Iran had a rich and ancient history long before the adoption of Islam after the Arabs defeated their Zoroastrian rulers 1,350 years ago. There were positive links between the ancient Hebrews and the first Persian emperor, Cyrus, who liberated them from their captivity in Babylon. Israel hopes to weaponise Iranians’ non-Arabic identity as a way of emphasising the Ayatollahs’ putting Arab issues like Palestine ahead of Iranians’ national interest since the
fall of the Shah in 1979.
A potent mix of foreign setbacks and economic hardships could produce a variant of the Arab Spring popular uprisings in Iran – a Persian Autumn, if you will.
But we should remember the souring of the Arab Spring following the early optimism in 2011. Political infighting and sectarian splits emerged producing new authoritarian regimes in Tunisia and Egypt and civil war in Libya, Syria and Yemen. It would be naive to presume that regime change from below in Iran would necessarily produce harmony, democracy and prosperity there.
Understandably, people will hope anything must be better than the regime which produced such a dystopian mix of fundamentalism and cynicism.
Regime change would end sanctions and give a new government access to oil and gas revenues plus foreign investment which could revive the Iranian economy. But the Iranian state could face disintegration if its ethnic minorities – Kurds and Arabs in the west, and Baluchis in the southeast – see a collapse of the Ayatollahs’ regime as the moment to break away from the country. That could destabilise neighbouring states.
Iran’s biggest minority, Azeris, a third of the population, straddle the border with ex-Soviet Azerbaijan. They have so far aligned with Iran, and the Islamic Republic’s leaders, including Khamenei, have Azeri family links. But if Shiism ceases to be an integrating factor and family ties to a fallen regime no longer pull strings in Tehran, then Azeris might seek separation.
An independent, ex-Iranian Azerbaijan would be dangerous for Israel’s regional ally, ex-Soviet Azerbaijan, since its population would be five times greater and its capital, Tabriz, a more ancient centre of Azeri culture than Baku.
The danger that militant Iranian nationalism itself would rise out of the ruins of the Islamic Republic shouldn’t be ruled out.
What made the Ayatollahs’ regime formidable was its ability to synthesise Shiite fundamentalism with Iranian imperial patriotism. If the Islamic pillar collapses out of popular disillusion with the mullahs’ incompetence, corruption and external failure, Iranians might turn to nationalism, even if consecrated at the ballot box. They wouldn’t be the first nation to liberate themselves from one oppressive ideology only to fall for another.
But at least it is high time for Iranians to make their own mistakes freely. This autumn could be their chance.