspections can be done any time, without prior notice.

It hasn't been decided yet. All parties involved have made it clear that they have an agreement in principle, a framework for what the ultimate resolution should look like. Now they can focus on the specifics.

 

[Johnnypenso]

It hasn't been decided yet. All parties involved have made it clear that they have an agreement in principle, a framework for what the ultimate resolution should look like. Now they can focus on the specifics.

When are these specifics ironed out? When does the deal go to the Senate and Congress?

 

[Imari]

I'm more interested to know what "sanctions relief" consists of. That seems to be all Iran is getting out of the deal, so for all that they're giving up it must be pretty sweet.

 

[Sanji Himura]

When are these specifics ironed out? When does the deal go to the Senate and Congress?

If Josh Earnest has his way, it won't go before Congress. That's why I mentioned the START 3 treaty. Obama will ram the agreement through without ratification. Mainly because it requires a 2/3rds majority to ratification.

 

[prisonermonkeys]

When are these specifics ironed out?

At the next round of talks. Which don't have a set date yet, and will probably take some time. But this is still a big step.

When does the deal go to the Senate and Congress?

One all parties - the Unites States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, China and Iran - are in agreement.

Obama can only get the sanctions imposed by the United States repealed (or at least lessened). The other major powers, particularly the Europeans, have their own sanctions in place. The deal only work if everyone is on the same page - the Europeans will repeal sanctions at the same time as the United States, but for that to happen, everyone needs to be in agreement first.

I'm more interested to know what "sanctions relief" consists of. That seems to be all Iran is getting out of the deal, so for all that they're giving up it must be pretty sweet.

It will open up the entire economy. Iran has been seriously stymied by the sanctions. They're one of the biggest, most populous and most stable countries in the region, and could become the economic powerhouse of the Middle East - but they have been set back years by the sanctions.

For now, the West is willing repeal the sanctions, but they will have to look at Iran's long-term future. Iran has offered assistance in stopping ISIL - independently of the US-led coalition - which will probably earn them a lot of goodwill with the West. But they're too big to simply repeal economic and diplomatic sanctions; the West will probably have to consider the role Iran will play in regional and global security in the future, and maybe even look at a nuclear power program one day.

 

[prisonermonkeys]

Obama will ram the agreement through without ratification. Mainly because it requires a 2/3rds majority to ratification.

He might not have a choice. If he were to put it through the usual channels, and if it got shot down for political purposes, it would not be received well by Tehran. Both sides of politics want Iran to shut down its nuclear programme, and I think that it would be very difficult to make the case that it's not in America's interests given that the deal needs to satisfy England, France, Germany, Russia, China and the European Union. Tehran doesn't trust Washington because of what happened in 1953, and given that their economy is at stake and they're willing to scale back their nuclear programme, any rejection by American politicians for the purposes of sticking it to Obama will likely set American-Iranian relations back at least a decade.

 

[Dotini]

As much as I would like to see improved US-Iran relations, it must be admitted that the senate has a constitutional role to play in foreign policy. They may be misled, corrupted by Wall Street and politically polarized at the moment, but that does not excuse a president from exceeding his authority, even in a virtuous cause. It will be a stern test of his leadership and political skills to see how he works this out. It could easily all blow up - literally so in some scenarios.

 

[prisonermonkeys]

As much as I would like to see improved US-Iran relations, it must be admitted that the senate has a constitutional role to play in foreign policy.

But it's a question of why the senate are making the decisions that they are. It's one thing to reject a policy because it's not in the country's interests. It's another thing entirely to reject it because they want to frustrate the President. Tehran is clearly feeling the pinch of the sanctions, which is why they're negotiating. They know that their economic future is at stake. But if the proposal gets rejected, they'll be stuck with the sanctions because of the whims of a few politicians.

 

[Blitz24]

But it's a question of why the senate are making the decisions that they are. It's one thing to reject a policy because it's not in the country's interests. It's another thing entirely to reject it because they want to frustrate the President. Tehran is clearly feeling the pinch of the sanctions, which is why they're negotiating. They know that their economic future is at stake. But if the proposal gets rejected, they'll be stuck with the sanctions because of the whims of a few politicians.

What if the reason they reject is due to consistent distrust of the Iranians and their belief that they won't hold their side of the deal?

 

[prisonermonkeys]

What if the reason they reject is due to consistent distrust of the Iranians and their belief that they won't hold their side of the deal?

Any deal that will see Iran disband its nuclear programme will inevitably call for the Americans to trust Tehran at some point. They cannot expect Iran to exist in a state of economic quicksand indefinitely.

At the same time, any deal will call for the Iranians to make good on their promises. If they break those promises, then sanctions can be reapplied.

 

[Blitz24]

Any deal that will see Iran disband its nuclear programme will inevitably call for the Americans to trust Tehran at some point. They cannot expect Iran to exist in a state of economic quicksand indefinitely.

At the same time, any deal will call for the Iranians to make good on their promises. If they break those promises, then sanctions can be reapplied.

I just hope that any promise broken isn't one that costs human lives.

 

[prisonermonkeys]

I just hope that any promise broken isn't one that costs human lives.

It's unlikely. The economic sanctions have crippled the Iranian economy. Iran won't bounce back overnight - they can't agree, get short-term benefits, then go back on their word and have the economy frozen again. And Rouhani got himself elected on a more moderate platform than Ahmadenijad, who was quickly becoming a liability.

 

[Sanji Himura]

But it's a question of why the senate are making the decisions that they are. It's one thing to reject a policy because it's not in the country's interests. It's another thing entirely to reject it because they want to frustrate the President. Tehran is clearly feeling the pinch of the sanctions, which is why they're negotiating. They know that their economic future is at stake. But if the proposal gets rejected, they'll be stuck with the sanctions because of the whims of a few politicians.

I take it that the words "advise and consent" mean absolutely nothing. Enough people know that if this gets rammed through like the START 3 accords, then we, as in the people in the US, have lost all real political power. Congress was to be a check against a president who makes treaties and backroom deals like this, but they became toothless worms and try to stop him.

The president isn't some end all be all either. He can't go and make foreign policy decisions without some input from Congress.

 

[NissanSkylineN1]

What if the reason they reject is due to consistent distrust of the Iranians and their belief that they won't hold their side of the deal?

If anything, Iran has the rights to distrust the United States from the endless interference in the government throughout the 20th century. I doubt Iran would do anything to further damage their economy. Also, you have to realize that Iran is giving a pretty awesome middle finger towards Netanyahu from this.

 

[prisonermonkeys]

The president isn't some end all be all either. He can't go and make foreign policy decisions without some input from Congress.

Perhaps, but the Iranians already distrust the Americans because of their role in the 1953 coup, which they took to be a case of meddling in their domestic affairs, undermining their economy and reversing the democratic process for the sake of safeguarding their own interests. Even if the Senate feel that they have a legitimate reason for rejecting this deal, the Iranians will likely take it the same way - especially if the other countries repeal their own sanctions.

 

[Eunos_Cosmo]

I think Iran wants to be and can be the dominant economic power in the entire middle east region. I know that the majority of the people in Iran also want to be out from the rather despotic leadership that currently exists. Easing the sanctions could go a long way in helping to establishing more progressive/moderate leadership in Iran in the years to come. My girlfriend is from Tehran, and apparently the news of the lifting of sanctions has the Iranian people very happy/excited. She said it's been nearly impossible for, example, her family to send money to her in the US because of the sanctions. It would be amazing if relations of Iran to Europe and the US could be friendly again.

On the US side, I hope that Obama can/will meet with congress in private to mediate things. Any sort of public conference will have far too much posturing at stake on both sides, potentially ruining the chances of the deal passing through the senate. I do agree that it must be approved by congress or else risk damaging our own system.

On the Iranian side, that absolute imbecile Mahmoud Ahmadinejad set back Iranian relations to basically everywhere by years due to his foolish mouth.

 

[Johnnypenso]

I think Iran wants to be and can be the dominant economic power in the entire middle east region. I know that the majority of the people in Iran also want to be out from the rather despotic leadership that currently exists. Easing the sanctions could go a long way in helping to establishing more progressive/moderate leadership in Iran in the years to come. My girlfriend is from Tehran, and apparently the news of the lifting of sanctions has the Iranian people very happy/excited. She said it's been nearly impossible for, example, her family to send money to her in the US because of the sanctions. It would be amazing if relations of Iran to Europe and the US could be friendly again.

On the US side, I hope that Obama can/will meet with congress in private to mediate things. Any sort of public conference will have far too much posturing at stake on both sides, potentially ruining the chances of the deal passing through the senate. I do agree that it must be approved by congress or else risk damaging our own system.

On the Iranian side, that absolute imbecile Mahmoud Ahmadinejad set back Iranian relations to basically everywhere by years due to his foolish mouth.

Given that Saudi Arabia's GNP/Capita is about 3.5 times that of Iran and it's oil reserves are close to double that of Iran, I think Saudi Arabia will continue to be the dominant force in the Middle East for some time to come. The only way this will change is if Iran engages in armed territorial conquest and both the Saudis and the U.S. will never allow that to happen.

 

[Eunos_Cosmo]

Given that Saudi Arabia's GNP/Capita is about 3.5 times that of Iran and it's oil reserves are close to double that of Iran, I think Saudi Arabia will continue to be the dominant force in the Middle East for some time to come. The only way this will change is if Iran engages in armed territorial conquest and both the Saudis and the U.S. will never allow that to happen.

Iran has a vastly more diversified economy than Saudi Arabia. Not to mention Saudi Arabia has almost no manufacturing base, considerably poorer education and it's technological innovations register nearly zero in comparison with most economic powers. With the economy of Iran beginning to privatize, I think we will see impressive things from the Persians.

Take a look at these two pages and tell me which economy has more potential in the future:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Iran

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Saudi_Arabia

 

[Johnnypenso]

Iran has a vastly more diversified economy than Saudi Arabia. Not to mention Saudi Arabia has almost no manufacturing base, considerably poorer education and it's technological innovations register nearly zero in comparison with most economic powers. With the economy of Iran beginning to privatize, I think we will see impressive things from the Persians.

Take a look at these two pages and tell me which economy has more potential in the future:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Iran

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Saudi_Arabia

Until a cost effective alternative is found to fossil fuels, I'll go with Saudi Arabia's 80+ years of oil reserves. When it comes to economic power, the free flow of money right out of the ground is hard to beat and Iran has a long, long way to get even close to Saudi Arabia on a per capita basis. 50 years from now it might be a different story.

 

[Danoff]

I do love when people thing these "agreements" will actually be held up.

 

[Eunos_Cosmo]

Until a cost effective alternative is found to fossil fuels, I'll go with Saudi Arabia's 80+ years of oil reserves. When it comes to economic power, the free flow of money right out of the ground is hard to beat and Iran has a long, long way to get even close to Saudi Arabia on a per capita basis. 50 years from now it might be a different story.

Actually it's easy to beat. Have a "free flow of money right out of the ground" PLUS other industries. Of the top 10 world economies, all of them have vast, diversified economies. Also too, just because SA has 80 years of reserves, that doesn't mean it can produce all of it at once. If Iran can match SA's oil production rate while simultaneously bolstering its other industries (both of which I think are achievable) then it's no question Iran will become the economic leader in the region. Iran's nominal GDP is not very far off of Saudi Arabias, despite oppressive sanctions.

If you are using purely GNP/capita as a metric of economic power, one would also have to argue that Norway and Qatar are more dominant economic powers than the US or the EU, a truly ludicrous claim. In fact, on a GNP/capita basis, Iran is ahead of China by a large margin! Of course the Saudis will be ahead in this category, TWO THIRDS of their workers (7.5 million of them) are not SA citizens and are therefore not calculated into GNP/capita calculations.

 

[prisonermonkeys]

Given that Saudi Arabia's GNP/Capita is about 3.5 times that of Iran and it's oil reserves are close to double that of Iran, I think Saudi Arabia will continue to be the dominant force in the Middle East for some time to come. The only way this will change is if Iran engages in armed territorial conquest and both the Saudis and the U.S. will never allow that to happen.

Saudi Arabia's GNP/Capita figures are misleading. Yes, it has fantastic oil reserves, but the oil fields - and thus the wealth - it controlled almost exclusively by the royal family. The average wage of the rest of the population is much, much lower than the GNP/Capita figures would have you believe.

 

[Johnnypenso]

Saudi Arabia's GNP/Capita figures are misleading. Yes, it has fantastic oil reserves, but the oil fields - and thus the wealth - it controlled almost exclusively by the royal family. The average wage of the rest of the population is much, much lower than the GNP/Capita figures would have you believe.

And the oil income from Iran is spread out amongst the people or also mainly enjoyed by a select group at the top of the food chain?

Actually it's easy to beat. Have a "free flow of money right out of the ground" PLUS other industries. Of the top 10 world economies, all of them have vast, diversified economies. Also too, just because SA has 80 years of reserves, that doesn't mean it can produce all of it at once. If Iran can match SA's oil production rate while simultaneously bolstering its other industries (both of which I think are achievable) then it's no question Iran will become the economic leader in the region. Iran's nominal GDP is not very far off of Saudi Arabias, despite oppressive sanctions.

If you are using purely GNP/capita as a metric of economic power, one would also have to argue that Norway and Qatar are more dominant economic powers than the US or the EU, a truly ludicrous claim. In fact, on a GNP/capita basis, Iran is ahead of China by a large margin! Of course the Saudis will be ahead in this category, TWO THIRDS of their workers (7.5 million of them) are not SA citizens and are therefore not calculated into GNP/capita calculations.

Per Capita is relevant when economies are roughly close in size, which Iran and SA are. When Norway moves into the middle east they'll become relevant to a discussion about Middle Eastern economic power. Qatar's economy is too small to be the dominant economic power of the Middle East.

 

[prisonermonkeys]

And the oil income from Iran is spread out amongst the people or also mainly enjoyed by a select group at the top of the food chain?

It's spread out a little bit more than in Saudi Arabia, but as has been pointed out, Iran has a more diverse economy than Saudi Arabia.

The situation with Iran has its origins in the oil industry. Iran had vast reserves of oil, but didn't have the means or the knowledge needed to extract it. So they did a deal with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Consortium - now British Petroleum - to start drilling. AIOC got the oil rights, and Iran got 16% of profits from drilling. But when they moved to a democracy in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the government started to feel that they were getting a bad deal out of it when they wanted to develop the economy, and tried to renegotiate. AIOC refused, and so the Iranians moved to nationalise the oil industry. That went down poorly with the British AIOC, and faced with the potential loss of oil, the British and Americans orchestrated a coup, removing the prime minister from power and replacing him with a dictatorial, pro-Western Shah, who kept the AIOC deal intact in exchange for support from the West.

Parallel to this, the CIA orchestrated another coup, this time in Guatemala, removing a democratically-elected leader and replacing him with a pro-Western dictator. All of this was interpreted by the Iranians as the United States interfering with the affairs of sovereign states to protect their own interests abroad at the expense of the interests of the people living abroad. It was seen as hypocritical because America was a democracy and styled as the pinnacle of giving the people a voice, but foreign policy was actively shutting down democracies.

 

[sumbrownkid]

Honestly, Iran probably has nuclear grade material somewhere.

The idea of making a nuke is not new at all. The big question is delivering such a weapon and it will be a successful delivery on a target, though I hope that will never, ever, happen in our lifetime and in generations to come after.

As for the Saudi vs Iran thing, my parents do live in Saudi, and for all the wealth it has, there is still a pitiful amount of poverty in that country. Which is sad but royalty would rather gamble it in Vegas than investing it in the people. Iran is definitely more ahead in education and diversification of it's manufacturing and IT sectors. All the Saudis do is just pump more oil.

Iranians were forced to create their own industries in the face of sanctions.

 

[prisonermonkeys]

If they did, then I doubt that they would use it. I know that there is a lot of inflammatory anti-Israeli rhetoric being thrown around - which has stopped since Rouhani was elected - but I think that most of it is born out of their distrust as Washington. Iran is opposed to what it sees as an illegitimate state, and when Israel has been so heavily supported by America, they likely see Israel as being a vehicle for American foreign policy to influence the Middle East. If America and Iran could reconcile their differences, I think we would all be surprised at how little they rally against Israel. They would continue to support the Palestinians, but there has been a cooling of the anti-Israeli sentiment as Washington has put some distance between America and Israel.

 

[Imari]

I do love when people thing these "agreements" will actually be held up.

They'll be held up as long as it's in the best interest of both parties to do so. That's why I asked what Iran was getting out of it, because unless there's enough incentive for them to actually comply then they'll just hide their nuclear facilities better next time.

You're right though, these sorts of agreements are not binding in any sense. The moment either side wants to break them, they will. If Iran were to suddenly find itself under military pressure and need nukes, this agreement would go straight out the window.

Nukes for most countries are mostly bargaining chips rather than actual tools, it just seems that Iran has managed to used the nuclear program itself as a bargaining chip before actually getting to the weapon stage. Good on them, that's good gamesmanship. Saves them a lot of money and time to get what they probably wanted in the first place anyway.